Financial Integration and Scope Efficiency: Post Gramm-Leach-Bliley by Yuan, Yuan
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Risk Management and Insurance Dissertations Department of Risk Management and Insurance
8-16-2007
Financial Integration and Scope Efficiency: Post
Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Yuan Yuan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss
Part of the Insurance Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Risk Management and Insurance at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Risk Management and Insurance Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation








In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree 
from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available 
for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type.  
I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted 
by the author or, in his/her absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in his 
absence, by the Dean of the Robinson College of Business.  Such quoting, copying, or publishing 
must be solely for the scholarly purposes and does not involve potential financial gain.  It is 
understood that any copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential 















All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in 
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement. 
 
The author of this dissertation is: 
 
Yuan Yuan 
801 E Clay St, Apt# F1 
Whitewater, WI 53190 
 
The director of this dissertation is: 
 
Dr. Richard D. Phillips 
Chair, Department of Risk Management and Insurance 
Georgia State University 
35 Broad Street, 11th Floor  
Atlanta, GA 30303 






FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND SCOPE EFFICIENCY 












Doctor of Philosophy 
 




















GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 




























   II
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the YUAN YUAN Dissertation Committee.  
It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of Philosophy in Business 




H. Fenwick Huss 
Dean 





Richard D. Phillips, Chair 
 
Martin F. Grace 
 
Robert W. Klein 
 
Harold D. Skipper 
 




   III
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1            INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION……………………………..……… 1
CHAPTER 2            HISTORY OF U.S. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND GLB ACT……… 10
2.1.    DEFINITION OF BANCASSURANCE AND ASSURBANKING………………………………… 10
2.2.    INSURANCE INVOLVEMENT IN BANKING PRE-GLB………………………………………… 12
2.3.    BANK INVOLVEMENT IN INSURANCE PRE-GLB……………………………………………… 13
2.4.    GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999…………………………………………………………. 16
CHAPTER 3            LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………… 21
CHAPTER 4            CONSTRUCTION OF THE BANKING/INSURANCE DATABASE…… 25
CHAPTER 5            ASSURBANKS AND BANCASSURERS: WHO ARE THEY?.................. 27
5.1.    ASSURBANKS……………………………………………………………………………………… 27
5.2.    BANCASSURERS…………………………………………………………………………………… 28
CHAPTER 6            THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN INTEGRATION……………………… 30
6.1.    MARKET STRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF FIRMS……………………………… 30
6.2.    FIRM PERFORMANCE…………………………………………………………………………… 31
CHAPTER 7            THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN INTEGRATION………………………… 40
7.1.    MARKET STRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF FIRMS…………………………….. 41
7.2.    FIRM PERFORMANCE…………………………………………………………………………… 43
CHAPTER 8            SCOPE ECONOMIES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: A SURVEY
                                  OF THE EVIDENCE ………………………………………………………..…49
8.1.    COST SCOPE ECONOMIES……………………………………………………………………….. 50
8.2.    REVENUE SCOPE ECONOMIES…………………………………………………………………. 52
8.3.    PROFIT SCOPE ECONOMIES……………………………………………………………………… 54
CHAPTER 9            HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT…………………………………………. 56
CHAPTER 10          METHODOLOGY AND DATA……………………………………………… 62
10.1.ECONOMETRIC APPROACH……………………………………………………………...………… 62
10.2.DATA………………………………………………………………………………………...………… 67
10.3.ESTIMATION OF OUTPUTS, INPUTS, AND PRICES…………………………………….……… 67
CHAPTER 11          EMPIRICAL RESULTS……………………………………………………… 77
11.1.SCOPE ECONOMY ESTIMATES………………………………………………………...………… 77
11.2.REGRESSION ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………..……………… 81
CHAPTER 12          SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS……………………………………….… 88
      REFERENCE………………………………………………………………………………………… 93
      APPENDICES…………………………………………………………………………………………106  
   IV
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1. INSURANCE UNDERWRITING NET INCOME / TOTAL NET INCOME,                   
INSURANCE INCOME / NON-INTEREST INCOME………………………………… 106
TABLE 2. TOP 10 ASSURBANKS AND BANCASSURERS…………………………….…...…. 107
TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY NUMBER, ASSETS, PREMIUM, NET INCOME       
(LIFE-HEALTH INSURERS)……………………………………………………..……... 108
TABLE 3.1. DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY NUMBER, ASSETS, PREMIUM, NET INCOME       
(PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURERS)………………………………..…………….….. 109
TABLE 4. FIRM SIZE BY TOTAL ASSET, PREMIUM, NET INCOME                                          
(LIFE-HEALTH INSURERS)……………………………………………………….…… 110
TABLE 4.1. FIRM SIZE BY TOTAL ASSET, PREMIUM, NET INCOME                                
(PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURERS)…………………………………..………….….. 111
TABLE 5. A.M. BEST RATING……………………………………………………………...…..… 112
TABLE 6. GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION: NUMBER OF STATES INSURERS                
LICENCED IN………………………………………………………………………...….. 113
TABLE 7. NUMBER OF AFFILIATED VS. NON-AFFILIATED BY INSURANCE LINES           
(LIFE-HEALTH INSURERS)…………………………………………………….…..….. 114
TABLE 7.1. NUMBER OF AFFILIATED VS. NON-AFFILIATED BY INSURANCE LINES           
(PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURERS)……………………………..……………….….. 115
TABLE 8. INSURERS PRODUCTS CONCENTRATION HERFINDAHL INDEX (FOCUSED      
VS. MULTI-LINES)………………………………………………………………..….…. 116
TABLE 9. INSURERS RETURN ON ASSET (ROA), RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE)………....... 117
TABLE 10.1. INSURERS PROFITABILITY TEST……………………………………….…….…...... 118
TABLE 10.2. INSURERS LEVERAGE TEST…………………………………………….……...…….. 119
TABLE 10.3. INSURERS LIQUIDITY TEST…………………………………………..…………....… 120
TABLE 11. DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY NUMBER, ASSETS, DEPOSITS,                                
AND NET INCOME (COMMERCIAL BANKS)………………………………….….. 121
TABLE 11.1. DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY NUMBER, ASSETS, DEPOSITS,                                
NET INCOME (THRIFTS)………..………………………………………...…………… 122
TABLE 12. FIRM SIZE BY ASSETS, TOTAL DEPOSITS, NET INCOME ($M)                         
(COMMERCIAL BANKS)…………………………………………………………..…... 123
TABLE 12.1. FIRM SIZE BY ASSETS, TOTAL DEPOSITS, NET INCOME ($M)     
(THRIFTS)………………………………………………….…………………………..… 124
TABLE 13. TOTAL DEPOSITS, INTEREST BEARING DEPOSITS, TOTAL LOAN & 
LEASE……………………………………………..………………………………...…... 125
TABLE 13.1. INTEREST INCOME AND NON-INTEREST INCOME………….....……………….. 127
TABLE 14. BANKS OPERATING PERFORMANCE:  RETURN ON ASSET (ROA),                
RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE),  NET OPERATING INCOME TO ASSETS …......…. 129
TABLE 14.1. BANKS OPERATION PERFORMANCE: INTEREST MARGIN, AND                          
NON-INTEREST MARGIN………………………………………...…………...………. 131
TABLE 14.2. BANKS OPERATION PERFORMANCE: RBC RATIO, NET LOAN TO                   




   V
TABLE 15. PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE OUTPUTS AND LINES OF BUSINESS 
DEFINITIONS………………………………………………………………….…...……. 134
TABLE 16. DATA SAMPLE STATISTICS……………………………………………………….... 135
TABLE 17. OUTPUTS AND INPUTS MEASURERS………………………………..………..…… 136
TABLE 18. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES IN COMPOSITE FUNCTION 
ESTIMATION - COMMERCIAL BANKS…………………………………………….. 138
TABLE 19. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES IN COMPOSITE FUNCTION 
ESTIMATION - THRIFT SAVING BANKS……………………………….………….. 139
TABLE 20. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES IN COMPOSITE FUNCTION 
ESTIMATION - LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.……………………………….…. 140
TABLE 21. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES IN COMPOSITE FUNCTION 
ESTIMATION - PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES ..…….……. 141
TABLE 22. COST, REVENUE, AND PROFIT SCOPE ECONOMY ESTIMATES………...….…. 142
TABLE 23. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF REGRESSION VARIABLES…………………...…. 143
TABLE 24. SCOPE ECONOMIES REGRESSION ANALYSIS – JOINT FIRMS…………....…… 144  
 
   VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BCAR Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio 
BHC Bank Holding Company 
BHCA Bank Holding Company Act of 1956   
BHCFR Bank Holding Company Financial Report 
CALL Commercial Banks Call Report 
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CBs Commercial Banks 
CD Certificate of Deposit 
CEBA Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987   
EU European Union 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Company 
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991  
FEDSR Federal Reserve Structure Report 
FHC Financial Holding Company 
FRB Federal Reserve Board 
GAO General Accounting Office 
GLB Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999   
GSA Glass-Steagall Act of 1933   
GSGA Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982   
LOMA Life Office Management Association 
M&As Merge and Acquisitions 
NAIC National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
NAICS North American Industry Classification System  
NBA National Banking Act of 1864   
NICHR National Information Center Hierarchy Report 
NPW Net Premium Written 
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
OTS Office of Thrift Supervision 
PHS Policy Holder Surplus 
P-B Pulley and Braunstein (1992) composite model 
RBC Risk Based Capital 
ROA Return on Assets 
ROE Return on Equity 
SBs Thrift Saving Banks 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification  
SLHC Saving and Loan Holding Company 
SLHCA Savings and Loan Holding Company Act of 1967   
TFR Thrift Financial Report 
THCFR Thrift Holding Company Structure Report 
  













Committee Chair: Dr. Richard D. Phillips 
 
Major Department:  Risk Management & Insurance 
 
The enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 promised the most fundamental 
reform to be made in U.S. financial services regulation in more than half a century. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) removed barriers that forced separation between commercial banks, 
investment banks, and insurance companies; and it allowed subsidiaries of banks or insurance 
companies to engage in a broad range of financial activities that were not permitted for banks or 
insurers themselves. Few doubted the potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial 
service providers and on the financial market. However, there is a striking lack of empirical 
research on the effects of diversification by financial firms. The first goal of this dissertation is to 
identify domestic “assurbanks” (insurers owning banks) and “bancassurers” (banks owning 
insurers) and to identify the unique subsidiaries of financial services companies licensed as  
commercial banks, thrifts, or insurance companies in the U.S. We construct a unique dataset that 
links the banking and insurance regulatory datasets. A second objective is to investigate the 
effects of integrating the banking and insurance sectors of the U.S. economy. We evaluate the 
market structure and operating performance of financial institutions in the integrated banking and 
insurance industry. Gains from exploiting scope economies and product mix efficiencies are 
   VIII
often cited as motives for financial institution integration. A third objective is to estimate 
efficiency effects from the economies of scope across the two formally separate sectors by 
estimating multi-product costs, revenue, and profit functions.  The final objective is to test 
whether scope economies exist for firms that jointly produce financial products across multiple 
sectors and to explain the variation of scope economy estimations. 
The empirical evidence suggests that both domestic assurbanks and bancassurers are 
large in size and count for a significant portion of the banking and insurance market share. These 
firms are also more diversified in terms of their traditional products with a focus on personal line 
products. Large bancassurers appear more interested in investing in small-size life and property-
liability subsidiaries. Large assurbanks are more interested in acquiring small-size thrifts. Banks 
prefer to affiliate with life insurance more than property-liability insurance, and insurers are 
more likely to affiliate with thrift saving banks than to affiliate with commercial banks. 
Diversified firms have higher profitability in their traditional lines of business. Bancassurers 
perform well in the insurance business, but most assurbanks lose money in their banking 
division. The scope economy results; investigating consumption complementarities suggests that 
a significant number of cost scope diseconomies, revenue scope economies, and weak profit 
scope economies exist in the post-GLB U.S. integrated banking and insurance sectors. The scope 
economies are variant among firms, and certain firm characteristics (size, business portfolio, 
geographic diversification, product mix and diversification, insurance distribution system, and 
X-efficiency) are the determinants of scope economies. 
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 CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
When the landmark financial service reform legislation, the Financial Service Modernization 
Act1 (known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), was passed in 1999, it was viewed as the 
culmination of years of effort to reform the U.S. financial service industry and the most 
significant legislation in decades to affect the financial service industry. GLB repealed the 66-
year old Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) of 19332 and eliminated the restrictions on affiliation between 
commercial banks and investment banks. GLB substantially modified the 43-year old Bank 
Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 19563 and removed barriers which forced separation between 
commercial banks and insurance companies. It allowed subsidiaries of bank holding companies, 
insurance companies, investment banks, and other types of financial institutions to engage in a 
broad range of financial activities that were not permitted before.  
The potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial services providers were 
great, and as the end of 2003—under the GLB Act—more than 600 companies operated as 
Financial Holding Companies (FHC), which represented 78 percent of the total assets of all Bank 
Holding Companies (BHC).  In addition, more than 1,300 FHCs/BHCs became engaged in 
insurance agency or underwriting activities under the Act. In addition, by the end of 2003, more 
than 2,500 insurance companies (either through agents or through risk bearing underwriters) 
were affiliated with commercial banks and thrift institutions.4 Today, financial service 
consumers can choose from a broadening array of financial tools and from companies either 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
2 Pub. L. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
3 Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956). 
4 BHC Statutory Financial Report (multiple years); Federal Reserve Report to Congress, 2003 
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aiming to serve their multiple needs or companies specializing in one or two types of financial 
products. Thus, looking at GLB on a superficial level, given the changes that had already taken 
place, it appears to have produced radical changes in the insurance and banking industries.  
When GLB passed, it was expected to spur waves of cross-sector mergers (M&As). 
However, massive cross-sector M&As did not occur. Instead, banks bought specialized securities 
firms and acquired insurance agencies and brokerages rather than acquiring insurance 
underwriting companies as had been predicted. Banks now control some of the largest insurance 
brokerages companies. Insurance companies applied for new thrift charters instead of 
commercial bank charters. After GLB, some firms even chose to de-converge. In 2002, Citigroup 
spun off the property/casualty insurance unit of Travelers, and St. Paul Companies bought the 
insurance unit from Citigroup in 2003. Later in 2005, Citigroup announced it was selling 
Travelers Life & Annuity to MetLife. The different activities of financial institutions following 
GLB and the effects we observed in the market raise important policy and research questions on 
the motivations and consequences of integration and the optimal structure of the financial 
services industry.   
Some of the U.S. financial regulations have resulted mainly from historical circumstance 
while others have been designed to attain certain policy objectives. For instance, prior to the 
1920s, the free banking approach was dominant in U.S. banking. Commercial banks were 
explicitly permitted to engage in security activities until the 1929 stock market.  It was argued 
that abuse in the securities activities of commercial banks was the primary catalyst behind the 
banking industry collapse. The subsequent 1933 Banking Act established a wall between 
commercial banking and investment banking after the failure of 11,000 banks. For the past 
century, the insurance industry has opposed bank entry into the insurance business. They feared 
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that banks would enjoy unfair competitive advantages since national banks were regulated 
federally while insurers were subject to varying state regulations regarding capital and licensing 
requirements. Hence, prior to the enactment of GLB, U.S. financial services were statutorily 
fragmented into three broad sectors: banking, insurance, and securities. 
There have been several historical arguments against U.S. financial services industry 
reform. Consumer advocates feared that financial conglomeration would have negative 
implications for consumers. For example, they warned that using just one provider would 
weaken customer’s power to negotiate and could jeopardize people’s life savings if handled by 
inadequately trained salespersons. Thus, one-stop shopping would cost consumers more than it 
would save them. Consumer advocates also pointed out the risks of privacy information abuse. In 
order to exploit conglomeration synergistic gains, sharing customer information and databases 
was expected. It was feared that affiliates would share customer information inappropriately and 
without informed consent. If consumers were not provided with some form of protection, they 
could be subjected to a heightened risk of unwanted solicitation, credit fraud, and identity theft. 
Their concerns were triggered by the loss of existing privacy legislation. For example, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act of 19975 allowed affiliates to share information and gave the consumer the 
right to “opt-out” of cross-selling arrangements.  
Over time, the financial industry headed towards consolidation. Such convergence was 
spurred by the changes that had been taking place in the market since the 1980s, including 
advancing technology, financial innovations, increased competition, changing customer’s needs, 
financial globalization, and deregulation in other industrialized countries. Financial services 
institutions wanted to offer a broad array of financial products and services. The products of 
banks, insurers and security firms could no longer be functionally separated. The existing 
                                                 
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 6806. 
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regulatory structure needed to be changed as the traditional lines that separated these segments 
had been crossed due to the development of new financial products.6 The country advanced 
financial reform in spite of the lack of financial modernization legislation. The Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) began to explore the possible expansions of bank insurance 
power.7 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) liberally granted thrift charters so that entities 
could enlarge their financial service offerings. In addition, industry leaders moved forward on 
their own.  The merger of Travelers and Citicorp in 1998 increased the pressure on Congress to 
pass the financial services modernization act.8 The anti-affiliation laws were eventually repealed 
by GLB in 1999. Privacy advocates successfully petitioned Congress for limits on the use of 
nonpublic personal information. Such curbs on the use of this nonpublic personal information are 
built into the GLB Act.9   
A debate exists among researchers about the motives for diversification. According to the 
theoretical justifications for diversification, the existence of certain imperfections in the product 
or capital markets is one set of explanations for a diversification strategy. Diversified production 
can provide various potential benefits, such as a reduction in transaction costs (Coase, 1937), the 
creation of internal capital markets (Stein, 1997), the expansion of the managerial skills of 
managers (Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor, 1999), the increase in operating efficiency through 
economies of scope and scale (Teece, 1980), the concentration of market power (Villalonga, 
2000), the increase in debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971), and the decrease of expected taxes 
                                                 
6 For example, variable rate annuities incorporate features of both insurance and investment products. 
7 For example, based on Section 92 of the National Banking Act, OCC Interpretive Letter 366 (1986) stated that 
national banks may sell insurance to customers residing outside small towns where their main offices or branches 
were located. 
8 Citicorp and Travelers Group publicly announced their merger on the morning of April 6, 1998. The combined 
company was named Citigroup (“Citicorp, Travelers Group to merger,” Dow Jones Newswires, 6 April 1998 at 7:03 
a.m.). 
9 The privacy provisions of GLB are located in Title V (the Financial Privacy Law). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 
(2000). 
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(Flannery, Houston, and Venkataraman, 1993). An alternative explanation assumes conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders, where managers choose to diversify out of a self-
interest to increase their compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), power and prestige (Jensen, 
1986).  Diversifying make their positions more secure as they make investments using their 
specialized skills (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990a, b); diversifying reduces the risk of their personal 
investment portfolios by reducing risk for the firm since the managers cannot reduce their own 
risk by diversifying their portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
Proponents of financial integration claim that it provides discipline to corporate 
management, helps corporations restructure more efficiently than stock markets, allows 
economies of scale and scope, and promotes financial stability and economic development. 
Proponents argue that earnings diversification can lower the cost of capital and raise the debt 
capacity of the firm. Internal capital markets are said to be less prone to information asymmetries 
and other market imperfections than external markets (Williamson, 1970; Gertner, Scharfstein, 
and Stein, 1994). Opponents question the theorized cost advantages, and they believe that 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, as well as, conflicts in market power 
concentration may lead to lower efficiency. 
Economic and finance theories have discussed the potential effects of diversifying 
consolidation, and there exists extensive literature exploring the impact of diversifying 
transactions by non-financial firms on firm value (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Servaes, 1996; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Chevalier, 1999; Hyland and Diltz, 2002; 
Villalonga, 2004) and on productive efficiency (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987; Lichtenberg, 
1992; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002; Schoar, 2002).  
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However, there is a significant lack of empirical research on the effects of diversification 
by financial firms. Carow (2001a) and Johnston and Madura (2000) found an increase in the 
stock prices of both the acquirer and the target; they noted gains to banks, insurers, and 
brokerage firms in response to the Citicorp–Travelers merger, which joined a commercial bank 
with an insurer, both of which also conducted securities underwriting.  Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) found significant market value gains associated with M&As between banks and insurers 
in Europe. The remaining available research of financial integration, however, has mostly 
focused on “within-sector” diversification, e.g., providing deposits and loans by a commercial 
bank (Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996) or providing property-liability and life insurance 
products within an insurance group (Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000). Seven years after 
the passage of GLB, the specific ways in which GLB has affected the U.S. financial system are 
still widely open to question. There is still no comprehensive study analyzing the effect of GLB 
or one investigating the post-GLB market structure and the performance of financial institutions 
manufacturing multiple financial products.  
One of the important elements in the current debate is the effect integration has on the 
efficiency of financial institutions. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide the first set of 
evidence to inform this debate. In this research, we estimate economies of scope of the cross-
sector integration in the post-GLB U.S. financial services industry across costs, revenue and 
profit measures. Gains from exploiting scope economies and product mix efficiencies are often 
cited as motives for financial institution integration. Scope efficiency gains can be created by 
sharing such physical inputs as computers, furniture, or offices; employing common information 
systems, distribution systems, advertisement departments, or investment departments; reusing 
managerial expertise; obtaining external capital by issuing securities in larger sizes; providing 
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consumption complementarities (“one-stop shopping” convenience) to customers. However, 
scope diseconomies may also arise at the same time because of higher administration and 
coordination expenses, organizational diseconomies, cross-subsidization in internal capital 
markets, or they may arise because of the loss of specialized expertise for customers needing  
tailored products.  
Since the 1990s, substantial research has been devoted to measuring the productive 
efficiency of financial institutions, particularly in commercial banks. Literally hundred of studies 
have been conducted to estimate various measures of efficiency of financial institutions located 
in more than two-dozen countries.10 However, there is little research on the efficiency effects of 
integrating providers of different categories of financial services into universal-type 
organizations. The little evidence that exists is extrapolated either from scope efficiency within 
one sector of the financial industry, e.g., the commercial banking (Berger, Hanweck, and 
Humphrey, 1987; Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996) 
or the insurance industry (Grace and Timme, 1992; Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000), or 
from simulations of risk diversification benefits of diversifying integration in the absence of any 
synergistic gains (Kwast, 1989; Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Whalen, 1999b; Allen and 
Jagtiani, 2000; Lown, Osler, Strahan, and Sufi, 2000). To the best of our knowledge, this 
research is the first to evaluate the costs, revenue and profit scope economies resulting from 
cross-sector integration in the post-GLB U.S. financial service industry. 
We utilize a two-stage econometric method to investigate economies of scope. The 
analysis proceeds as follows. We first estimate costs, revenue, and profit scope economy scores 
using econometric functions. Then, in the second stage, the scores from the first stage are 
                                                 
10 Berger and Humphrey (1997) critically reviewed more than 130 studies and summarized empirical efficiency 
estimates of financial institutions in 21 countries. 
   7
regressed upon a set of variables describing firm characteristics and environments.11 The second 
stage regression allows us to test whether scope economies exist for firms that jointly produced 
financial products across multiple sectors and allows us to explain the variation of scope 
economy estimations. 
A likely reason empirical research on the integration of the banking and insurance sectors 
is so scarce is because the regulatory data sets available to study this issue are product specific, 
and there is no convenient way to identify companies affiliated with one another across sectors.  
Thus, the first effort in our study is to construct a unique dataset which links the insurance 
regulatory data sets available from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) with the bank regulatory data sets from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The combined 
data set exists for of all financial conglomerates (bancassurers and assurbanks), specialist banks, 
and specialist insurers in the U.S. banking and insurance industry during the years 2003, 2004, 
and 2005. In addition, the existence of the combined data set will facilitate academic research to 
document the economic outcomes of combining formerly separate sectors of the financial service 
industry.   
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the history of U.S. financial 
integration and reviews GLB and its effects on the U.S. banking and insurance industries. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and research on GLB and U.S. financial market integration. 
Chapter 4 describes the construction of the dataset. In Chapter 5, we identify the relevant firms in 
both the banking and insurance markets. Chapters 6 and 7 present the market analysis and 
                                                 
11 The two-stage procedure used literature explaining the differences in efficiency. Bank studies include Aly et al. 
(1990), Berger et al. (1993), Pi and Timme (1993), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1995), Mester (1996), and Berger and 
Hannan (1998). Thrift institution studies include Cebenoyan et al. (1993a, 1993b), Mester (1993), and Hermalin and 
Wallace (1994). Insurance firm studies include Garder and Grace (1993), Berger et al. (2000), and Cummins et al. 
(2003). 
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discuss the results. Chapter 8 discusses the concept of scope economies and reviews the prior 
research relevant to the U.S. financial services industry. In Chapter 9, we develop the testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 10 explains the estimation methodologies and the data set used and outlines 
the estimation of inputs, outputs, and prices. Chapter 11 reports the scope economies estimation 
results and discusses the regression results. Chapter 12 offers conclusions. 
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 CHAPTER 2   
HISTORY OF U.S. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND GLB ACT 
Prior to 1999, U.S. financial services were statutorily separated into three broad sectors: banking, 
insurance, and securities. The securities sector was one area of the financial services industry that 
exhibited significant crossover with banks. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 established a wall 
between commercial banking and investment banking after the failure of 11,000 commercial 
banks. The 1933 Act prohibited banks from principally engaging in underwriting securities. 
However, in 1986 the FRB eased these restrictions by raising the limits of bank-ineligible 
securities activities to less than 5 percent of BHC’s total revenue. The revenue limit was raised to 
10 percent in 1989 and to 25 percent in 1996. These securities subsidiaries are called “Section 20 
companies.” 
Unlike affiliations between banks and securities companies, affiliations between banks and 
insurance companies have been highly restricted since the early 1900s. GLB totally lifted 
barriers which restricted competition across financial sectors. Because of the lack of data for 
security firms relevant to insurance and banking, this dissertation focuses on the integration 
across U.S. banking and insurance sectors. In this section, we investigate the background and 
regulatory history of financial service integration in the U.S. banking and insurance sectors. We 
trace how banks became involved in insurance activities and how insurers have expanded their 
traditional business to offer banking products. 
2.1. DEFINITION OF BANCASSURANCE AND ASSURBANKING  
A financial conglomerate is commonly defined as any group of companies under common 
management control that provides services, predominantly in two or more of the three major 
   10
financial services sectors.12 In this dissertation, we differentiate between bank-initiated and 
insurer-initiated financial conglomerates and, therefore, define bancassurance and assurbanking 
as follows: Bancassurance is the process of a bank selling insurance products manufactured by 
insurance subsidiaries that are owned by the bank, either through its own distribution channels or 
through outside agents. Assurbanking is the process of an insurance company selling banking 
products manufactured by banking subsidiaries that are owned by the insurer. Instead of focusing 
on distribution and cross-selling, our definition focuses on the manufacturing of cross-sector 
financial service product, and encompasses integration of production, management, and 
controlling rights.  
Thus, we differentiate from other studies that have defined the integration of banking and 
insurance in other ways. For example, financial integration has been defined as a financial 
service group participating in more than one of the major sectors of the financial service industry 
(e.g., commercial banking, insurance underwriting, investment banking) either in-house or in 
separately capitalized subsidiaries of the group.13 Diversification of a financial company occurs 
when a financial institution expands beyond its traditional or existing business to new business 
activities, either in its primary financial sector (concentric diversification) or in other financial 
sectors (conglomerate diversification).14 In contrast, universal banking is the term commonly 
used to refer to diversified bank institutions in the European Union (EU) that manufacture and 
distribute diversified cross-sector financial services.15  
 
                                                 
12 Skipper and Kwon (2007), p. 656. 
13 Financial integration can also be referred as “financial conglomeration” or “conglomerate diversification.” 
14 In the literature, “diversification” often refers to geographical diversification, horizontal diversification, vertical 
integration, concentric diversification, business diversification, or conglomerate diversification.  
15 Unlike universal banks in the other EU countries, German universal banks are allowed to hold equity stakes in 
both financial and non-financial firms (Vander Vennet, 2002). 
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2.2. INSURANCE INVOLVEMENT IN BANKING PRE-GLB 
Insurance companies have been highly constrained in their ability to penetrate the banking 
market compared to the access of their banking counterparts. In the early 1900s, in New York 
(and some other states), policies restricted the ability of insurance companies to invest in 
common stocks. Insurance companies were required to divest themselves of bank stocks and 
were prohibited from acting as underwriters for securities or engaging in securities syndications. 
In competition with banks, insurance companies in the 1950s began entering the home mortgage 
market and made loans to corporations. In the 1960s, a series of M&As occurred in the insurance 
industry, which sometimes involved non-insurance businesses, including banks and thrifts. In 
response, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) approved a model 
insurance holding company statue, designed to impose restrictions on companies intending to 
acquire insurers and to target companies insurers intended to acquire. The model statue was 
subsequently adopted by most states. Under the model statue, the state regulator had the power to 
oversee the activities of an insurance holding company and its non-insurance subsidiaries.  
Prior to GLB, in an effort to meet bank competition, insurers found ways around the 
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) prohibition of affiliating banking and insurance activities. 
The most popular strategy involved insurers acquiring unitary thrift holding companies, non-
bank banks, and limited purpose trust companies. The Savings and Loan Holding Company Act 
(SLHCA) of 196716 provided that a company owning only a single thrift institution was a unitary 
thrift holding company and was not subject to any restrictions on other activities undertaken. 
Therefore, an insurance company or its holding company could legally purchase a single thrift. A 
second strategy allowing insurers to enter banking was to operate non-bank banks. The BHCA of 
1956 defined a bank as an institution that “both accepted demand deposits and made commercial 
                                                 
16 Pub. L. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968). 
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loans.” Insurance companies exploited this definition by establishing a non-bank bank that either 
accepted saving deposits but not demand deposits, or one that made consumer loans but not 
commercial loans.17 A third strategy was to establish a limited purpose trust company, which 
was not considered a bank if it accepted only trust funds (not demand deposits) and did not offer 
FDIC insurance on these deposits. 
2.3. BANK INVOLVEMENT IN INSURANCE PRE-GLB 
From a historical perspective, BHCs, national banks, state-chartered banks and thrift saving 
banks have long possessed federal permission to engage in a range of insurance activities.18 In 
this section, we review the regulation and legislation on BHCs, national banks, state banks, and 
thrifts, respectively. 
In 1916, Congress amended the National Banking Act (NBA) of 1864.19 Section 92 of 
NBA prescribed the legislative scheme for giving national banks the authority to sell insurance. 
National banks were empowered to locate and sell insurance in any place with a population of no 
more than 5,000 – the famous “place of 5,000” provision. During the era of the Great 
Depression, banking and securities activities were separated, and affiliations between 
commercial banks and securities companies were prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.20 
For BHCs, Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 195621 permitted 
BHCs to engage in activities of a “financial, fiduciary or insurance nature,” which included 
                                                 
17 In 1987, the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA), Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987), redefined “bank” 
to include any institution with FDIC deposit insurance. However, CEBA grandfathered non-bank banks existing 
before March 5, 1987, also known as CEBA banks.  
18 The banking industry has a dual chartering system and is regulated at both the state and federal levels. The 
National Banking Act of 1864 provides for a system of banks to be chartered by the federal or state governments. 
State chartered banks may conduct business under the mandates of state law. Nationally chartered banks are 
empowered to engage in a specific set of activities under the National Banking Act. Their parent holding companies 
are regulated under the BHCA by the Federal Reserve Board. The BHCs and their non-banking subsidiaries business 
(such as finance and mortgage companies), before GLB, were also limited to those closely related to banking. 
19 Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864). 
20 The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks from being principally engaged in underwriting securities. 
21 Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956). 
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insurance agency activities. However, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) still did not approve the 
general insurance underwriting for BHCs during 1950 to 1970.  
In 1971, the FRB first promulgated the list of permissible non-banking activities for 
BHCs, including permissible insurance activities in what was known as Regulation Y. However, 
a decade later, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Act (GSGA) of 198222 that rolled back 
Regulation Y and prohibited BHCs from providing insurance as principal underwriters, agents or 
brokers, with the following exemptions: BHCs could underwrite and sell credit life insurance, 
credit accident and health insurance, and mortgage related insurance; BHCs could act as agent or 
broker for property insurance on loan collateral; BHCs could sell general insurance in towns of 
less than 5,000 inhabitants; small BHCs with total assets of less than $50 million could engage in 
any insurance agency activities, except for annuities and life insurance sales; and BHCs engaging 
in insurance agency activities engaged in before 1982 were allowed to continue.23 Under 
Regulation K, BHCs were permitted to underwrite or sell any type of insurance overseas without 
restriction and were also allowed to own foreign insurance companies.24
National banks, which are chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), could be owned by a BHC and could exercise the powers contained in the National 
Banking Act and the regulations promulgated by the OCC. There are two sources of authority for 
national banks to engage in insurance activities: Section 24 of the National Banking Act and the 
“place of 5,000” exception in Section 92 of the National Banking Act. Section 24 did not permit 
national banks to engage in insurance agency or underwriting business in general. However, the 
                                                 
22 Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). 
23 The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 grandfathered insurance agency activities specifically engaged in before May 
1, 1982, with strict limitation.  Insurance agency activities specifically engaged in before January 1, 1971, were fully 
grandfathered without limitation of product type or geographic location. However, this grandfather privilege was not 
transferable. 
24 The FRB intended to improve the international competitiveness of U.S. banking organizations by expanding 
permissible activities abroad and by reducing regulatory burden associated with the conduct of such activities. 
BHCs, therefore, could establish offshore subsidiaries to engage in insurance abroad. 
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OCC recognized exceptions to this general rule and approved the underwriting and selling of title 
insurance, credit related insurance,25 and mortgage guaranty reinsurance, as well as acted as an 
agent in the sale of municipal bond insurance, mortgage reinsurance, and crop insurance. Since 
1986, the OCC expanded national banks’ insurance powers under the “place of 5,000” exception 
in Section 92 by allowing national banks or their branches, located in any place with a 
population of 5000 or less, to sell insurance to their customers located anywhere in the nation. 
State banks are chartered by individual states, and the ability of state banks to diversify 
into the insurance industry varies by state. For years, a number of states allowed their state banks 
to provide insurance services to their customers. For example, South Dakota and Delaware led 
the way in authorizing insurance activities for banks chartered in their states. In 1991, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)26 limited the activities of 
any FDIC-insured state-chartered banks acting as a principal to those activities permissible for 
national banks. However, state-chartered banks could still engage in agency activities authorized 
by state-chartered authorities. Other insurance activities could be authorized under FDICIA if 
permitted under state law. FDICIA specifically prohibited state banks from underwriting 
insurance except to the extent permitted for national banks and grandfathered underwriting 
activities. By the end of 1998, 40 states allowed state banks to operate insurance agencies, 
increasing from 22 states in 1995. 
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is the regulatory supervisor of federally chartered 
saving banks and federal and state-chartered saving associations and their holding companies.27 
Since the 1970s, insurance selling has been a pre-approved activity for thrift institutions. Under 
                                                 
25 These products included credit life, health and accident insurance, mortgage life and disability insurance. National 
banks were allowed to sell crop insurance through insurance agencies without geographic restriction. 
26 Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). 
27 Saving institutions include saving banks and saving associations, and throughout this dissertation we refer to them 
as saving institutions or thrift saving banks. 
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federal law, thrifts may engage in non-thrift activities through their service corporation 
subsidiaries. Multiple savings and loan holding companies28 were generally limited in their non-
thrift activities, but they were permitted to engage in insurance agency business. However, a 
unitary savings and loan holding company and its non-thrift subsidiaries were not restricted with 
respect to the activities they could engage in. Thus, unitary savings and loan holding companies 
could legally own insurance companies (either agents or risk-bearing underwriters). By 
purchasing one, and only one, thrift institution, insurance companies could obtain a license with 
the OTS as a unitary savings and loan holding company. 
In summary, insurance companies in the U.S. have historically had a difficult time 
offering a wide range of banking products prior to the passage of GLB. Banks, however, could 
act as agents or brokers selling insurance products but were severely limited in what they could 
do as far as underwriting insurance products. Given regulations prohibiting most banks from 
producing insurance prior to GLB, some U.S. banks attempted to enter the insurance business by 
designing new products, which incorporated insurance features. These insurance-like products 
included, for example, municipal bond guarantee insurance, which was allowed by the OCC in 
1985, and the CD (certificate of deposit) annuity introduced by several small banks, which 
permitted the annuitization of an amount deposited into a CD. 
2.4. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999 
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The 
law allowed banks of all sizes to be able to offer their customers a wide range of financial 
products and services manufactured by the same financial service conglomerate. In addition, 
other types of financial companies – insurance and securities companies, or even, financial 
                                                 
28 A multiple savings and loan holding company controls directly or indirectly two or more federally or state-
chartered thrift institutions insured by FDIC. 
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technology companies were able to more readily form into a single financial operation. 
Numerous financial products across sectors were now permitted to be manufactured under one 
roof. 
2.4.1. IMPACT ON BANKS ENTERING INSURANCE 
GLB provides two vehicles to allow financial institutions to engage in new types of financial 
activities or to affiliate with other financial companies: financial holding companies (FHCs) and 
financial subsidiaries. FHCs, the more flexible of the two possibilities, may engage in new 
activities that are financial in nature, including banking, merchant banking, securities, insurance 
underwriting or agency through a holding company affiliate regulated by the Federal Reserve 
Board. BHCs can apply and elect to be FHCs and then conduct all activities permitted under 
GLB and BHCA. These activities must be 1) financial in nature or incidental to such financial 
activity or 2) complementary to a financial activity and present no substantial risk to the safety or 
soundness of the financial institutions or the financial system. As of March 11, 2000, the date 
GLB went into effect, the FRB announced the list of the first 117 FHCs.29   
GLB provides banks with the alternative of using a subsidiary rather than an FHC as the 
vehicle for conducting new financial activities. A financial subsidiary, which can engage in most 
of the newly-authorized activities, must be a direct subsidiary of a bank. The most important 
difference between the FHC and the financial subsidiary is that the latter is prohibited from 
engaging in certain financial activities as a "principal.” Therefore, there is no requirement that a 
bank organization has to be part of an FHC to engage in new activities (except for prohibited 
activities30) through a financial subsidiary. Under GLB, neither a national bank nor its 
subsidiaries may underwrite insurance unless underwriting was permitted by the OCC rulings 
                                                 
29 Federal Reserve Board statistic release. 
30 The prohibited activities are insurance underwriting and annuity issuance, real estate development or investment, 
and merchant banking.  
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before January 1, 1999. National banks may still act as an insurance agent in offices of the 
national bank located in a place of less than 5,000 inhabitants. In general, state banks are 
prohibited by the FDICIA from engaging in insurance underwriting even if permitted under state 
law, except to the extent that the activity is permitted for national banks. The new insurance 
underwriting restrictions for national banks in GLB also restrict the underwriting ability of state 
banks. A state bank may also own a subsidiary that engages in activities comparable to those 
permitted by GLB for the financial subsidiaries of national banks.31
The GLB Act substantially expands the ability of a bank to affiliate with any financial 
institution, such as an insurance company or a security firm. However, with limited exceptions, 
GLB withholds the longstanding prohibition on a bank affiliating with commercial companies. 
Recognizing that thrift institutions have become much more like banks, GLB also prohibits a 
commercial company from affiliating with a thrift institution and specifically acquiring a thrift 
institution through the "unitary thrift holding company" vehicle.32
2.4.2. IMPACT ON INSURERS ENTERING BANKING 
An insurance company and its holding company may take advantage of GLB and apply 
to become an FHC so that it may begin manufacturing banking products. If an insurance 
company elects to become an FHC, it may continue to engage in all prior lawful non-banking 
activities in which it was engaging as of September 30, 1999. In addition, insurance companies 
still have the option to expand into the banking industry through the vehicle of saving and loan 
holding companies (SLHC). Following GLB, the OTS ruled that SLHCs are eligible under GLB 
                                                 
31 A grandfather provision allows state banks to retain their existing subsidiaries, which may or may not qualify as a 
financial subsidiaries, and to continue to engage in activities lawfully conducted before the enactment of GLB. 
32 GLB grandfathers any commercial company that was a unitary thrift holding company as of May 4, 1999 or had 
an application pending at the OTS to become a unitary thrift holding company as of that date. 
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to engage in the same list of financial activities permissible for FHCs.33 SLHCs generally are 
subject to revenue and other restrictions applicable to BHCs and have to abide by conditions 
imposed by the Federal Reserve on FHCs.  
Since the passage of GLB, the majority of insurers that have entered the banking sector 
have done so by using SLHCs instead of FHCs. By 2005, more than 40 insurers were approved 
by the OTS as SLHCs and engaged in banking business through their thrift subsidiaries.34 Only 
one insurance company, MetLife, chose to become an FHC and own a small commercial bank. 
The most likely reason for this is the regulatory burden. FHCs and commercial banks are 
regulated by various regulators. For example, federally chartered commercial banks are regulated 
by the OCC; state chartered commercial banks are regulated by the state banking regulatory 
authorities; insured commercial banks are also monitored by FDIC, and FHCs are regulated by 
the Federal Reserve. However, the only regulator for thrifts and SLHCs is the OTS. In addition, 
thrifts have much more freedom in establishing branches and offices nationwide. Thrifts may do 
business in any state in the nation without restrictions. In order to expand business to other states, 
commercial banks have to meet different requirements imposed by different states, e.g., branch 
restrictions.  
Another aspect of GLB, which facilitates insurance companies’ entry into banking via an 
FHC, is the provision permitting mutual insurance companies to re-domesticate to another state 
for the purpose of converting to a stock company. An insurance company organized in a mutual 
organizational form may wish to convert to a stock company form to obtain access to equity 
capital and related financing alternatives (convertible debentures, warrants, or preferred stock) 
from the capital market. These financial alternatives are necessary to expand the financial 
                                                 
33 Federal Register, November 8, 2001 issue. 
34 Thrift Holding Company Structure Report. For example: State Farm owned Sate Farm Bank; Allstate owned 
Allstate Bank; American International Group owned AIG Federal Saving Bank. 
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activities under the new powers (Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003; Butler, Cui, and Whitman, 
2000; Cagle, Lippert, and Moore 1996). Such demutualization can also provide enhanced 
corporate structure flexibility and make it possible for mutual insurance companies to affiliate 
with other financial institutions. GLB eases the process of converting the status of a company by 
permitting a mutual insurance company to easily re-domesticate to a state with laws favorable for 
conversion to the stock company form of ownership.  
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 CHAPTER 3   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The available research on U.S. financial integration has been limited and mostly focused on the 
immediate wealth effects of GLB and on the potential efficiency effects developed from 
simulations.  Using event-study methodology, Carow (2001a) and Johnston and Madura (2000) 
investigated the 1999 merger of Citicorp with Travelers, which signaled impending financial 
modernization, and found positive market value gains for the merged entity, life insurers, large 
banks, and brokerage firms. Carow and Heron (2002) examined the capital market reaction to 
GLB and found that only insurance and investment companies were predicted to benefit from 
GLB. Carow (2001b) focused on how a reduction in the insurance industry’s barriers to bank 
entry affected the market value of firms in the insurance and banking industry. His evidence 
suggested that insurance companies experienced a significant reduction in wealth surrounding 
the OCC and Supreme Court rulings35 while bank stock prices did not change significantly. 
However, Mamun, Hassan, and Maroney (2005a) and Neale and Peterson (2005) suggested that 
the main winners from GLB were property-liability insurers followed by life insurers, and larger 
insurance companies benefited more from GLB than others.  
The results of wealth effects on the banking industry are mixed. Akhigbe and Whyte 
(2001) also found positive valuation effects of GLB on the banking industry. Hendershott, Lee 
and Tompkins (2002), on the other hand, did not find significant wealth effect of GLB on banks. 
A recent study by Mamun, Hassan and Maroney (2005b) found the impact of GLB on the 
                                                 
35 The OCC granted national banks the right to sell fixed-rate annuities on April 4, 1985, and variable-rate annuities 
on February 12, 1990. Based on Section 92 of the NBA, on August 13, 1986, the OCC ruled that a national bank or 
its branch located in a place of 5,000 or less population may sell insurance products to its customers located 
anywhere. The 1995 Supreme Court case (NationBank vs. VALIC) and 1996 Supreme Court case (Barnett Bank vs. 
FL Insurance Commissioner) upheld the OCC rulings and brought this segment of regulatory change to completion. 
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banking industry, including welfare gains by the banking industry and decreased exposures to 
systematic risks after passage of GLB.   
A second series of papers attempted to estimate the potential efficiency gains of 
consolidation. For example, Berger (2000) and Saunders and Walter (1994) argued that allowing 
universal banking would enhance the efficiency of the financial service industry, without 
increasing the risks to the financial system stability. Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999) 
examined the relationship between diversifying M&As, efficiency, and scale economies in the 
U.S. life insurance industry over 1988-1995. They found that diversifying M&As within the life 
insurance industry had a beneficial effect on efficiency.36 Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 
(2000) investigated economies of scope in the U.S. insurance industry by studying diversified 
and specialist insurers for the period 1988-1992 and found cost scope economies and revenue 
scope diseconomies, as a result of providing life insurance and property-liability insurance 
jointly. Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993) showed that joint production was more efficient 
for banks in limited branching and statewide branching regulatory environments, and 
specialization was more efficient for others in unit banking regulatory environments. Berger, 
Humphrey, and Pulley (1996) found little or no revenue scope efficiency between deposits and 
loans in term of charging customers for joint consumption benefits.  
Although a number of studies have been done across products within a sector, only a 
handful of studies exist, which investigate the cross-industry integration of the U.S. financial 
service industry and which investigate financial conglomerations. Two exceptions are papers by 
Berger (2000) and Malkonen (2004), which theoretically analyzed the efficiency and competitive 
implications of financial conglomeration. Berger (2000) suggested that integration across 
financial service industries increased the potential for efficiency gains and that integration also 
                                                 
36 Also see Gardner and Grace (1993), Cummins and Zi (1998). 
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may bring greater revenue efficiency gains than cost efficiency gains with most of the gains 
coming from the benefits of risk diversification. Malkonen (2004) conducted a study on financial 
conglomeration driven by cost-efficiency gains and suggested that conglomeration triggers 
competition in the credit market and increases profits in insurance. His model showed that cost-
efficiency gains were fully passed to consumers and aggregate risk in the financial markets was 
reduced, suggesting lower capital requirements for financial conglomerates.  
Meanwhile, there is a significant lack of empirical research on the effects of 
diversification by financial firms. Since affiliation across industries was prohibited prior to GLB, 
research in this area has only progressed using simulated data.  Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) 
examined the effect of BHC mergers with non-bank financial firms. Using simulated data, they 
found that BHC mergers with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduced risk. Wall, 
Reichert and Mohanty (1993) focused on the question of whether deregulating commercial bank 
activities would affect a banks’ riskiness by examining the portfolio effects of combining bank 
activities with non-bank financial activities. Their results suggested that portfolios, along with 
certain industries in which banks have been seeking to remove barriers to growth, offer 
significant opportunities for increasing return while lowering risk. Reichert and Wall (2000) 
updated and extended the earlier empirical analysis by Wall et al. (1993) and suggested that 
efficient diversification may change over time, perhaps due to certain factors, such as the 
macroeconomic environments or advancing technologies. Allen and Jagtiani (2000) created a 
synthetic financial conglomerate consisting of one bank, one securities firm, and one insurance 
company. They showed lower overall risk but higher systematic risk in the banking industry 
because of integration.  
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Whalen (1999a, 1999b) examined the overseas insurance activities and securities 
activities of U.S. BHCs for the period from 1987 to 1997.37 Whalen found that average returns 
on both foreign insurance and securities activities were higher than traditional banking activities 
and that the combination of insurance and securities business in banks can noticeably improve a 
bank’s risk and return opportunities. He concluded that overseas insurance and securities 
activities reduced risk for U.S. banks.  
However, to our knowledge, there has been no empirical study available investigating 
cross-sector integration in the U.S. financial industry. Only a handful of studies provide some 
mixed evidence on universal banking in the European Union. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
studied M&As between banks and insurers in Europe and found that many of the events 
increased combined value. Lang and Welzel (1998) found scope economies for small German 
banks; Allen and Rai (1996) found very small scope economies of universal banking in the EU; 
Vander Vennet (2002) showed limited evidence of scope economies of banking in the EU and no 
consistent evidence of expansion path subadditivity. 
                                                 
37 U.S. BHCs are allowed to be involved in insurance and securities activities overseas by Federal Reserve 
Regulation K. They are required to report separately on foreign bank activities with the Federal Reserve. 
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 CHAPTER 4   
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BANKING/INSURANCE DATABASE 
The regulatory data sets in the U.S. covering financial service firms are product specific, with no 
convenient way to identify affiliations among companies across different product lines (i.e., 
bancassurers and assurbanks).  Thus, one of the main efforts in this dissertation is to construct a 
linking variable that allows us to match the unique company identifiers between the insurance 
and bank regulatory data sets.   
The data come from a variety of sources. The variable we develop links the unique 
company identifiers in the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) insurance 
data sets together with the identifiers in the Bank Holding Company Financial Report (BHCFR), 
the Commercial Banks Call Report (CALL), and the Thrift Financial Report (TFR). These four 
data sets contain financial and domicile information for almost all insurance companies, BHCs, 
FHCs, commercial banks, and thrifts operating in the United States for our research period over 
2003 – 2005.38   
To construct the linking variable, we first identify the list of insurance companies 
affiliated with banks, if any, by using key word searches on the Federal Reserve Structure Report 
(FEDSR) and the Thrift Holding Company Structure Report (THCFR), and by using self-
reported answers to queries posed by insurance regulators as part of the annual oversight process 
as reported on the General Interrogatories page of each company’s annual regulatory statements. 
With supplementary information from the National Information Center Hierarchy Report 
(NICHR), we can tie the BHCFR, TFR and CALL to FEDSR and THCFR by the core linkage 
                                                 
38 These datasets might miss some types of insurers or banks. For example, single-state insurers are not required to 
report to the NAIC although some do; prior 2005 state-chartered commercial banks that were not insured by the 
FDIC were not required to file CALL reports, but since 2005 all commercial banks are insured by FDIC. 
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code assigned by the FRB.  In the final step, we match the banking data to the insurance 
regulatory data manually using company name, location and other domicile information required 
to perform the merge.  
Firms under common ownership in the combined data set are aggregated to the group 
level. We aggregate separately the data of each group’s life, property-liability, commercial 
banks, and saving bank subsidiaries to obtain the divisional totals. A firm is treated as a single 
producer with up to four business divisions – life insurance division, property-liability insurance 
division, commercial banking division, and thrift division.  We eliminate inactive firms with zero 
or negative total assets, liabilities, or net worth. Insurance companies with zero premium income 
and banks with zero deposits are not viable business entities and, therefore, are also deleted. 
After these deletions, the data sets have 90 joint producers, 1,346 insurance specialists, and 7,261 
bank specialists for the year 2003. Since almost all joint producers are large, in this study we 
focus on large financial institutions licensed as insurers or banks in the U.S. We then further 
excluded joint producers with less than $1 billion total assets, banks with less than $1 billion 
total assets, and insurers with less than $600 million total assets from the data sample. The final 
data sample consists of 88 joint producers, 204 insurance specialists, and 461 bank specialists for 
the year 2003.  These firms include 182 life insurers, 191 property-liability insurers, 437 
commercial banks, and 185 thrifts. The firms included account for about 98 percent life 
insurance industry assets, 94 percent property-liability insurance assets, 88 percent commercial 
banks assets, and 81 percent thrifts assets.39  
                                                 
39 The data shows the similar figures over the three year period 2003 – 2005. For example, the original data contains 
90, 86 and 87 joint producers, 1346, 1401 and 1412 insurance specialists, 7261, 7110 and  7046 bank specialists for 
the year 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively.  The final data sample statistics are shown in Table 16. 
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 CHAPTER 5   
ASSURBANKS AND BANCASSURERS: WHO ARE THEY? 
In this section, we identify the major assurbanks and bancassurers in the post-GLB U.S. financial 
industry and present summary statistics regarding their operations. Table 1 presents a summary 
of assurbanks and bancassurers over the period 2003 – 2005. The statistical pattern seen in Table 
1 is similar and stable over the three year period.40  
5.1. ASSURBANKS 
By the end of 2003, 44 insurance groups had banking operations and were classified as 
“assurbanks.” Table 2 Panel A lists the ten largest assurbanks for the year 2003 in terms of asset 
size. MetLife, with $12.1 million net loss from its banking businesses, was the only insurer to 
elect to be organized as an FHC under the GLB Act.  By the end of 2003, 33 assurbanks utilized 
the SLHC vehicle to enter into the banking market. The remaining assurbanks, grandfathered by 
various exemption provisions, owned either non-bank banks or trust companies. Among the top 
10 assurbanks, only AIG, ING, and Nationwide had net income gains from their banking 
activities, with all others reporting losses in their banking subsidiaries. Of the 44 assurbanks 
included in the study, 24 out of the 44 had net income gains from banking activities with an 
average of 12.4 percent total net income earned from banking business (Table 1) while almost 
half earned less than 3 percent profit from banking activities (median 2.3 percent).  
ING Direct is a thrift subsidiary of ING Group. Its successful banking operation in the 
U.S. makes it stand out from the others. Opened for business in September 2000, ING Direct has 
become the country's largest internet-based bank and the fourth-largest thrift bank. As a 
                                                 
40 The market structure and performance analysis results are similar over the three year period, therefore in this 
chapter and next two chapters the analysis is presented for the year 2003. 
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standalone thrift division of the Dutch financial service conglomerate, ING Direct USA does not 
cross-sell with its affiliates. It is a direct-to-the-customer operation, an internet-based savings 
bank. There are no branches, no ATMs, and also no fees, no minimum deposits. Only a limited 
number of products are offered: savings accounts, a few certificates of deposit, and a handful of 
mutual funds. The simplicity of the model allows them to operate at very low cost. In some parts 
of the business, they operate at one-sixth the cost of a conventional bank. Targeting the 
homogeneous customers is part of their strategy to keep cost down. Low costs mean that ING 
Direct can offer relatively high interest rates on deposits, which in turn attract potential 
customers. Although ING Direct is an example of a conglomeration, it is one which affiliates 
with various financial institutions but shows no effort to integrate. Instead, their standalone, 
simple, straight forward business model creates their success. 
5.2. BANCASSURERS 
From the enactment date of GLB to the end of 2003, more than 630 BHCs have converted to 
FHC status in the banking industry. Although the number of FHCs was much smaller than the 
number of BHCs, these FHCs controlled 78 percent of all commercial banking assets as of the 
first quarter of 2003.41 For the year 2003, 44 top tier FHCs/BHCs42 reported general insurance 
underwriting business and 1,251 top tier FHCs/BHCs reported insurance agency business (with 
or without insurance underwriting) in their regulatory financial report. Table 2 Panel B lists the 
top 10 banking groups in terms of total insurance underwriting income. Not surprisingly, 
Citigroup is at the top of the list. It is interesting to note that even though Citigroup spun off its 
property-liability segment in 2002 and its life segment in 2005, 7.04 percent of its net income for 
2003 was generated from its insurance businesses in the year 2003. Unlike the largest 10 
                                                 
41 Federal Reserve Board Report to Congress, 2003. 
42 Top tier FHCs/BHCs are defined as FHCs or BHCs without parent holding companies, and lower tier 
FHCs/BHCs are those owned by top tier FHCs/BHCs. 
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assurbanks, all the top 10 bancassurers reported gains in their insurance underwriting 
subsidiaries in 2003. 
Table 1 shows that bancassurers average 19.5 percent of total group net income from 
insurance underwriting, but half average less than 3 percent. As fee income has become a more 
important source of revenue for banks, these banking groups average 8.09 percent non-interest 
income from insurance agency and underwriting income (median 3.99 percent). In addition to 
insurance underwriting, many banking groups sell insurance products through agencies they 
own. We identify 1,251 FHCs/BHCs that conduct insurance business only as agents. For banks 
acting as agents only, their insurance agency business accounts for 5.6 percent of their total non-
interest income (median 1.72 percent). For the thrift sector, only 9 thrifts took advantage of the 
OTS rules allowing insurance underwriting subsidiaries without becoming an FHC. Except for 
Washington Mutual Bank Group, these thrifts are much smaller in size and have inconsequential 
effects on the thrift industry. Therefore we do not discuss them here separately.  
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 CHAPTER 6   
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN INTEGRATION 
In this section, we analyze the post-GLB U.S. insurance and banking industries from the aspects 
of industry structure and firm performance. Individual insurers are divided into three groups: 
Non-affiliated insurance companies (those without any affiliation with banks either through 
direct control or through holding companies to which they belong); assurbanking-affiliated 
insurance companies43 (insurers affiliated with banks by either directly owning banks or through 
their insurance holding companies); bancassurance-affiliated insurance companies44 (those 
directly owned by banks or owned through their insurance holding companies owned by banks); 
and bank-affiliated insurance companies (referring either to assurbanking-affiliated or 
bancassurance-affiliated insurance companies. 
6.1. MARKET STRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF FIRMS 
As reported in Table 3, our data sample contains 36 assurbanking-affiliated life insurance 
companies, 36 bancassurance-affiliated life insurance companies, and 110 non-affiliated life 
insurance companies for the year 2003. These assurbanking-affiliated life insurance companies 
represented 19.8 percent of the life insurers in number, but accounted for 57.7 percent of total 
assets, 51.6 percent of premiums written, and 53.4 percent of net income. Representing 19.8 
percent of the life insurance companies, the bancassurance-affiliated life insurers accounted for 
only 7.3 percent of total assets, 7.0 percent of premiums written, and 9.8 percent of net income. 
The 60.4 percent non-affiliated life insurers took the remaining one-third life insurance market 
share.  
                                                 
43 In other words, assurbanking-affiliated insurance companies are insurance subsidiaries of assurbanks. 
44 In other words, bancassurance-affiliated insurance companies are insurance subsidiaries of bancassurers. 
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Table 3.1 shows the distribution of property-liability insurers. In 2003, 25 assurbanking-
affiliated property-liability insurance companies represented 13.1 percent of the firms in number 
and approximately one-third of industry assets, premiums written and profits. The 22 
bancassurance-affiliated property-liability insurers held 3.5 percent property-liability industry 
assets. The remaining 144 non-affiliated property-liability insurers controlled an approximate 
two-thirds share of the industry assets, premiums written, and net income. This pattern suggests 
that banks appear less interested in the property-liability sector compared with the life sector, and 
support the argument that banks are more likely to begin their insurance business in the life 
sector (Carow, 2001b).  
Table 4 and 4.1 show the average firm size in terms of total assets, premiums written, and 
net income. Assurbanking-affiliated life and property-liability insurers were significantly larger 
than non-affiliated and bancassurance-affiliated insurers regardless of the metric used.  
Bancassurance-affiliated life and property-liability insurers were the smallest, but the average 
bancassurance-affiliated life insurer was not statistically different from the average non-affiliated 
life insurers in terms of total assets and net income.  
6.2. FIRM PERFORMANCE 
In this section, we first discuss the insurer’s A.M. Best Strength Rating, the business geographic 
patterns, and the product mix and diversifications. We then explore the operating performance of 
the three insurer groups’ (non-affiliated, assurbanking-affiliated, and bancassurance-affiliated)  
by conducting profitability, leverage, and liquidity tests.  
6.2.1. A.M. BEST RATINGS 
A.M. Best’s Financial Strength Rating is an independent rating based on a comprehensive 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of an insurance company's balance sheet strength, 
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operating performance, and business profile.  Best’s ratings scale areas follows: A++, A+ 
(Superior); A, A- (Excellent); B++, B+ (Very Good); B, B- (Fair); C++, C+ (Marginal); C, C- 
(Weak); D (Poor); E (Under Regulatory Supervision); F (In Liquidation); S (Rating 
Suspended).45 Table 5 Panel A shows that 83 percent of assurbanking-affiliated life insurers had 
A.M. Best ratings of A- or higher, compared with 58 percent of bancassurance-affiliated life 
insurers and 68 percent of non-affiliated life insurers. For property-liability insurers, 89 percent 
of assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers, 62 percent of bancassurance-affiliated 
property-liability insurers, and 78 percent of non-affiliated property-liability insurers had A.M. 
Best ratings of A- or higher (Table 5 Panel B). Thus, insurance companies that have banking 
subsidiaries tend to have higher ratings than those owned by banks or non-affiliated insurers.  
6.2.2. GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION 
We now examine insurers’ business geographic patterns by calculating the number of states in 
which they are licensed. We can interpret from Table 6 that, on average, assurbanking-affiliated 
insurers were more geographically diversified. For example, half of assurbanking-affiliated life 
insurers obtained licenses and conducted business in 48 and more states, and similarly half of 
assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers were licensed and conducted business in 45 or 
more states. Bancassurance-affiliated life insurers were the least geographically diversified 
compared with non-affiliated and assurbanking-affiliated in 2003.  
6.2.3. PRODUCT MIX AND DIVERSIFICATION 
We then examine insurers’ product mix and diversifications. We categorize life insurance 
products as individual life, individual annuity, credit life, group life, group annuity, and accident 
& health insurance; we categorize the property-liability products as personal property, personal 
                                                 
45 Best’s Key Rating Guide, 2004 Edition. 
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liability, commercial property, and commercial liability.46 Table 7 Panel A demonstrates that 
bank-affiliated life insurers were more interested in personal products, especially individual 
annuities and credit life compared with non-affiliated life insurers. This evidence suggests that 
affiliation with banks plays an important role in developing a business portfolio because of 
banks’ business in selling annuities and credit life insurance. Bank-affiliated life insurers 
accounted for approximately one-third of each product line in number, but their premium income 
share was more than 60 percent of each sub-market except for accident & health insurance. For 
the property-liability sector, the pattern is that bank-affiliated property-liability insurers were 
more interested in personal products than commercial products. Bank-affiliated property-liability 
insurance companies represented no more than one-fourth of each property-liability product 
market in number, but accounted for about 50 percent of the personal products underwriting and 
one-third of commercial products underwriting (Table 7.1).  
Since we know bank-affiliated insurance companies are more diversified across 
industries, it is interesting to ask whether they are also more diversified on their traditional 
products within the insurance sector. Some studies have suggested efficiency gains and 
economies of scale and scope in U.S. insurance industry.47 Such efficiency gains may prompt 
these within-industry diversified insurers to extend to the banking industry. The results support 
this hypothesis. Table 8 shows the products Herfindahl Index for life and property-liability 
insurers.48 Table 8 Panel A and Panel B show that compared with specialized insurers, bank-
                                                 
46 Leverty (2005), Cummins and Phillips (2005), Cummins et al. (2003), Berger et al. (2000).  Table 15 lists the 
detail product and line of business definitions. 
47 For the life insurance industry only, see: Cummins and Zi (1998), Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999), 
Cummins and Weiss (2000), Segal (2003). For the property-liability industry only, see: Cummins and Weiss (1993). 
For the life and property-liability insurance, see: Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000), Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 
(2003). 
48 The product Herfindahl Index for an insurer producing n types of products is measured as   (P1^2 + P2^2 + …+ 
Pn^2 ) / (P1 + P2 + … + Pn)^2, where Pi is the ith product net premium written. Insurance products include 
property-liability insurance (personal short-tail lines, personal long-tail lines, commercial short-tail lines, and 
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affiliated insurance companies were more diversified within both life and property-liability 
insurance markets.  
6.2.4. OVERALL PERFORMANCE – ROA, ROE 
We use the widely accepted measures return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), to 
compare insurers’ overall performance. The results in Table 9 suggest that in the life insurance 
sector, assurbanking-affiliated insurers had significantly higher ROE. Among the three insurance 
groups, ROA was not statistically significant. In the property-liability sector, interestingly, 
bancassurance-affiliated insurers, on average, had the highest ROA and ROE, and the difference 
is significant. Assurbanking-affiliated property insurers had significantly higher ROA and ROE 
than the non-affiliated. Generally, bank-affiliated insurers had better overall profitability than 
non-affiliated insurers in the year 2003.  
6.2.5. PROFITABILITY TEST 
In this section, we compare the profitability of life insurers using accounting measures of 
profitability widely used in the industry and commonly accepted by regulators:  
(1) Total Benefits Paid as a percentage of Net Premiums Written -- Total benefits 
paid include death benefits, matured endowments, annuity benefits, accident and 
health benefits, disability and surrender benefits, and other miscellaneous 
benefits.   
 
(2) Commissions and Expenses Incurred as a percentage of Net Premiums Written -- 
Commissions and expenses include payments on both direct and assumed 
business, general insurance expenses, insurance taxes, licenses and fees, increase 
in loading and other miscellaneous expenses, and exclude commissions and 
expense allowances received on reinsurance ceded.   
 
(3) Net Operating Gain (after taxes) as a percentage of Total Assets -- Total assets are 
the mean of current and prior year admitted assets; and this ratio measures 
insurance earnings in relation to the company's total asset base.   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
commercial long-tail lines) and life insurance (individual life insurance, individual annuity, group life insurance, 
group annuity, and accident and health insurance). The property-liability insurer products and lines of business 
definitions are listed in Table 15. 
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(4) Yield on Invested Assets – The ratio of annual net investment income divided by 
investment assets. Investment assets are the mean of current and prior year cash 
and invested assets plus accrued investment income minus borrowed money.  
 
Table 10.1 Panel A shows that bank-affiliated life insurance companies performed better 
in terms of insurance expense ratio and net operating gains to assets. Bank-owned life insurers 
had significantly lower investment yield. However, they had a higher benefit incurred ratio than 
non-affiliated life insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated life insurers had a significantly higher 
investment yield. The difference on the benefits paid as a percentage of net premiums written 
was not statistically significant among the life insurers.  
For property-liability insurers, we compare five profitability measures: 
(1) Loss Ratio -- The ratio of incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses to Net 
Premiums Earned.  This ratio measures the company's underlying profitability or 
loss experience on its total book of business.   
 
(2) Expense Ratio -- The ratio of underwriting expenses (including commissions) to 
Net Premiums Written.  This ratio measures the company's operational efficiency 
in underwriting its book of business.    
 
(3) Combined Ratio -- This ratio is the sum of the Loss Ratio and Expense Ratio.  It 
measures a company's overall underwriting profitability.  A combined ratio of less 
than one indicates the company has reported an underwriting profit.    
 
(4) Yield on Invested Assets -- The ratio of annual net investment income divided by 
the mean of cash and net invested assets.  This ratio measures the average return 
on a company's invested assets, before capital gains or losses and income taxes.   
 
(5) Return on Policyholders' Surplus (PHS) -- This ratio measures a company's 
efficiency in utilizing its surplus on a total return basis. "Return" is calculated as 
the overall after-tax profit from underwriting and investment activity, including 
unrealized capital gains. 
 
Table 10.1 Panel B summarizes the profitability tests for property-liability insurers. It 
shows that bank-affiliated property-liability insurance companies had a significantly lower loss 
ratio compared with non-affiliated property-liability insurers. Although their expense ratio was 
higher, it was offset by the lower loss ratio and led to lower combined ratios. Similar to 
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assurbanking-affiliated life insurers, assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers had the 
best investment earnings with an average investment yield of 4.6 percent. The ratio of return on 
PHS indicated that bank-affiliated property-liability insurers, including both assurbanking-
affiliated and bancassurance-affiliated, were more efficient in utilizing their surplus on a total 
return basis. 
6.2.6. LEVERAGE TEST 
Following industry accepted measures of leverage, we compare the following life insurers’ 
operating leverage measures:  
(1) Net Premium Written to Capital and Surplus -- This ratio reflects the leverage of 
the company's current volume of net business in relation to its capital and surplus 
after reinsurance assumed and ceded. This test measures the company's exposure 
to pricing errors in its current book of business. 
   
(2) Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s 
adjusted surplus relative to the required capital necessary to support its operating 
and investment risks.49   
 
(3) Capital and Surplus to Liability -- This test measures the relationship of capital 
and surplus to the company's unpaid obligations after reinsurance assumed and 
ceded. It reflects the extent to which the company has levered its capital and 
surplus base. On an individual company basis, this ratio will vary due to 
differences in product mix, balance sheet quality, and spread of insurance risk.   
 
(4) Reinsurance Leverage Ratio -- The relationship of total reserves ceded plus 
commissions and expenses due on reinsurance ceded plus other refunds due or 
recoverable from reinsurers to total capital and surplus.      
 
Table 10.2 Panel A shows that the ratio of NPW to surplus was statistically lower for 
bancassurance-affiliated life insurers than for bancassurance-affiliated and non-affiliated life 
insurers in 2003. About 50 percent of assurbanking-affiliated and non-affiliated life insurers had 
“strong balance sheet” BCARs (median 174 percent, 163 percent, respectively), while 
                                                 
49 Life insurers with a BCAR score of more than 100 percent are considered to have "adequate" balance sheet 
strength, and firms with a BCAR score of more than 175 percent are believed to have a “very strong” balance sheet. 
Risk Based Capital ratio is also shown, which shows the consistent results with BCAR. 
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bancassurance-affiliated life insurers had much more secure BCARs (median 194 percent). The 
evidence suggests that bank-owned life insurers were more securely capitalized. This argument 
can also be supported by the capital-to-liability ratio where we see that bancassurance-affiliated 
life insurers had significantly higher capital-to-liability ratios compared with assurbanking-
affiliated and non-affiliated life insurers. The results of the reinsurance leverage ratio test suggest 
that bank-affiliated life insurers used less reinsurance than non-affiliated life insurers. In sum, 
assurbanking-affiliated life insurers carried the highest leverage ratio, and bancassurance-
affiliated life insurers were significantly less levered than non-affiliated insurers at the end of 
2003.   
For property-liability insurers we look at the following industry accepted measures of 
leverage:  
(1) Net Premium Written to Policyholders' Surplus -- This ratio measures an insurer’s 
net retained premium in relation to its surplus and the company’s exposure to 
pricing errors in its current book of business.   
 
(2) Net Leverage Ratio -- This ratio equals the sum of an insurer's Net Premiums 
Written to Policyholders' Surplus Ratio and the Net Liabilities to Policyholders' 
Surplus Ratio. It measures the combination of a company's net exposure to pricing 
errors in its current book of business and errors of estimation in its net liabilities 
after reinsurance, in relation to policyholders' surplus.   
 
(3) Gross Leverage Ratio -- This ratio equals the sum of Net Leverage and Ceded 
Reinsurance Leverage.50 It measures a company's gross exposure to pricing errors 
in the current book of business, to errors of estimating its liabilities, and exposure 
to its reinsurers.  
  
(4) Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s 
adjusted surplus relative to the required capital necessary to support its operating 
and investment risks.51   
 
                                                 
50 Ceded Reinsurance Leverage is calculated as reinsurance recoverable, ceded balances payable and ceded 
premiums written, less funds held, divided by policyholders' surplus.   
51 Property-Liability insurers are deemed to have "adequate" balance sheet strength if they generate a BCAR score 
of over 100 percent, and deemed to have “very strong” balance sheet strength if generating a BCAR score over 200 
percent. 
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Table 10.2 Panel B shows that bancassurance-affiliated property-liability insurers had the 
lowest NPW to PHS ratio. But the difference among insurers was not significant. The bank-
affiliated property-liability insurers presented lower net leverage ratio and gross leverage ratio 
than non-affiliated insurers, but the gross leverage ratio was not significantly different between 
bank-affiliated and non-affiliated property-liability insurers. On average, all the property-liability 
insurers had “very strong balance sheet strength” with higher than 200 percent BCAR. However, 
the average BCAR for bancassurance-affiliated property-liability insurers was about 50 percent 
higher than the average BCAR for assurbanking-affiliated and non-affiliated insurers. In sum, 
non-affiliated property-liability insurers were more levered than the bank-affiliated ones, and 
assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers were more levered than the bancassurance-
affiliated in 2003.   
6.2.7. LIQUIDITY TEST 
We calculate four liquidity ratios for life insurers:  
(1) Quick Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of unaffiliated quick assets to liabilities.52 This 
test measures the proportion of liabilities covered by cash and quickly convertible 
investments. It indicates a company's ability to meet its maturing obligations 
without requiring the sale of long-term investments or the borrowing of money.   
 
(2) Current Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of unaffiliated invested assets to liabilities, 
excluding mortgages and real estate. It measures the proportion of liabilities 
covered by cash, and it measures unaffiliated investment assets holdings.  
 
(3) Operating Cash Flow to Total Assets -- Operating cash flow is the change in cash 
and invested assets attributable to net underwriting and net investment income 
after policyholder dividends and federal income taxes. It measures a company’s 
ability to meet current obligations through the internal generation of funds from 
insurance operations. Negative balances typically indicate unprofitable 
underwriting results or low yielding assets.  
 
(4) Non-Investment Grade Bonds to Capital -- This test measures exposure to non-
investment grade bonds as a percentage of capital and surplus.  Generally, non-
                                                 
52 Quick assets include 80 percent of unaffiliated common stock, cash, short-term investments, Government bonds 
maturing in five years or less and all other bonds (excluding affiliates) maturing in one year or less.   
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investment grade bonds carry higher default and liquidity risks. The designation 
as non-investment grade utilizes the bond quality classifications, which coincide 
with different bond ratings assigned by major credit rating agencies. 
 
Table 10.3 Panel A consistently shows that bancassurance-affiliated life insurers had 
higher liquidity ratios but lower operating cash flows than their non-affiliated and assurbanking-
affiliated counterparts at the year-end 2003. In addition, they invested the least in non-investment 
grade bonds. Non-affiliated life insurers had the lowest quick and current liquidity ratios and the 
difference was significant.  
The liquidity ratios used for property-liability insurers are similar to those used for life 
insurers: the quick liquidity, current liquidity, operating cash flow ratio, and ratio of non-
investment grade bonds to PHS. Table 10.3 Panel B shows similar liquidity rations between 
property-liability insurers and life insurance companies. Bancassurance-affiliated property-
liability insurers had significantly higher liquidity ratios but lower operating cash flows than 
non-affiliated and assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers, and they invested the least 
in non-investment grade bonds. Non-affiliated property-liability insurers had the lowest quick 
and current liquidity ratios, and they invested the most in the non-investment grade bonds. The 
evidence suggests that insurance subsidiaries of assurbanks and bancassurers retained more 
costly liquid and short-term assets, and showed prudence on settling their outstanding liabilities. 
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 CHAPTER 7   
THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN INTEGRATION 
The GLB Act generally creates three main types of banks in terms of cross-industry integration. 
Non-affiliated Commercial Banks (CBs) are those without any affiliation (either direct control or 
through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies. Bancassurance-affiliated 
Commercial Banks (CBs)53 are those affiliated with insurance companies by directly holding 
insurers or through their FHCs/BHCs, which own insurance companies. Assurbanking-affiliated 
Commercial Banks (CBs)54 are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their 
FHCs/BHCs, which are owned by insurers. Insurer-affiliated Commercial Banks (CBs) refer to 
either assurbanking-affiliated or bancassurance-affiliated commercial banks. Similarly, in the 
thrift savings industry, there are Non-affiliated Saving Banks (SBs), Bancassurance-affiliated 
Saving Banks (SBs), Assurbanking-affiliated Saving Banks (SBs), and Insurer-affiliated Saving 
Banks (SBs). 
We identify 110 FHCs/BHCs reporting insurance underwriting income in their required 
financial reports to the Federal Reserve Board. However, some of the bancassurers have only in-
house insurance underwriting, such as credit-related insurance and mortgage-related insurance. 
Some of these bancassurers have insurance subsidiaries not filing reports with the NAIC, such as 
title insurance companies, captive insurance companies, and single state insurers.55 In addition, 
according to Regulation K, banks are allowed to own insurance subsidiaries overseas, which are 
not required to file with the NAIC if are not involved in domestic business. Thus, in this section, 
                                                 
53 In other words, bancassurance-affiliated commercial banks are the banking subsidiaries of bancassurers. 
54 In other words, assurbanking-affiliated commercial banks are the banking subsidiaries of assurbanks. 
55 For example, Banknorth Group owned Northgroup Captive Insurance Inc., and First Merchants Corporation 
owned Indiana Title Insurance Company. 
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we present statistics for the insurer-affiliated CBs or SBs that have insurer affiliates filing with 
the NAIC. The non-affiliated CBs or SBs include banks subsidiaries of those FHCs/BHCs, 
which report insurance underwriting income to the FRB but have no insurance subsidiaries filing 
with the NAIC.  
By analyzing the business profile of these FHCs/BHCs (bancassurers with no insurance 
subsidiaries), we find that the insurance business they conducted mainly supported their banking 
business or just appeared to be by-products supporting the banking operations, such as credit 
related insurance and mortgage insurance. Because these banks are different from bancassurers 
with full line insurance subsidiaries,56 we classify them as non-affiliated commercial banks with 
insurance underwriting business reported. The assurbanking-affiliated CBs are all small trust 
banks or grandfathered non-bank banks. Since they are small in size and no more than 10 in 
number, we merge these banks to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Hence, we have the following 
structure for CBs: 
Commercial Banks (CBs): 
• Bancassurance-affiliated CBs 
• Non-affiliated CBs 
o Non-affiliated INS CBs --- with insurance underwriting 
o Non-affiliated NOINS CBs --- without insurance underwriting 
 
7.1. MARKET STRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF FIRMS 
The data sample contains 48 bancassurance-affiliated CBs, 46 non-affiliated INS CBs, and 343 
non-affiliated NOINS CBs for the year 2003. Table 11 shows that bancassurance-affiliated CBs 
represented 11 percent of the commercial banks in number, but they accounted for over half of 
                                                 
56 In 2003, 44 FHCs/BHCs with general insurance underwriter subsidiaries are identified and included in our data. 
   41
the total assets, deposits, and net income of the market. Non-affiliated INS CBs were 10.5 
percent of the commercial banks in number and about 20 percent of market total assets, deposits, 
and net income. So, important players in the commercial banking industry have been involved in 
the insurance underwriting business through either in-house production or manufacturing 
affiliates. The remaining non-affiliated NOINS CBs represented the majority of the commercial 
banking market in number (78.5 percent), but they accounted for only one-fourth market share in 
terms of total assets, deposits, and net income.  
In the thrift sector, 39 assurbanking-affiliated SBs, 14 bancassurance-affiliated SBs, and 
132 non-affiliated SBs were identified. Similar to the commercial banking sector, bancassurance-
affiliated SBs were 7.6 percent of the thrift saving market in number and accounted for a 29.1 
percent share of the total assets, 27.6 percent of deposits, and 33.4 percent of net income (Table 
11.1). Assurbanking-affiliated SBs were 21.1 percent of the thrifts in number, 5 percent of the 
total assets, 6.3 percent of deposits, and 2.7 percent of net income. Non-affiliated SBs 
represented the remaining 71.4 percent of thrifts in number and approximately two-thirds of 
industry total assets, deposits, and net income.  
Table 12 and 12.1 show the average bank size in terms of total assets, deposits, and net 
income. Table 12 shows a pattern that on average bancassurance-affiliated CBs were 
significantly larger than non-affiliated ones regardless of the metric used. However, the variance 
on firm size was higher among bancassurance-affiliated CBs than non-affiliated INS CBs.57 The 
firm size disparity in the thrift industry is shown in Table 12.1. We can see a significant firm size 
difference: assurbanking-affiliated SBs are significantly smaller than bancassurance-affiliated 
SBs and non-affiliated SBs. Although bancassurance-affiliated SBs on average were the largest 
                                                 
57 Our data sample contains large banks with at least $1 billion assets, which include the large wholesales banks, 
e.g., Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo.  These giant banks are kept in the data sample in the 
univariate analysis, but are excluded in the later scope efficiency analysis.  
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among SBs, the size difference is not statistically significant. Because of the super large thrifts in 
the data, e.g., Washington Mutual, Golden West Financial, the variance on firm size is much 
higher among bancassurance-affiliated SBs. The evidence suggests that large commercial and 
saving banks are more likely to affiliate with full line insurance companies, and insurance 
companies are more likely to extend their traditional business to banks through relative small-
size thrifts. 
7.2. FIRM PERFORMANCE 
7.2.1. PORTFOLIO OF BANKING PRODUCTS 
The traditional banking products are deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet and loans 
on the asset side. We compare three banking product measures: total deposits, interest bearing 
deposits, and total loans and leases. Total deposits include deposits and savings accounts that 
either require interest payments or are not allowed to pay interest. Interest bearing deposits 
include only those requiring interest payments, such as savings accounts and time deposits. Total 
loans and leases include loans to individuals, commercial and industrial loans, and all other loans 
and leases.  Table 13 Panel A shows the average total deposits, interest bearing deposits and total 
loan and lease. To control for size effects they are scaled by assets. The evidence indicates that 
non-affiliated NOINS CBs had more deposits than non-affiliated INS CBs and bancassurance-
affiliated CBs. And non-affiliated INS CBs had more deposits than bancassurance-affiliated 
CBs. The differences were statistically significant. On the asset side, bancassurance-affiliated 
CBs had statistically less loan portfolios than non-affiliated CBs. Non-affiliated NOINS CBs in 
turn had significantly more loan portfolios than bancassurance-affiliated CBs.  
In the thrift sector, Table 13 Panel B shows that non-affiliated SBs had significantly more 
deposits compared with assurbanking-affiliated and bancassurance-affiliated SBs. On the asset 
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side, assurbanking-affiliated SBs had statistically less loans portfolios than other SBs. Loan 
portfolio differences between bancassurance-affiliated SBs and non-affiliated SBs were not 
statistically significant. The evidence suggests that, on average, CBs and SBs without insurance 
business had more deposits and loans than those with insurance business or affiliates in 2003.  
7.2.2. INTEREST INCOME AND NON-INTEREST INCOME 
In this section, we compare the interest income, non-interest income, and ratio of non-interest 
income to interest income between banks. Interest income is the main source of revenue for 
banks and includes interest and fee income on loans, income from lease financing receivables, 
interest income on balances due from depository institutions, interest and dividend income on 
securities, and other interest income. Non-interest income comes from fiduciary activities, 
service charges on deposit accounts, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting 
fees and commissions.  To control for the size effect, we scale the interest income and non-
interest income by total asset. Table 13.1 Panel A indicates that, on average, bancassurance-
affiliated CBs had significantly higher interest income and non-interest income than non-
affiliated CBs. We then calculate the ratio of non-interest income to interest income. The results 
show that both the mean and median measure presented the same trend, and the measures 
indicate that bancassurance-affiliated CBs conducted significantly more non-interest related 
business than non-affiliated CBs.  
The evidence in the thrift saving industry is shown in Table 13.1 Panel B. Assurbanking-
affiliated SBs had the lowest interest income, but the highest non-interest income was seen in the 
thrift saving sector. The interest income of the non-affiliated and the bancassurance-affiliated 
were not statistically different. The interest thing is that non-affiliated SBs had a significantly 
higher ratio of non-interest income to interest income than both bancassurance-affiliated and 
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assurbanking-affiliated SBs. It suggests that for non-interest income generating business, bank-
affiliated saving banks were involved less in the non-insurance related business.  
7.2.3. OVERALL PERFORMANCE – ROA, ROE, AND NET OPERATING 
INCOME TO ASSETS 
We follow the widely accepted measures, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
net operating income to assets ratio to compare banks’ overall performance. In the commercial 
banking sector, those affiliating with insurers or conducting limited insurance underwriting 
business had consistently higher ROA, ROE, and net operating income to assets ratios than those 
without any insurance business (Table 14 Panel A). The evidence in thrift saving sector is 
different: on average assurbanking-affiliated saving banks performed worse in 2003 than the 
other two SBs groups (Table 14 Panel B), even showing negative average ROE and showing net 
operating losses. This evidence suggests that although assurbanking-affiliated SBs had profitable 
interest business (discussed next), their lower non-interest related return still couldn’t be offset 
and, as a result, it contributed to their lower overall return.  
7.2.4. INTEREST MARGIN AND NON-INTEREST MARGIN 
The interest margin and non-interest margin measure the profitability of banks and are two 
important ratios in evaluating banks’ performance and conditions. Interest margin is defined as 
the dollar difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of earning 
assets. Similarly, the non-interest margin is defined as the dollar difference between non-interest 
income and non-interest expense as a percentage of earning assets. Table 14.1 Panel A indicates 
that, on average, bancassurance-affiliated CBs had significantly higher interest and non-interest 
margins than non-affiliated CBs. And non-affiliated INS CBs had significantly higher non-
interest margins but lower interest margins than non-affiliated NOINS CBs. The evidence in the 
thrift saving industry is different. Table 14.1 Panel B shows that bancassurance-affiliated SBs 
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had the highest interest margins and assurbanking-affiliated SBs had the lowest interest and non-
interest margins among thrift institutions. However, all three thrifts groups showed negative non-
interest margins on average in 2003.  
7.2.5. RBC RATIO, LOAN TO DEPOSIT RATIO, AND NET CHARGE-OFF TO 
LOAN RATIO 
In this section, we compare three key ratios highly monitored by bank regulators. These are the 
risk-based capital (RBC) ratio, the loan to deposit (LTD) ratio, and the net charge-offs to loan 
ratio.  Bank capital performs several important functions. The FDIC Rules and Regulations, Part 
325 Appendix A - Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, establish a risk adjusted capital 
framework; they are used in the examination and supervisory process of the bank. The risk-based 
framework includes a definition of capital for risk-based capital purposes, a system for 
calculating risk-weighted assets by assigning assets and off-balance sheet items to broad risk 
categories, and a minimum supervisory ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets, which 
is the risk-based capital ratio.58 Table 14.2 Panel A and B show RBC ratios for the commercial 
banking sector and the thrift sector, respectively. In the commercial banking industry, 
bancassurance-affiliated CBs had significantly higher RBC ratios than non-affiliated CBs. In the 
thrifts, the evidence is different: assurbanking-affiliated SBs had the highest RBC ratios. 
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs had the lower RBC ratios than non-affiliated SBs, but the 
difference was not significant. Incorporating the evidence discussed in Chapter 6, these results 
indicate that commercial banking and insurance subsidiaries of bancassurers presented higher 
RBC ratios in the banking and insurance industry. Thrift subsidiaries of assurbanks showed the 
                                                 
58 Risk-based capital standard serves as a useful tool for assessing banks’ capital adequacy ; it  is considered  a 
capital measure that is more explicitly and systematically sensitive to the risk profiles of individual banks.  Under 
the risk-based framework, a bank's qualifying total capital base consists of two types of capital elements, "core 
capital elements" (Tier 1) and "supplementary capital elements" (Tier 2). To qualify as an element of Tier 1 or Tier 2 
capital, a capital instrument should not contain or be subject to any conditions, covenants, terms, restrictions, or 
provisions that are inconsistent with safe and sound banking practices. Total risk-based capital is the sum of Tier 1 
capital and Tier 2 capital.  
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highest RBC ratios in the thrift saving industry, and insurance subsidiaries of assurbanks 
presented market average RBC ratios in the insurance industry. 
The loan to deposit (LTD) ratio is used as a measure of liquidity in banking sector; it 
often receives the most attention. The LTD ratio, measured as the value of a bank's gross 
outstanding loans divided by total deposits, indicates the percentage of a bank's loans funded 
through deposits. An upswing in the LTD may indicate that a bank has less of a cushion to fund 
its growth and to protect itself against a sudden recall of its funding, especially a bank that relies 
on deposits to fund growth. The evidence in Table 14.2 Panel A shows that non-affiliated 
NOINS CBs’ had the lowest LTD ratio suggesting that they had higher liquidity than those 
commercial banks with insurance business or affiliated with insurers. In the thrift saving sector, 
bancassurance-affiliated SBs showed the lowest liquidity level and non-affiliated SBs had lower 
liquidity levels than assurbanking-affiliated SBs, but the difference was not statistically 
significant (Table 14.2 Panel B). 
Charge-offs are loans written off as uncollectable by the banks and are loans recognized 
as losses. Charge-offs are measured on a net basis and are calculated as loans charged off as 
losses minus recoveries on loans preciously charged off.  The net charge-off ratio is calculated as 
net loan charge-offs divided by the total loans.59 Table 14.2 Panel A shows that bancassurance-
affiliated CBs had statistically higher loan charge-off ratios than non-affiliated INS CBs, and 
non-affiliated INS CBs had higher loan charge-off ratios than non-affiliated NOINS CBs. This 
suggests that commercial banks affiliated with insurers had higher losses on default loans than 
those with in-house insurance business. And commercial banks with in-house insurance 
                                                 
59 A similar measure of bank’s performance on loan is the allowance for loan losses, which was originally referred 
to as the “reserve for bad debts,” and is a valuation reserve established and maintained by charges against the bank’s 
operating income. As a valuation reserve, it is an estimate of uncollectible amounts that is used to reduce the book 
value of loans and leases to the amount that is expected to be collected (“Allowance to Loan and Lease Loss,” OCC, 
1998). We calculate the loan allowance ratio of a bank and find similar evidence as the loan charge-off ratio. 
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underwriting business had higher losses on default loans than those without any insurance 
affiliates or insurance underwriting business. For savings banks, Table 14.2 Panel B presents 
similar evidence. Insurance-affiliated SBs (including bancassurance-affiliated and assurbanking-
affiliated) had significantly higher loan charge-off ratios than non-affiliated SBs.  
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CHAPTER 8   
SCOPE ECONOMIES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES:                                                         
A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Financial services integration is broadly defined as a financial service group's participation in 
more than one of the major sectors of the financial service industry either in-house or through 
separately capitalized subsidiaries. In this dissertation, we further classify financial service 
integration as being either within-sector integration or cross-sector integration. Within-sector 
integration involves offering multiple financial products within the same sector of the financial 
industry. Cross-sector integration involves offering a broad range of financial products in two or 
more sectors of the financial industry.60 We specifically focus on cross-sector integration and 
refer to financial services cross-sector integration as “financial integration” in short.  
One of the important elements in the current debate is the effect integration has on the 
efficiency of financial institutions. The most commonly quoted source of potential gains from 
cross-sector integration is the exploitation of scope economies (Herring and Santomero, 1990; 
Saunders and Walter, 1994; Calomiris, 1998; Berger, 2000; Yeager, Yeager and Harshman, 
2004). The scope efficiency gains can be created, for example, by providing customers the 
consumption complementarities (“one-stop shopping” convenience); sharing such physical 
inputs as computers, furniture, or offices; employing common information systems, distribution 
systems, or services department; reusing managerial expertise; obtaining external capital by 
issuing securities in larger sizes. However, scope diseconomies may also arise at the same time 
because of organizational diseconomies, higher administration and coordination expenses, 
                                                 
60 Within-sector integration occurs when, for example, a commercial bank expands its banking business by acquiring 
another commercial bank, or an insurance holding company owning only life insurance subsidiaries acquires a 
property-liability insurance company. Cross-sector integration occurs when, for example, a bank holding company 
launches an insurance subsidiary, or an insurance group offers banking products through its banking subsidiaries. 
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principal-agent conflicts, cross-subsidization in internal capital markets, or losing specialization 
expertise when customers need specially tailored products. Therefore, it is particularly important 
to evaluate scope and product mix efficiencies of financial conglomerates (e.g., bancassurers and 
assurbanks).  
The remainder of this dissertation investigates scope economies of the cross-sector 
integration in the post-GLB U.S. insurance and banking industries across costs, revenue and 
profit measures. This chapter briefly reviews the concept of scope economies and discusses the 
prior literature concerning cost scope economies, revenue scope economies, and profit scope 
economies in the financial services industries. 
8.1. COST SCOPE ECONOMIES 
Cost scope economies refer to the reduction of the average total production costs through the 
production of a wider variety of goods or services. For cross-sector integration, cost scope 
economies may be realized from the sharing of physical inputs such as computers, software, 
furniture, or offices; reusing managerial expertise and experience; raising external capital at 
lower costs because of reduced risks; and employing common service functions, such as 
distribution, advertisement, or investment. One of the most desirable things about joint 
production is that commercial bank and insurer integration may lower total costs by cross-selling 
and by using a joint customer database and using information at a lower cost.61 However, cost 
scope diseconomies may also arise from the integration because of higher coordination and 
administrative costs, and organizational diseconomies may arise when producing or distributing 
a broad range of products.  
                                                 
61 Jappelli and Pagano (2002) showed that by using a common information system or reusing gathered information, 
integrated financial institutions can diminish the adverse selection problem and reduce their default rate in credit 
markets. Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2002) offered empirical evidence showing that information gathered from 
different financial services gave an advantage to institutions that combined these services over other lending 
institutions. 
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Some studies exist estimating the cost scope efficiencies of providing multiple products 
within a single financial institution. These studies evaluate cost scope economies of within-sector 
products (e.g., commercial loans and consumer loans) rather than cross-sector products (e.g., 
commercial loans and life insurance policies). Within the U.S. banking sector, the evidence was 
mixed and most studies found no substantial evidence of cost scope economies in commercial 
banks or in savings and loans (e.g., Mester, 1987, 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Pulley and 
Humphrey, 1993; Ferrier, et al., 1993; Jagtiani, Nathan, and Sick, 1995; and Rogers, 1998).62 
Two papers found evidence of cost scope diseconomies arising from the coordination and 
administrative costs of banks offering a broad range of products (Cebenoyan, 1990; Winton, 
1999). As for the evidence in Europe, Cavallo and Rossi (2001) examined six EU countries and 
found consistent cost scope economies at all production levels, suggesting that cost scope 
economies can increase as banks move towards the universal banking model. Valverde and 
Fernandez (2005) examined Spanish banks and found significant cost scope economies when 
incorporating off-balance sheet business. 
Within the insurance sector, Grace and Timme (1992) found no significant cost scope 
economies for the largest 423 U.S. life insurance companies. Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 
(2000) focused on both the U.S. life and property-liability insurance sectors for the period 1988-
1992 and found cost scope economies for firms in all size quartiles when those firms jointly 
offered life and property-liability insurance. A more recent paper by Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 
(2003) extended Berger et al. (2000) and found no evidence of cost scope efficiencies for firms 
offering both life and property-liability insurance in the U.S. insurance sector during the period 
1993-1997.  
                                                 
62 See: Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987), Hunter, Timme, and Yang (1990), Goldberg et al., (1991), Noulas, 
Miller, and Ray (1993). 
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In addition, Kellner and Mathewson (1983) found cost scope economies in the Canadian 
life industry. Khaled, Adams, and Pickford (2001) concluded that small and medium-sized New 
Zealand life insurance companies experienced cost scope diseconomies while the large-sized 
companies had neither economies nor diseconomies of scope. Hirao and Inoue (2004) found 
statistically significant cost scope economies for Japanese property-liability insurers, and 
Toivanen (1997) showed modest cost scope economies in the Finnish non-life insurance 
industry. Though these economy studies exist, scope studies in the financial services industry are 
limited, with the available research providing unconvincing evidence.  
Although studies have investigated scope economies across lines of business within the 
same sector of the U.S. financial services industry, no evidence exists on whether scope 
economies exist for offering a wider variety of products across different sectors of the industry. 
To our knowledge, no empirical study investigates the scope efficiencies of financial 
conglomerates in the U.S., and only a handful of studies provide evidence on scope economies of 
financial conglomerates in the EU, with mixed results. Lang and Welzel (1998) found mostly 
diseconomies of producing loans and investment-oriented services within German universal 
banks, and they found cost scope economies only for small German banks. By searching for 
complementarities between loans and investment-related products offered by universal banks, 
Allen and Rai (1996) showed small scope economies for EU universal banking. Vander Vennet 
(2002) found limited evidence of cost scope economies of universal banks in Europe.  
8.2. REVENUE SCOPE ECONOMIES 
Scope economies in revenue refer to the increases of total revenue resulting from the production 
of different categories of services or products. Revenue scope economies may occur because of 
consumption complementarities, otherwise called the demand super-additivity. By offering “one-
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stop shopping” convenience, financial conglomerates can reduce consumers’ search and 
transactions costs.  Furthermore, some customers may be willing to pay more for the 
convenience of “supermarket” shopping for their banking and insurance needs. Demand side 
scope efficiency gains may also arise by cross-selling a broad range of financial products or 
integrating distribution systems. Reputation recognition can also lead to revenue scope 
economies when the integration or consolidation associates itself with a strong brand name, 
which customers recognize and prefer. By diversifying across products, financial conglomerates 
may lower their risk if net cash flows are negatively correlated. In this sense, conglomerates may 
realize revenue scope economies by charging higher prices because of their lower bankruptcy 
and financial distress costs. In addition, financial integration may also provide firms with market 
power in pricing. 
However, the existence of revenue scope diseconomies cannot be dismissed, especially if 
the integration creates or enhances conflicts of interest. The conglomerate form of organization 
can create internal capital markets, which may somehow worsen inefficient cross-subsidies and 
investment inefficiencies arising from managerial agency problems (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Lamont, 
1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). Scharfstein and Stein (2000) reported inefficient cross-subsidies in 
internal capital markets, which are often “socialist” in nature, whereby weaker divisions receive 
subsidies from stronger ones. Thus, the failure of a subsidiary may endanger the other 
subsidiaries and even the group as a whole.  
Mester (1992b) argued that the market would view problems in one subsidiary as 
signaling problems in other subsidiaries and emphasized that BHCs have tended to rescue their 
failing affiliates. In a financial conglomerate, catastrophic losses of one business line (e.g., 
property-liability insurance) could be subsidized by other business lines (e.g., commercial 
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banking). Thus, commercial banking customers would worry about their savings and change to 
unaffiliated banks. In this case, revenue scope diseconomies are more likely to occur. Revenue 
scope diseconomies may also arise if specialists from different types of financial services have 
better knowledge and expertise in their areas and can provide better-tailored products for 
customers, and, thereby, charge higher prices than joint producers.  
There exists little research investigating revenue scope efficiency effects of financial 
services integration. The studies that do exist, again, are based on within-sector data (e.g., 
banking or insurance), and the results are inconclusive. Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley (1996) 
and Noulas, Miller, and Ray (1993) found little or no evidence of revenue scope efficiency for 
providing deposits and loans. In addition, both studies showed non-increasing revenue for 
charging customers for joint consumption benefits. Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000) 
found revenue scope diseconomies from providing life insurance and property-liability insurance 
products by integrated insurers. However, using a more sophisticated estimation technique, a 
more recent research by Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003) found weak evidence of revenue scope 
economies in the U.S. insurance industry.  
8.3. PROFIT SCOPE ECONOMIES 
Profit scope economies generally refer to increased profits from producing a broader range of 
products. Profit scope economies simultaneously consider both costs and revenues and, 
therefore, reflect differences in product or service quality, which may not be measurable by 
considering cost or revenue scope efficiency in isolation. For example, customers show their 
preference for “one-stop shopping” by paying more for such consumption convenience, which 
leads to revenue scope economies. However, financial conglomerates may incur additional 
expenses in offering one-stop shopping convenience to their customers that leads to cost scope 
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diseconomies. So, revenue scope economies or cost scope diseconomies alone cannot explain the 
net scope efficiency gain/loss from integrating different categories of financial products. In this 
sense, profit scope economies dominate the more commonly used concept of cost and revenue 
scope economies since estimation of profit scope economies incorporates both cost and revenue 
efficiency effects.  
Studies of profit scope efficiencies generally do not find consistent benefits of either joint 
production or specialization either within the banking or the insurance industry. Studies typically 
find that joint production was more efficient for some firms and specialization was more efficient 
for others (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000; 
Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2003). Few studies analyzing profit efficiencies have found meaningful 
profit scope economies among traditional deposit and loan outputs (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; 
Rogers, 1998). Vander Vennet (1999, 2002) studied universal banks in Europe and showed that 
universal banks typically had both higher revenue and higher profitability than specialized banks. 
Vander Vennet (1996) suggested that EU universal banks appear to be more profit efficient than 
non-universal banks. Valverde and Fernandez (2005) examined Spanish banks and found 
significant profit scope economies when the banks incorporated off-balance sheet business. 
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 CHAPTER 9   
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we develop the testable hypotheses regarding scope economies in financial 
services. Some studies investigated valuation effects of regulation or deregulation in the financial 
services industry, and most of the results suggest that regulations destroy value while 
deregulation creates value. For example, Rajan (1996) and Benston (1996) showed that the 
Glass-Steagall Act had limited financial institutions’ ability to pursue economies of scope, and 
Mamun et al. (2005a, 2005b) suggested GLB had provided welfare gains to banks and insurance 
companies.  Although GLB largely eliminates the barriers and restrictions on affiliations across 
financial sectors, it does not necessarily follow that financial "supermarkets" will become 
dominant in the U.S. financial service industry. Furthermore, we observe the coexistence of 
conglomeration and specialization business strategies by U.S. banks and insurance companies. 
Whether scope efficiency benefits exist for either joint or specialized production remains an open 
question for cross-industry financial conglomeration in the U.S. These suggest the first two 
general hypotheses regarding the existence of scope economies, stated in null form as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Neither scope economies nor diseconomies exist in the post-GLB 
integrated banking and insurance industries. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Economies of scope are invariant among financial conglomerates jointly 
producing banking and insurance products. 
 
As we discuss in Chapter 8, economies of scope can arise from variety cost 
complementarities and/or revenue complementarities. Firm-specific characteristics, e.g., firm 
size, product mix, distribution network, and regulatory regime, may affect those 
complementarities and then contribute to assorted scope economies or diseconomies. Some 
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banks or insurers could be in a better position to benefit from the diversified manufacturing. We 
then formulate the following specific hypotheses to address the question of which types of banks 
and insurers are more likely to realize economies of scope through cross-industry financial 
integration.  
Firm size is regarded as an important factor in the financial institution literature. Akhigbe 
and Whyte (2001) and Barth et al. (2000) found that large banks benefited more from the 
passage of GLB than small banks. In addition, there is a consensus that firm size may be 
associated with greater or lesser scope economies, and it is typically found that large banks or 
insurance companies could exploit higher scope economies than small ones (Berger, Humphrey, 
and Pulley, 1996; Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor, 1999;  Berger, et al., 2000; Cummins, Weiss, and 
Zi, 2003). Financial conglomerates jointly producing banking and insurance products may gain a 
competitive advantage through implicit government guarantees if they are large enough and if 
they are considered “too big to fail.” These large conglomerates may also gain a reputational 
advantage if consumers perceive that the implicit guarantees reduce potential losses. The implicit 
guarantees may also allow them to borrow funds at lower costs (Kane, 1995, 1999; Carow, 
2001a). Cost scope economies may exist on a small scale, from sharing some inputs or sharing 
fixed resources such as computers or offices, but for larger conglomerates these cost scope 
economy gains could be exhausted or offset by coordination or management diseconomies. 
Nevertheless, large scale may be needed to generate revenue scope economies from consumption 
complementarities because of the need to maintain a large distribution network. The third null 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Larger financial conglomerates are more likely to exploit economies of 
scope in jointly producing banking and insurance products.  
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The two primary product segments of the insurance sector are life-health insurance and 
property-liability insurance. The business opportunities offered by GLB may benefit some lines 
of insurance business more than others. Carow (2001a) found that life insurance companies 
benefited more from the passage of GLB than did property-liability insurers. A GAO (1990) 
study, along with a study conducted by Saunders and Walter (1994), concluded that synergistic 
gains are greater for the combination of banks and life insurers than for the combination of banks 
and property-casualty insurers. Given regulations precluding banks from manufacturing 
insurance, U.S. banks have been engaging in the insurance business through the selling of 
annuities and through the selling of credit and mortgage-related insurance, and they have long 
entered distribution alliances with insurance companies. Since life insurance products have more 
similarities with banking products or since they can function as complementarities to banking 
products, banks are more interested in life insurance products than property-liability products 
(Johnston and Madura, 2000). The evidence found in Chapter 6 supports this inference – bank-
owned insurers accounted for 7.3 percent life insurance industry assets but only 3 percent 
property-liability industry assets. Carow (2001b) found that life insurance companies received 
more intense competition from banks than did property-liability insurers.63  
A majority of banks has been offering annuities and credit related life and health 
insurance to their customers for a long time. A 1996 Life Office Management Association survey 
of banks and thrifts involved in insurance distribution showed that banks were most likely to sell 
annuities followed by term life and whole life, and were least likely to distribute property-
liability products. As a result, many banks and thrift institutions have accumulated significant 
experience distributing life insurance. Hence, banks could gain greater scope economies when 
                                                 
63 The combination of banks and life insurers may also benefit from risk reduction. Using simulated data, Boyd and 
Graham (1988) and Brewer et al. (1988) document reduced coefficients of variation and reduced bankruptcy risk for 
bank-life insurance combination. 
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combining with life insurers than property-liability insurers.  The fourth null hypothesis is stated 
as follows:  
Hypothesis 4: Economies of scope are more likely to occur in jointly producing life and 
banking products than in jointly producing property-liability and banking products. 
 
In addition, economies that arise from marketing, distribution, administration, and other 
functions could be more prevalent in the retail product lines than in the commercial lines.  The 
primary argument in favor of this position is that marketing, distribution, administration, and 
other functions tend to be more homogeneous in the retail lines and more heterogeneous in the 
commercial lines. Retail customers may be willing to pay more for such one-stop shopping 
convenience, however, commercial customers face relatively trivial search or transaction costs 
and prefer tailored products for their banking or insurance needs. These arguments suggest the 
following null hypothesis in relation to the product portfolio: 
Hypothesis 5: Economies of scope are more likely to occur in the retail financial product 
lines than in the commercial lines.  
 
A sixth hypothesis has to do with distribution systems, which may have an effect on the 
level of scope economies. Although a consolidated bank and insurer may lower total costs or 
increase expected revenue by cross-selling, scope economies may vary with distribution systems. 
Insurers using vertically integrated distribution systems distribute their products through 
exclusive agents, direct marketing (by company employees), or mass marketing (mail and/or 
mass media advertising). Insurers using horizontally integrated distribution systems distribute 
through brokers or independent agents who sell the products of multiple insurers.64  
Banks are expected to sell their insurance affiliates’ products through their branches or 
offices. Banks affiliated with vertically integrated insurers can reuse insurers’ relatively large 
investments in advertising and marketing, which more likely create cost scope economies. 
                                                 
64 Kim, Mayers , and Smith (1996) had further discussions of the choice of insurance distribution system. 
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However, revenue scope economies may be less likely in the affiliation between banks and 
vertically integrated insurers because such affiliations may increase competition and conflicts 
within the group, which is especially serious when bank-sold insurance products are similar to 
the insurance products offered by their insurer affiliates, especially annuities.65 In this sense, 
insurers using horizontal distribution systems may be in a better position to gain revenue scope 
economies when affiliating with banks. Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997) found that 
vertically integrated distributors are more likely to realize both cost and revenue scope 
economies in the life insurance industry. However, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003) did not find 
evidence that scope economies were more likely for insurers using vertically integrated 
distributions than those using horizontal distribution systems. These arguments inform the next 
hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 6: Economies of scope are more likely to be present for the combination of 
banks and insurers using vertically integrated distributions than for the combination of 
banks and insurers using horizontally integrated distributions.   
 
Since efficient managers are already outperforming their competitors, with the ability to 
achieve high levels of X-efficiency, they can use and extend their managerial talent, experience, 
and expertise into the conglomeration. Thus, they can better realize economies of scope, yielding 
a positive relationship between efficiency and scope economies. X-efficiencies capture 
individual firm’s deviations from the efficiency frontier. For example, the revenue X-efficiency 
refers to how close a firm’s actual revenues are to the revenues of a best-practice firm producing 
the same outputs.66 The last hypothesis is as follows: 
                                                 
65 Banks and thrift institutions made about 15 percent of individual annuity sales in 1999 and about 23 percent in 
2003 (The Financial Services Fact Book 2005). 
66 Consistent with the original definition of Leibenstein (1966), Berger (1993) defined cost X-efficiency as the ratio 
of the minimum costs that could have been expended to produce a given outputs bundle to the actual costs 
expended, and varies between 0 and 1. We follow Berger (1993) and define revenue X-efficiency and profit X-
efficiency as the ratio of the actual revenue or profit earned to the maximum revenue or profits that could have been 
earned to produce a given outputs bundle.  
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Hypothesis 7: X-efficient firms are more likely to enjoy economies of scope in the joint 
production of banking and insurance products.    
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 CHAPTER 10   
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This section describes the data, the two-stage econometric method utilized and the estimation of 
outputs, inputs, and prices. 
10.1. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
The translog functional form, first proposed by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973), 
has been employed to estimate cost functions in a number of scope economy studies. However, 
this functional form does not allow for zero production of any product and, therefore, is not ideal 
for scope economy estimation. Some studies attempted to circumvent this problem by estimating 
the translog function at some close-to-zero output value (e.g., Benston, Berger, Hanweck, 
Humphrey, 1983; Gilligan, Simirlock, and Marshall, 1984; Murray and White, 1983; Mester, 
1987; and Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1987). Unfortunately, these efforts have proved 
unsatisfactory since the translog was not well behaved around zero and scope economy 
estimation was sensitive to the value chosen (Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1987). More 
recently, researchers have introduced Box-Cox transformations into the conventional translog 
functions (Box and Cox, 1964; and Cebenoyan, 1990).67 Again, the results were still 
unsatisfactory as the Box-Cox parameters were found close to the translog function parameters 
(Pulley and Humphrey, 1993).  
In this dissertation, we use the composite cost function first proposed by Pulley and 
Braunstein (1992). The composite function not only allows zero output for some products but 
                                                 
67 Using Box-Cox transformation in outputs, the hybrid translog function substitutes lnQi with (Qλi -1)/λ. 
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also negative values for the dependent variable. Thus, this functional form is attractive for the 
scope economies analysis, especially for estimating profit scope efficiencies.68  
10.1.1. FUNCTION FORM 
The composite Pulley and Braunstein (P-B) model combines a quadratic structure for outputs 
















where C is total costs; qi is the ith output, i=1,…,n; rk is the kth input price, k=1,…,m; α, β, δ, 
μ  are coefficient vectors to be estimated; ε denotes a random error term. The theoretical 
requirement that the cost function be homogeneous of degree one in input prices is met by 
imposing the following restrictions (Brown, Caves and Christensen, 1979):69
  and ∑ ∑  ( k, l = 1,…,m ) ∑ = 1kk β == 0k lkkll ββ
  (k = 1,…,m) ∑ = 0ikk δ
The symmetry restriction implies αij = αji and βkl = βlk. The constant terms β0 and the interaction 
term  are omitted because of the technical difficulty in estimating both constant 
terms and both interaction terms simultaneously (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; McKillop et al., 
1996; and Berger et al., 2000).
∑∑ kiik rq lnμ
70 Hence, the P-B composite model used is specified as  
                                                 
68 This type of model has been used to estimate economies of scope in banking (e.g., Pulley and Humphrey, 1993; 
McKillop, Glass, and Morikawa, 1996; Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997) and in 
insurance (e.g., Berger et al., 2000; Hirao and Inoue, 2004). 
69 The function must exhibit homogeneity of degree one in input prices to be a well-behaved cost function. That is a 
doubling of all input prices exactly doubles costs. Linear homogeneity, a necessary condition for the cost function, is 
not necessary for the alternative revenue and profit functions. 
70 The original P-B model has two constant terms, α0 and β0 , and two interaction terms, ∑∑μikqilnrk and 
∑∑δikqilnrk.  Technically, they cannot be simultaneously estimated. P-B (1992) and other literature recommended 
retaining one in the final model.  













   (2) 
Consistent with the literature, we adopt a modified version of the composite cost function 
















  (3) 
In this normalized composite function, the dependent variable is normalized by the price of the 
last input (rm). Output terms are scaled by the sample mean (yi =qi /mean(qi)) and input prices are 
normalized by the last input price (sk = ri / rm). The normalization of output quantities by the 
sample mean helps reduce scale bias in estimation and the normalization by the last input price 
imposes linear homogeneity in the input prices, a necessary condition for the empirical cost 
function to be consistent with production theory.  
 The revenue and profit functions estimated in our study are identical to the composite 
cost function, (2) and (3), except that the dependent variable, cost, is replaced by revenue and 
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71 Following Berger et al. (2000), we use the same form and independent variables for the cost, revenue, and profit 
functions to avoid the impact of specification differences on the cost, revenue, and profit scope economies 
estimations. Although linear homogeneity is not necessary for the revenue and profit functions, we impose the same 
normalization to avoid the specification differences effects. In addition, output prices generally move with input 
prices, so we assume that if all input prices double, output prices would approximately double, as would profits and 
revenues.  
Furthermore, these are also called alternative revenue and profit efficiency functions. Standard profit efficiency 
takes output prices to be exogenous, and the alternative profit efficiency takes output quantities to be exogenous.  It 
is called the alternative profit function because it includes output quantities rather than output prices. The alternative 
profit efficiency concept is used primarily because output prices and quality are difficult to measure accurately for 
banks and because output quantities are relatively fixed in the short-run and cannot respond quickly to changing 
prices as is assumed in the use of standard profit efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997, 2003). 
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where R is the revenue; P is the profit. The modified composite cost, revenue, and profit 
functions are estimated by non-linear least squares.  
10.1.2. MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
Cost economies of scope (CSCOPE) are measured as the percentage of costs that firms could 
save by producing multiple products jointly instead of producing each product separately in 
specialist firms (Panzar and Willig, 1975, 1981). The traditional measure of CSCOPE (specified 






rqqCrqCrqCCSCOPET −+=     (8) 
Where C( . ) is a continuous cost function estimated for conglomerates only;72 q1 and q2 are 
output level of the two products; and r refers to the input price vector. Cost scope economies are 
believed to be present if CSCOPET > 0, and diseconomies are present if CSCOPET < 0. Since 
data on specialist firms were generally not available, this measure was acceptable and widely 
used in literature. Recently, this traditional measurement by Panzar and Willig (1981) was 
                                                 
72 The traditional approach to estimating scope economies of financial institutions is to use a single continuous cost 
function that is estimated only for joint producers but is assumed to apply to specialists as well. This is usually 
necessitated by an absence of data on specialist firms. 
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criticized by some researchers. Panzar and Willig assumed that both specialist firms and 
conglomerates produced financial products with the same technology, and they operated at the 
same production frontier. They estimated a single cost function using the conglomerates data 
only and applied this to both specialists and conglomerates. However, the assumption was hard 
to justify, as it was quite possible that the joint producers used different technologies than the 
specialists, especially when the market segment served was different.  
To fix these problems, an alternative measure of scope economies has been developed by 
Berger, Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2000), who suggested that cost, revenue, or profit functions 
should be estimated separately for specialist firms and joint producers. This approach is feasible 
only when data are available on both diversified and specialized firms. Fortunately, this is the 
case for our data sample. Thus, we adopt this alternative approach for our estimation. This 
approach gives the measure of cost scope economies when producing two product categories, Q1 
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where CS1(q1; r1) is the cost function for the specialist firm S1 producing Q1; CS2(q2; r2) is the 
cost function for the specialist firm S2 producing Q2; CJ1(q1 ; r1) is the cost function for the 
division J1 (producing Q1 only) of conglomerates; CJ2(q2 ; r2) is the cost function for the division 
J2 (producing Q2 only) of conglomerates. Cost scope economies are believed to be present if 
CSCOPE> 0, and diseconomies are present if CSCOPE< 0. 
Revenue and profit scope economies are generally measured as the percentage increase in 
revenue or profit when different categories of products are provided jointly instead of being 
provided separately. The revenue scope economies score (RSCOPE) is given by 
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where RS1( . ),  RS2( . ),  and PS1( . ),  PS2( . ) are revenue and profit functions for specialist firms 
S1 and S2 respectively; RJ1( . ), RJ2( . ), and PJ1( . ), PJ2( . ) are revenue and profit functions for 
divisions J1 and J2 of conglomerates,. Similarly, revenue or profit scope economies are believed 
to be present if RSCOPE> 0 or PSCOPE> 0, and scope diseconomies are present if RSCOPE< 0 
or PSCOPE< 0.  
10.2. DATA 
The data screening and selection process is discussed in Chapter 4. The data sample used 
contains 260 observations of diversified firm jointly producing banking and insurance products, 
613 insurance specialist observations (offering insurance products only) and 1,450 bank 
specialist observations (offering banking products only) over the three year period 2003 – 2005. 
Table 16 shows the statistics of the data sample. The number of firms is further disaggregated by 
sectors and product lines. The firms included in the data sample accounts for 98 percent of life 
insurance industry assets, 94 percent of property-liability insurance assets, 88 percent of 
commercial banks assets, and 81 percent of thrifts assets.   
10.3. ESTIMATION OF OUTPUTS, INPUTS, AND PRICES 
Like other service industries, it is difficult to define what financial institutions produce and how 
the services are priced. This section briefly discusses the measurement of outputs, inputs, and 
prices for insurance companies and banks, respectively. Table 17 summarizes the output and 
input measures. 
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10.3.1. OUTPUTS AND PRICES 
Three alternative methods have been used in the literature to measure outputs in the financial 
services industry – the asset (financial intermediation) approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), the 
user-cost approach (Donovan, 1978), and the value-added (production) approach (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992). The asset approach considers financial institutions as intermediaries that 
borrow funds from depositors and then lend the money to borrowers. The user-cost approach 
determines whether a financial product is an input or output by comparing its contribution to the 
firm’s revenue. If its return on assets exceeds the opportunity cost of funds, then the product is 
treated as an output, otherwise, it is considered as an input. The value-added approach treats all 
asset and liability categories as having both output and input characteristics (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992; Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; Pulley and Humphrey, 1993; Berger et al., 2000; 
Cummins et al., 2003).  Those categories having significant value added are considered 
important outputs, and others are treated as inputs, intermediate products, or unimportant 
outputs.  
10.3.1.1. INSURANCE OUTPUTS AND PRICES 
The literature has evolved over time and the value-added approach is believed to be the most 
appropriate approach to measure the outputs of the insurance industry (Leverty, 2005).73 
Consistent with the recent literature on insurance efficiency (e.g., Cummins and Zi, 1998; Berger 
et al., 2000; Cummins and Weiss, 2001; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2003; Greene and Segal, 
2004), we identify three principal services provided by insurance companies:  risk pooling and 
risk-bearing, real financial services, and financial intermediation. The actuarial, underwriting, 
claim settlement, and associated expenses incurred in operating risk pools are the main 
                                                 
73 Leverty (2005) surveyed the production approach in defining and measuring P&L insurer’s outputs and discussed 
the issues in measuring the efficiency of P&L insurers. 
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components of value added related to risk-pooling and risk-bearing. In life insurance, real 
financial services include personal financial planning, pension counseling, and commercial 
benefit plan administration. In property-liability insurance, risk surveys, coverage program 
design, and consulting on policy deductibles and limits are the major real services related to 
insured losses. For financial intermediation, interest credited to life insurance policies and 
premium discounts applied to property-liability insurance policies represent the value added of 
the insurers’ intermediation function.  
PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE. For property-liability insurers, the present 
value of real losses incurred (PV(L)) is used as a output proxy (Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 
1997; Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2003). Losses incurred 
are generally defined as the total losses that are expected to be paid by insurers for providing 
insurance coverage arising from business written during the previous year; specifically they are 
calculated as the sum of losses paid plus the net change in loss reserves. They are good 
representations of risk-pooling and risk-bearing services since this service functions by 
collecting funds from individuals in the pool and then redistributing those funds to those who 
incur losses. Losses incurred are also good proxies for real services provided by the insurer. We 
calculate the present value to reflect claim settlement lags that may have a significant impact on 
certain product lines, e.g., liability insurance vs. auto physical damage insurance. Following the 
insurance literature, we define four output lines of business: personal short-tail lines, personal 
long-tail lines, commercial short-tail lines, and commercial long-tail lines. Table 15 provides a 
list of outputs and lines of business definition.  
We estimate the proportion of losses incurred from any accident year t that is paid in year 
t+j using the Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000), and we estimate industry aggregate claim 
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data obtained from Schedule P of the A.M. Best Rating Guide (2003, 2004, and 2005). Then the 
expected loss payouts of the company are discounted using interest rate data for U.S. Treasury 
yield curves obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.  
The output of intermediation functions is measured by the annual average real invested 
assets, which is computed as an average of the beginning and end-of-year invested assets 
(Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1997; Berger et al., 2000; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 1999, 2003; 
Cummins and Weiss, 2001). 
The prices of the four categories of property-liability insurance outputs are computed as 
pi = [Pi – PV(Li)] / PV(Li), (i = 1,…, 4), where pi refers to the price of output i; Pi refers to the 
total premium earned for the output i; and PV(Li) is the present value of losses incurred for 
output i. For the price of the intermediary output, we use the expected rate of return on the 
insurer’s invested assets, including the expected returns on both the stocks and other invested 
assets in the insurer’s investment portfolio. Because the expected return on other invested assets, 
such as bonds and notes, is typically close to their actual return, the rate of return on other 
invested assets in the portfolio is represented by the ratio of actual investment income (minus 
dividends on stocks) to insurer’s total holdings of other investment assets. For stocks, the 
expected rate of return is calculated as the cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French 
CAPM with Ibbotson Associates industry beta (SIC categories 6331).74 Finally, the expected 
portfolio rate of return is determined as a weighted average of the stocks and other investment 
asset returns with each proportion weighted in the investment portfolio.  
Because of the sample size limitation (146 observations of conglomerate property-
liability subsidiaries), we use three aggregate insurance outputs for property-liability insurers:  
                                                 
74 Industry betas are from Ibbotson Associates Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Standard Industrial 
Classification system (SIC) categories can be found at www.census.gov. 
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(1) personal lines combining personal short-tail and long-tail products; (2) commercial lines 
combining commercial short-tail and long-tail products; (3) intermediary output (invested 
assets). 
LIFE INSURANCE. Because of the specific limitations in information reported by life 
insurers, the present value of benefits incurred for life insurers is not available. Following 
accepted practice, e.g., Yuengert (1993), Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999), Berger, 
Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000), Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003), we use incurred benefits 
(payments received by policyholders in a year) plus additions to reserves as a proxy of life 
insurance outputs. Incurred benefits are suitable for measuring the risk-pooling and risk-sharing 
functions because they reflect the amount of funds pooled and redistributed by life insurers to 
policyholders for insured events. Increases in reserves are similar to bank deposits and represent 
the funds received by insurers but not needed for benefit payments and expenses. The funds 
backing the reserves are invested by insurers in financial instruments. Thus, additions to reserves 
should be a good output measure for the intermediation function. In addition, both are highly 
correlated with the real services provided by life insurers, such as personal financial planning 
and commercial benefit plan management. Consistent with the literature, we define five business 
lines: personal life insurance, personal annuities, group life insurance, group annuities, and 
accident and health insurance. Because of the small sample size (210 conglomerate life insurance 
subsidiary observations), we use three aggregate outputs for life insurers: (1) life insurance 
including personal and group life insurance; (2) annuities including personal and group annuities; 
(3) accident and health insurance. 
The prices of the life insurance outputs are computed by the function pi = [Pi + I i – (Li + 
Wi)] / (Li + W i ), (i = 1,…, 5), where pi is the price of output i; Pi refers to the total premium 
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earned for the output i; and Ii is the allocated investment income for output i;75 Li represents the 
incurred benefits for output i; and Wi is the additions to reserves for output line i. 
10.3.1.2. BANKING OUTPUTS AND PRICES 
Consistent with most of the recent literature on bank efficiencies, we measure bank outputs using 
the intermediation approach. The definition and measurement of banking outputs and prices are 
simpler and easier compared with insurance. The services provided by banks are traditional 
financial services (on-balance sheet), new financial services (on-balance sheet), and off-balance 
sheet (OBS) activities. The traditional financial services include deposits (demand, time and 
savings) and loans (real estate, commercial, installment), and those services continue to represent 
the majority of the bank business (Berger et al., 1992; Berger et al., 1997; Pulley and Humphrey, 
1993; Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002).  As noted by Stiroh 
(2000), fee-based services and off-balance sheet activities have been recognized as a growing 
category of bank assets and have accounted for a substantial portion of bank revenues. These 
activities are especially concentrated in large institutions and failure to account for them may 
lead to incorrect conclusions.76 New financial services, including portfolio management, mutual 
or pension fund distributions, and safekeeping services, are expected to reduce risk (Gallo, 
Apilado, and Kolari, 1996), enhance scale economies and produce cross-selling synergy (Kane, 
1995; Golter, 1996). The major off-balance sheet activities are loan commitments (lines of credit 
                                                 
75 Life insurers are required to report allocated investment income by product lines in their NAIC regulatory 
statement, which is not required for property-liability insurers.   
76 Mester (1992a) did not find complementarities between loans and off-balance sheet securitization; while Rogers 
(1998) found significant but small complementarities between traditional output and “new financial services.”  
Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) and Clark and Siems (2002) found complementarities when considering a wide range 
of off-balance sheet activities jointly although they vanished as bank size increased. Valverde and Fernandez (2005) 
examined Spanish banks and found that OBS business introduced both cost and profit scope economies compared to 
a narrow (traditional) definition of output mix. 
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and credit cards), credit derivatives, letters of credit, and loan originations, sales, and servicing 
(Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996; Clark and Siems, 2002; Rime and Stiroh, 2003).77  
Following the literature, we identify three categories of outputs – consumer loans, 
business loans, and other assets.78 The first output, consumer loans, involves intermediation and 
loan services and is calculated as the sum of the dollar value of residential loans, credit card 
loans and other installment loans. The second output, business loans, includes the dollar value of 
real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, farm loans and other loans and leases. The 
price of loans is defined as total interest and fee earnings on loans divided by the quantity of 
loans. The last output, other assets, includes a bank's new financial services and off-balance sheet 
business and reflects another important source of bank revenue. It is defined as the sum dollar 
value of securities and trading assets held by banks and OBS activities. The OBS activities are 
calculated as the risk-weighted (based on Basle Accord risk weights) amounts of unused 
commitments, letters of credit, derivatives and other OBS items.79 The price for “other assets” is 
obtained as the sum of the total interests and non-interest earnings on these assets divided by the 
total dollar value of “other assets.” 
10.3.2. INPUTS AND PRICES 
Unlike output definitions, there is a general agreement in the literature regarding the 
measurement of inputs in the financial service industry.  
                                                 
77 Also see DeYoung (1994), Hunter and Timme (1995), Jagtiani, Nathan, and Sick (1995), Berger, Humphrey, and 
Pulley (1996), Hughes and Mester (1998). 
78 It would be ideal if the bank outputs were disaggregated into more categories, e.g., commercial and industrial 
loans, real estate loans, installment loans to individuals. However, because of the trade-off between the degree of 
aggregation for outputs and the degree of freedom, our data cannot afford to lose the degree of freedom since the 
data have a small number of conglomerate observations. 
79 The Basle Accord risk weights indicates that the OBS items have approximately the same perceived credit risk 
and the same origination, monitoring, and control costs as loans. Since the correct risk weights specified by the RBC 
requirements vary according to maturity, type of contracts, and other characteristics, we assume the risk weights are 
100 percent for letters of credit, 50 percent for unused loan commitments, and 10 percent for derivatives and all the 
other OBS items (Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; and Berger and DeYoung, 2001). 
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10.3.2.1. INSURANCE INPUTS AND PRICES 
The inputs of property-liability and life insurers are very similar. Since they are similarly 
defined, this section presents the inputs and prices discussion for both life and property-liability 
insurers. Generally, the inputs to insurance fall into four principal categories – home office 
administrative labor, agent labor, material and physical capital, and financial equity and debt 
capital.  
Since insurers are not required to report detail information about the number of 
employees and quantity of materials used in business, we impute them from the dollar value of 
related expenses reported in their regulatory statements divided by the price. The price of the 
home office labor is obtained from average weekly wage rates for life insurers (SIC categories 
6311 or NAICS categories 524113) 80 and property-liability insurers (SIC categories 6331 or 
NAICS categories 524126) in their domicile state available from the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Similarly, the price of agent labor is defined as the premium-weighted average weekly wage 
rates for insurance agents (SIC categories 6411 or NAICS code 524210) in states where the 
insurer operates. The weight is the proportion of the insurer’s direct business written in each 
state. The price of the materials and business services is defined as the U.S. Department of Labor 
average weekly wage rates for business services. We use the national index consistent with 
materials being available for the same price nationwide.  




EQ = , where EHL denotes the dollar 
expenditures on home office labor and wHL refers to the price of home office labor. The dollar 
expenditure on home office labor is defined as the sum of salaries, payroll taxes, and employee 
                                                 
80 North America Industry Classification System (NAICS) and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories 
can be found at www.census.gov. 
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EQ = , where EAL is the dollar expenditures on agent labor and wAL refers to the 
price of agent labor. The dollar expenditure on agent labor is defined as the sum of net 
commissions, brokerage fees and allowance to agents. The quantity of material and physical 
capital is defined as the dollar value of net premises and fixed assets available in insurer’s 
regulatory report; the price of physical capital is obtained as occupancy and fixed asset 
expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital. 
 In addition to labor and physical inputs, we include two proxies for the financial capital: 
equity capital and debt capital. Financial equity capital plays an important role in reducing the 
insolvency risk81 and is viewed as one of the important inputs as conveyed in the literature (e.g., 
Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1998; and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 
2001). An insurer’s financial equity capital is defined as the statutory policyholders surplus 
measured as the average of beginning and end-of-year equity capital. To measure the price of 
financial equity capital, we use the estimated cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French 
CAPM with industry specific beta obtained from Ibbotson Associates Cost of Capital 
Yearbook.82  
The debt capital of insurers is defined as the funds borrowed from policyholders.  These 
funds are comprised of loss reserves and unearned premiums reserves. The price of policyholder 
supplied debt capital is calculated as total expected investment income minus expected 
investment income attributed to equity capital divided by average debt capital. The expected 
                                                 
81 The insurance pricing theory predicts that insurers have optimal capital structures and insurance product price is 
inversely related to insurers’ default risk (Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Cummins and Danzon, 1997). 
82 Cummins and Weiss (2001) proposed a book-value approach, which assumed that insurers held equity portfolios 
with a market beta coefficient of 1.0; and, therefore, they use a constant cost of equity across all insurers in the 
industry. It was calculated on the average 90-day Treasury Bill rate plus the long-term average market risk premium 
(1926 to the end of year t) on large company stocks from Ibbotson Associates. 
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investment income attributed to equity capital is calculated as the expected rate of investment 
return multiplied by average equity capital (Cummins and Weiss, 2001).    
10.3.2.2. BANKING INPUTS AND PRICES 
Similar to the inputs for insurance companies, the four inputs for banks (both commercial banks 
and thrift saving institutions) are widely recognized as deposits, labor, physical capital, and 
purchased funds (e.g., Berger, Dick, Goldberg, and White, 2005; Berger and Mester, 2003; 
Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996; 
and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001). 
 The first input, deposits, includes demand deposits, time and saving deposits. The 
quantity of deposits is directly measured as the total dollar value of demand deposits, time and 
saving deposit liabilities of the bank. The price of deposits is calculated as total interest expense 
on the deposits divided by the quantity of deposits. The quantity of labor is defined as the 
number of employees reported in the bank’s regulatory report, and the price of labor is calculated 
as the salary, wage and welfare per employee. The quantity of physical capital is defined by the 
dollar value of net premises and fixed assets available in the bank’s regulatory report, and the 
price of physical capital is obtained as occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the 
quantity of physical capital. Since purchased funds require very small amounts of physical inputs 
like labor and capital, they are treated as financial inputs to the intermediation process, which 
include federal funds purchased, large CDs, foreign deposits, demand notes, and other liabilities 
for borrowed money. The price of purchased funds is calculated as interest paid on these funds 
divided by the total dollar value of these funds, which is the quantity of purchased funds.  
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 CHAPTER 11   
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section reports the empirical results of the scope economies analysis for U.S. financial 
institutions jointly producing banking and insurance products. We first evaluate the cost, 
revenue, and profit scope economies by estimating the composite cost, revenue, and profit 
functions. Then, the second-stage regression results are discussed. 
11.1. SCOPE ECONOMY ESTIMATES 
It is well recognized that specialist firms and diversified firms may operate at different 
production frontiers due to different business strategies and technologies. We estimate cost, 
revenue, and profit functions for specialist and diversified firms, respectively. A total of 24 
functions is estimated: two types of firms (specialists and diversified) by four sectors (life 
insurance, property-liability insurance, commercial banking, and thrifts) by three types of 
functions (cost, revenue, and profit). Tables 18, 19, 20 and 21 show the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the function estimation for commercial banks, thrift saving banks, life 
insurers, and property-liability insurers, respectively. Panel A is the summary of the statistics for 
the diversified firms, Panel B is for the specialist firms, and Panel C shows the statistics for all 
firms in the sample. We use non-linear least square estimation to estimate the composite 
functions. The estimated functions well fit the sample and show good overall fitness.  
Scope economy estimates for the joint producers (bancassurers and assurbanks) are 
obtained by applying the scope economy formulas for each of them with the coefficients 
estimated from the composite functions. Scope economy estimates for the specialists are 
obtained by simulating mergers of insurance specialists with bank specialists (Berger et al., 
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2000). We use Cartesian product (also called direct product) to obtain the hypothetical financial 
conglomerates. The hypothetical financial conglomerates are created by merging every insurance 
specialist with every bank specialist in each given year.  Thus, 298,185 synthetic joint producers 
are obtained.83   
One common approach in inferring scope economies is to evaluate at a single point, e.g., 
the mean or median of the data. Nevertheless, this point estimation method has been criticized 
for its weak representation, as it may not provide a good approximation for the whole sample 
(Hirao and Inoue, 2004; and Berger et al., 2000). We present our scope economy estimations in 
several different ways. The cost, revenue, and profit scope economies are evaluated, first, for all 
the firms in the sample, then, for the actual joint producers only, and, finally, for the synthetic 
financial conglomerates. The scope economy scores, then, are evaluated at three points, the 25th 
(Q1), 50th (median), and 75th (Q3) percentile of the data. For example, for the whole sample the 
scope economy scores are estimates at the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile of 
outputs quantities and inputs prices. 
Table 22 summarizes the estimates of costs, revenue, and profit scope economy scores 
for all firms in the sample, the actual joint firms only, and the simulated joint firms only. 
Focusing first on cost scope economies, Panel A shows consistent negative cost scope economy 
estimates regardless of evaluation points or firms samples. The evidence indicates significant 
cost scope diseconomies on jointly producing banking and insurance products. For example, at 
median level of outputs and input prices, the data show cost scope diseconomies of 11.4 percent 
for all the firms, 24.1 percent for actual joint producers, and 26 percent for the hypothetical joint 
firms. The estimates at Q1 and Q3 suggest the same conclusion, and the cost scope diseconomies 
                                                 
83 The Cartesian product approach considers all possible firm pairs and, therefore, can reduce the potential for bias 
resulting from arbitrarily excluding ex ante some firm combinations that might be associated with scope economies 
or diseconomies. 
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are statistically significant. Panel A also shows an inverse relationship between firm size and 
cost scope diseconomies. As discussed in Chapter 9, cost scope economies may exist on a small 
scale from sharing inputs or sharing fixed resources such as computers or offices, but such gains 
could be offset by coordination or management diseconomies and exhausted in larger scale. The 
relationship between scope economies and firm size will be further discussed in the regression 
analysis. 
Panel B of Table 22 lists the revenue scope economies estimates. All the estimate scores 
are large in value and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The positive revenue scope 
economy scores indicate revenue scope economies in joint production, suggesting that offering 
both banking and insurance products can generate higher sales revenue than producing the 
products separately in specialists firms. At median value, actual joint firms could realize revenue 
scope economies of 32.1 percent, and for specialist firms, revenue scope economies are predicted 
to be 38.8 percent. In terms of the pattern between revenue scope economies and firm size, Panel 
B indicates a positive relationship. The larger the firm size, the higher its revenue scope 
economies. It is not surprising to see that small size firms are less capable of benefiting from 
such production complementarities. As discussed earlier, large scale operations may be needed to 
generate revenue scope economies from consumption complementarities because of the need to 
maintain a large distribution network. In addition, this finding suggests that large firms are the 
most efficient in utilizing cross-selling and exploiting benefits from offering one-stop shopping 
convenience when providing banking and insurance products simultaneously.   
Panel C of Table 22 provides the summary of profit scope economy score estimations. 
The data generally show significant profit scope economies for all firms in the sample, the actual 
joint firms only, and hypothetical joint firms only. However, profit scope economies are quite 
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small and less significant. For example, at sample median, actual joint producers could benefit 
from joint production by increasing 2 percent net income, and the specialists are predicted to 
increase 10 percent net income by conglomeration. Except for the estimates for actual joint 
producers at Q1, the profit scope economies are statistically significant. Similar to the revenue 
scope economies in Panel B, large firms show higher profit scope economies when producing 
both banking and insurance products. The profit scope economies increase from 2.6 percent at 
Q1, to 3.9 percent at median, to 7.6 percent at Q3 for all firms in the data.  
The findings reject Hypothesis 1 and suggest that significant cost scope diseconomies, 
significant revenue scope economies, and weak profit scope economies exist in the post-GLB 
integrated banking and insurance industries. The evidence of cost scope diseconomies cannot 
support production complementarities and suggests that cost savings from sharing resources such 
as marketing systems, information databases, and offices do not offset the extra costs possibly 
incurred in joint production and conglomeration. The findings of revenue scope economies 
support consumption complementarities, which suggests that customers are willing to pay more 
for the convenient one-stop shopping; Demand side scope efficiency gains also arise by cross-
selling.  The findings of profit scope economies indicate that revenue scope economies dominate 
cost scope diseconomies on joint productions. This leads to the final net profit scope economies, 
which, however, are small.  
Furthermore, the evidence of varied cost and revenue scope economies or diseconomies 
supports our contention that profit scope economies dominate the commonly used concept of 
cost or revenue scope economies. Neither the cost nor the revenue scope economies can explain 
net effects of integrating the banking and insurance manufacturing on financial conglomerate 
operations. Focusing on either cost or revenue economies may lead to misleading conclusions. 
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11.2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
We next investigate which types of firms are more likely to benefit from conglomeration and 
how firm characteristics explain the scope economies difference among firms. The remainder of 
the dissertation is devoted to a regression analysis. It is the second stage analysis. The cost, 
revenue, and profit scope economy scores are regressed on a set of firm characteristic variables. 
The regression results discussed in this section reveal the effects of firm characteristics on 
economies of scope and test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 9. Observations with extreme 
scope economy scores, e.g., scope economy scores greater than 1 and less than -1, are excluded 
from the sample. The final sample used in the regression contains 214 joint producer 
observations. 
Table 23 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of regression variables. Table 
24 shows the coefficient results for cost, revenue, and profit scope economy regressions. A 
truncated Tobit model is used since dependent variables are truncated at 1 and -1. The dependent 
variables are cost scope economy scores (function <1> and <4>), revenue scope economy scores 
(functions <2> and <5>), and profit scope economy scores (functions <3> and <6>). Two sets of 
regressions are estimated and compared. The only difference is the variables used to capture each 
firm’s business portfolio and product mix. Functions <1>, <2>, and <3> use the total personal 
business share and overall firm categories, while functions <4>, <5>, and <6> further segregate 
personal business share into insurance personal business share and banking personal business 
share. Then, firms are grouped into nine sub-categories.  
To test Hypothesis 3 that firm size is related on scope economies, we use the natural log 
of the gross total assets (LASSETGTA) to measure the size, which is a commonly used proxy in 
the literature. Gross total assets are defined as the sum of insurance division assets, bank division 
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assets, and allowance for loans and leases. The coefficient on LASSETGTA is negative in the 
cost regression and positive in both revenue and profit regressions. All these coefficients are 
statistically significant. These coefficient results are consistent with the findings in Table 3, with 
no controls for other factors. The coefficients suggest that large firms are more likely to benefit 
from revenue increases than cost savings when jointly producing banking and insurance 
products. They are more efficient in keeping large scale distribution networks which could 
generate significant revenue increases by cross-selling. Small firms are more likely to benefit 
from cost saving by sharing important or costly resources in conglomeration. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 are related with a firm’s business portfolio and product mix effects on 
scope economies. Three business share variables are used. The total personal products share is 
defined as total personal business outputs (including insurance personal business and banking 
personal business)84 divided by the firm’s total business outputs (P_SHARE). The personal 
product share in the insurance division is measured as the personal insurance outputs divided by 
total insurance outputs (P_SHARE_INS).85 The personal banking product share in the banking 
division is defined as the personal banking outputs divided by total banking outputs 
(P_SHARE_BK).86  
We also include indicator variables designed to capture broad differences in the business 
strategies employed by the firms. Firms whose bank division assets are more than 75 percent of 
total group assets are defined as bancassurers (DV_BKASSUR). If bank division assets account 
                                                 
84 Insurance personal business includes individual life or annuity insurance, private passenger auto physical damage 
insurance, and homeowner's insurance. Banking personal business includes consumer loans, credit cards and other 
installment loans, residence mortgage, and core deposits. 
85 Total insurance outputs include personal insurance outputs and commercial insurance outputs, such as group life 
or annuity insurance, inland marine, commercial auto insurance, and workers compensation. 
86 Total banking outputs include personal banking outputs and commercial banking outputs, such as commercial and 
industrial loans. 
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for less than 25 percent of group assets, the firms are categorized as assurbanks 
(DV_ASSURBK), and the remaining firms are conglomerates (DV_CONG).  
Each of the three groups is further segregated by the range of business in which they 
engage. The DV_BKASSUR is segregated into three indicators: bancassurers participating in life 
insurance business only (BKASSUR_LH), bancassurers owning property-liability insurance 
subsidiaries only (BKASSUR_PC), and bancassurers participating in both the life and property-
liability insurance business (BKASSUR_LHPC). The DV_ASSURBK is segregated into: 
assurbanks that operate commercial banks only (ASSURBK_CB), assurbanks owning thrift 
saving business only (ASSURBK_SB), and assurbanks owning both commercial banking and 
thrift saving businesses (ASSURBK_CBSB). Then, the DV_CONG is disaggregated into:  
conglomerates owning life insurance subsidiaries only (CONG_LH), conglomerates participating 
in the property-liability insurance business only (CONG_PC), and conglomerates doing both life 
and property-liability insurance business (CONG_LHPC). DV_CONG and CONG_LHPC are 
dropped because of the linearity. 
As shown in Table 24, both the overall total personal product share variable, P_SHARE, 
and division personal product share variables, P_SHARE_INS and P_SHARE_B, have negative 
coefficients in the cost scope regression and positive coefficients in the revenue and profit scope 
regression. These results suggest that joint firms with an emphasis on the retail business are less 
likely to realize cost scope economies but more likely to benefit from revenue scope economies. 
In addition, such effects are mainly dominated by the insurance retail business, which tends to 
contribute more effects than the banking retail business. The effect on net profit scope economies 
is estimated to be positive and statistically significant, which supports Hypothesis 5. Economies 
of scope are more likely to occur in personal product lines than in commercial lines. This finding 
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suggests that retail banking and insurance products are more homogeneous and could be 
efficiently produced through cross-selling. In addition, the results also suggest that commercial 
customers may prefer expertise and tailored products to meet their banking and/or insurance 
needs. Firms with business portfolios highly weighted on commercial products appear unable to 
achieve significant revenue scope economies due to joint production.  
As discussed in Chapter 9, life insurance products have more similarities to banking 
products than do property-liability insurance products, and higher economies of scope are 
expected to occur in the joint production of life and banking products than in the joint production 
of property-liability and banking products. The results in Table 24 show that the coefficient on 
BKASSUR_LHPC is positive and significant in the profit scope equation. This evidence 
suggests that bancassurers are profit scope efficient when participating in both the life and 
property-liability insurance business. The negative and significant coefficient on 
ASSURBK_CBSB in the profit scope equation suggests that assurbanks are profit scope 
inefficient when participating in both the commercial and thrift banking business. The coefficient 
on CONG_PC in the profit scope regression is positive and significant, suggesting that if the firm 
has balanced banking and insurance business, scope economies are more likely to occur when 
offering property-liability insurance products.  
To control for the business diversifications, four variables are included: the insurance 
product Herfindahl index (PRODHHI), the banking product Herfindahl index (PRODHHI_B),87 
                                                 
87 Herfindahl index (HHI) for a firm producing n types of products is measured as   (Y1^2 + Y2^2 + …+ Yn^2 ) / 
(Y1 + Y2 + … + Yn)^2, where Yi is the ith product output. Insurance products include property-liability insurance 
(personal short-tail lines, personal long-tail lines, commercial short-tail lines, and commercial long-tail lines) and 
life insurance (individual life insurance, individual annuity, group life insurance, group annuity, and accident and 
health insurance). Banking products include residential real estate loans, commercial real estate loans, credit card 
and other installment loans, farm loans, commercial & industrial loans, other loans, demand deposits, and time and 
saving deposits. 
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the insurance division geographic business HHI (DPWHHI),88 and the log of the number of 
domestic offices and branches in the banking division (LOFFDOM). The maximum possible 
value for the Herfindahl index of 1.0 indicates a single product manufacturing and, as such, 
higher index values indicate a decrease in product diversification. Table 24 shows that, the more 
products diversified in the insurance division, the more likely the firm is to exploit cost scope 
economies but the less likely it is to exploit revenue and profit scope economies. In addition, the 
more products diversified in the banking division, the more likely it is to realize cost and profit 
scope economies and the less likely it is to realize revenue scope economies. Only the insurance 
products diversification effects on net profit scope economies are statistically significant.  
The insurance geographic business Herfindahl index and the number of bank offices and 
branches capture the effects of national or local operation strategies. The higher the insurance 
geographic diversification variable, DPWHHI, and the lower the number of bank offices, 
LOFFDOM, the less geographically diversified. The results show that both measures of 
geographical diversification have a consistent impact on scope economies. Joint firms with more 
geographically diversified insurance or banking businesses are less likely to exploit cost scope 
economies but are more likely to exploit revenue and profit scope economies, suggesting that 
national operations contribute to net profit scope economy gains. This finding is consistent with 
our earlier discussions. National operations are sufficient to large sales volumes and, therefore, 
contribute to revenue scope economies. However, on the cost side, national operations can be 
cost inefficient, and extra costs or expenses can contribute to cost scope diseconomies. The 
results show that national operations provide positive net effects on profitability. 
                                                 
88 Herfindahl index for insurers operating in m states is measured as  (Y1^2 + Y2^2 + …+ Ym^2 ) / (Y1 + Y2 + … 
+ Ym)^2, where Yi is the direct premium written in the ith state. 
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We test the hypothesis regarding the insurance distribution systems using three dummy 
variables: insurance horizontal integrated distribution (DV_MKT_H = 1, if the insurance 
horizontal integrated distribution channels are used), insurance vertical integrated distribution 
(DV_MKT_V = 1, if insurance vertical integrated distribution channels are used), and both 
insurance horizontal and vertical distributions (DV_MKT_HV = 1, if both horizontal and vertical 
integrated distribution channels are used).89  The final classification is omitted from the 
regression to avoid linearity. The coefficient on DV_MKT_V is positive, and the coefficient on 
DV_MKT_H is negative in the profit scope equation, suggesting that banks affiliated with 
vertically integrated insurers could benefit from reusing insurers’ relatively large investments in 
advertising, marketing, and brand names and therefore enjoy profit scope economies. However, 
these two coefficients are not statistically significant in Table 24.  
Some of the other variables included in the regressions also appear related to scope 
economies. The capital to asset ratio (C_TO_A) estimated coefficients suggest that a higher 
capital to asset ratio leads to cost scope diseconomies and revenue and profit scope economies. 
The results are consistent with low risk firms attracting more potential customers; however, 
holding additional equity capital can be costly.   
The results in Table 24 also suggest that efficient companies are more likely to enjoy 
profit scope economies.  This is evidenced by the estimated coefficients on the X-efficiency 
variables for each industry are positive and significant. This finding supports our last hypothesis. 
Since efficient managers are already outperforming their competitors with the ability to achieve 
high levels of X-efficiency, they can reuse and extend their managerial talent, experience, and 
expertise into the conglomeration. Thus, they can be better able to realize economies of scope, 
                                                 
89 Vertical integrated distribution channels include exclusive/captive agents, direct response, internet, affinity group 
marketing, worksite marketing. Horizontal integrated distribution channels include independent agents, brokers, 
general agents, career agents, and banks.  
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yielding a positive relationship between efficiency and scope economies. Finally, two year-
dummy variables are added to the control for any possible effects, and the coefficients are 
significant for both sets of regressions. 
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 CHAPTER 12   
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 is a landmark financial services legislation, which 
promised the most fundamental reform in the U.S. financial services regulation in more than half 
a century. Few doubted the potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial service 
providers and on the market. However, there is a striking lack of empirical research on the 
effects of diversification by financial firms. This dissertation presents an empirical analysis of 
the insurance and banking sectors of the economy in the post-Gramm-Leach-Bliley era. This 
dissertation has sought to contribute new evidence on scope efficiencies from the joint 
production of insurance and banking products after the passage of the GLB Act.  
 The dissertation first identifies domestic assurbanks and bancassurers, and all the unique 
subsidiaries of all financial service companies in the U.S. licensed as a commercial bank, thrift, 
or insurance company. The data come from a variety of sources. We construct a unique variable 
that links the banking and insurance regulatory datasets. The data sample contains 260 
diversified firm observations (jointly producing banking and insurance products), 613 insurance 
specialist observations (offering insurance products only) and 1,450 bank specialist observations 
(offering banking products only) over the three year period 2003 – 2005. The data sample 
accounts for 98 percent of life insurance industry assets, 94 percent of property-liability 
insurance assets, 88 percent of commercial banks assets, and 81 percent of thrift savings banks 
assets. 
Following the construction of the dataset, we next conduct a univariate analysis to 
investigate the effects of integrating the banking and insurance sectors in the U.S. We evaluate 
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the market structure, firm characteristics, and operating performance of financial institutions in 
the U.S. integrated banking and insurance industry. The empirical results suggest that both 
domestic “assurbanks” and “bancassurers” are large in size and account for significant portions 
of the insurance and banking industries. Large commercial or saving banks are more interested in 
small-size life and property-liability insurance companies, and large insurance companies are 
more likely to extend their traditional business into banking through small-size thrifts. Banks 
appear more interested in life insurance than property-liability insurers, and insurers prefer to 
affiliate with thrift saving banks than with commercial banks. 
Insurance companies owning banking subsidiaries are more geographically diversified 
and have relatively higher A.M. Best ratings than insurance specialists and, therefore, they have 
presumably lower default risks. Joint producers are more engaged in personal lines than 
commercial lines of insurance and are more diversified in their traditional products. Joint firms 
have higher non-interest income than bank specialists even after controlling firm size effects. 
Firms jointly producing insurance and banking services have higher overall profitability in their 
traditional lines of business. Bancassurers perform well in the insurance business, but most 
assurbanks lose money in their banking division, evidenced by their negative interest and non-
interest margins. Joint producers generally keep higher equity capital in the non-traditional 
business divisions, which is evidenced by higher RBC ratios and lower leverage ratios. 
The next section of this dissertation examines the existence of scope economies in 
financial conglomerations. To do so, we utilize a two-stage procedure econometric method. The 
first stage consists of investigating cost, revenue, and profit scope economies for U.S. banks and 
insurers by estimating the composite costs, revenue, and profit composite functions. We then use 
the results to explain the variation of scope economy estimations and to examine the relationship 
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between scope economies and firm characteristics. The scope economy estimates are regressed 
upon a set of variables describing firm characteristics and environments.  
The estimation results suggest that significant cost scope diseconomies, revenue scope 
economies, and weak profit scope economies exist in the post-GLB U.S. integrated banking and 
insurance industries. The evidence of cost scope diseconomies suggests that cost savings from 
sharing inputs cannot offset the extra costs possibly incurred in joint production and 
conglomeration. The findings of revenue scope economies support consumption 
complementarities, showing that customers may be willing to pay more for the convenience of 
one-stop shopping; the findings also suggest that demand side scope efficiency gains also arise 
by cross-selling. This finding further suggests that financial conglomerates may target consumers 
of financial services in different ways, such as offering higher quality products for which they 
charge a premium.   
The findings of profit scope economies indicate that revenue scope economies dominate 
cost scope diseconomies for joint productions. That is, revenue scope efficiency gains can offset 
the cost scope efficiency losses and contribute to net profit scope efficiency gains. In addition, 
the findings of an inverse relationship between firm size and cost scope diseconomies and the 
positive relationship between firm size and revenue or profit scope economies indicate that scope 
economies are variant among different size firms, where small firms are more efficient in cost 
saving while large firms are efficient in maintaining large scale distribution networks and, thus, 
sales augments.  
In the second stage, we use regression analysis to test the determinants of scope 
economies. We address the following research questions: Which types of firms are more likely to 
benefit from conglomeration? How do firm characteristics explain scope economies differences 
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among firms. The regression results suggest that large firms are associated with higher cost 
scope diseconomies and higher revenue or profit scope economies than small firms. This is 
consistent with the evidence from the first-stage scope economy estimations. Large firms are 
more likely to benefit from increased revenue than increased savings when jointly producing 
banking and insurance products.  
Considering business portfolios and product mix, economies of scope are also found to be 
more likely to occur in personal product lines than in commercial lines. This finding suggests 
that retail banking and retail insurance products are more homogeneous and can be efficiently 
distributed through cross-selling, but commercial customers may prefer expertise and tailored 
products to meet their banking and insurance needs. Thus, firms with business portfolios highly 
weighted on commercial products struggle to achieve significant sales arising from joint 
production. Bancassurers focusing on their traditional banking business are found to be more 
profit scope efficient in conducting life and property-liability insurance business simultaneously, 
while assurbanks concentrating on insurance business are profit scope inefficient in engaging in 
both commercial and thrifts business. 
Business diversifications also affect scope economies in joint production. The more 
products diversified in insurance, the more likely to exploit cost scope economies but the less 
likely to exploit revenue and profit scope economies. In addition, joint producers, which are 
more geographically diversified in both the insurance or banking business, are more likely to 
realize profit scope economy gains. The results show that national operations impose positive net 
effects on scope efficiencies, the significant profit scope economies. Then, the impact of 
insurance distribution systems are that banks affiliated with vertically integrated insurers show 
higher profit scope economies in joint production.  
   91
The other firm characteristics affecting scope economies include capital-to-assets ratio 
and X-efficiencies. The results suggest the more X-efficient a firm is, the more scope efficient; 
and firms with high capital-to-assets ratio present high profit scope economies. 
After the passage of GLB, we did not observe the wave of cross-sector conglomerations, 
as expected in the U.S. banking and insurance industries. Banks and insurers showed their 
hesitation on exercising the new power granted by GLB. Our results further explain why U.S. 
banks and insurers have opted for integration at the marketing level rather than the production 
level. The cost scope economies on the supply side are not pervasive, and whether the magnitude 
of the revenue scope economies on the demand side is large enough to offset the cost increase, 
hinders cross-sector expansions.  
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Table 3 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Premiums, and Net Income  (Life-Health Insurers)
# Firms % Firms % Assets %Premiums % Net Income
ALL 182
-- Non-affiliated 110 60.4% 35.0% 41.4% 36.8%
-- Affiliated 72 39.6% 65.0% 58.6% 63.2%
    -- Assurbanking 36 19.8% 57.7% 51.6% 53.4%
    -- Bancassurance 36 19.8% 7.3% 7.0% 9.8%
Figure 3.a
Figure 3.b
This table provides the distribution and market share of Life-Health (L/H) Insurers in terms of number of firms, total asset, premium income (net 
premium earned), and net income.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which 
own or control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.






























Table 3.1 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Premiums, and Net Income (Property-Liability Insurers)
# Firms % Firms % Assets %Premiums % Net Income
ALL 191
-- Non-affiliated 144 75.4% 65.7% 58.0% 66.7%
-- Affiliated 47 24.6% 34.3% 42.0% 33.3%
    -- Assurbanking 25 13.1% 30.9% 39.1% 32.8%
    -- Bancassurance 22 11.5% 3.5% 2.9% 0.4%
Figure 3.1.a
Figure 3.1.b
This table provides the distribution and market share of Property-Liability (P/L) Insurers in terms of number of firms, total asset, premium income 
(net premium earned), and net income.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which 
own or control banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.






























Table 4 Firm Size by Total Assets, Premiums, and Net Income -- (Life-Health Insurers)
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
# Firms 110 72 36 36
Total Assets 11,164.46 34,530.79 61,317.55 7,744.03
Premium Income 1,685.11 3,978.30 7,003.38 953.22
Net Income 103.84 297.05 501.71 92.40
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Total Assets 2,282.10 2,656.45 21,231.63 125.96
Premium Income 484.48 363.93 3,095.84 9.63
Net Income 21.68 32.28 273.51 1.82
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Total Assets 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00
Premium Income 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
Net Income 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.00
Figure 4.a
Figure 4.b
This table provides average and median Life-Health (L/H) insurers' firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned), and 
net income.  The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which 
own or control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Mean ($ Million)
Median ($ Million)
t - Test   (P-value)






































Table 4.1 Firm Size by Total Assets, Premiums, and Net Income -- (Property-Liability Insurers)
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
# Firms 144 47 25 22
Total Assets 5,131.53 9,077.07 15,344.38 1,955.13
Premium Income 1,336.28 3,273.66 5,733.38 478.52
Net Income 131.98 222.54 413.09 6.00
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Total Assets 1,475.96 1,055.72 3,341.98 225.31
Premium Income 469.69 409.98 1,312.96 58.51
Net Income 22.68 36.11 59.69 8.87
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Total Assets 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.01
Premium Income 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01
Net Income 0.22 0.08 0.01 0.02
Figure 4.1.a
Figure 4.1.b
This table provides average and median Property-Liability (P/L) insurers' firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned), 
and net income.  The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which 
own or control banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
Mean ($ Million)
Median ($ Million)
t - Test   (P-value)












































Table 5 A.M. Best Rating
Panel A:  Life-Health Insurers' A.M.Best Rating
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
A++, A+ (Superior) 74 108 83 25
A, A- (Excellent) 177 70 47 23
B++, B+(Very Good) 46 12 4 8
B, B- (Fair) 13 4 0 4
<= C++ (Weak or Poor) 4 1 0 1
NR (Not Rated) 55 48 25 23
Total 369 243 159 84
Table 5 Panel B:  Property-Liability Insurers' A.M.Best Rating
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
A++, A+ (Superior) 261 103 102 1
A, A- (Excellent) 491 203 161 42
B++, B+(Very Good) 53 16 13 3
B, B- (Fair) 47 3 1 2
<= C++ (Weak or Poor) 13 1 0 1
NR (Not Rated) 103 43 22 21
Total 968 369 299 70
This table provides A.M. Best Financial Strength Rating for insurers.   A.M. Best's Financial Strength Rating is an independent opinion, 
based on a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative evaluation, of an insurance company's balance sheet strength, operating 
performance and business profile.  Its rating scale and associated descriptions include: A++, A+ (Superior); A, A- (Excellent); B++, B+ (Very 
Good); B, B- (Fair); C++, C+ (Marginal); C, C- (Weak); D (Poor); NR (Not Rated). Since the A.M. Best Rating is assigned to individual firms 
not groups, the firms analyzed here are non-grouped life or property-liability insurers.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or 
controled by banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding 
companies, which own or control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-
affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or 
controled by banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding 
companies, which own or control banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-
affiliated P/L insurers.







































Table 6 Geographic Diversification:  Number of States Insurers Licenced in.
Panel A:  Life-Health Insurers' Geographic Diversification : Num. of States Insurers Licensed in.
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Average Num. of States Licenced in 33 32 36 25
Median Num. of States Licenced in 47 47 48 24
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Average Num. of States Licenced in 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00
Table 6 Panel B:  Property-Liability Insurers' Geographic Diversification : Num. of States Insurers Licensed in.
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Average Num. of States Licenced in 27 41 44 33
Median Num. of States Licenced in 28 43 45 26
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Average Num. of States Licenced in 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.11
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-
affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control 
banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
t - Test   (P-value)
t - Test   (P-value)
This table shows insurers' geographic diversification. It reports the average and median number of states in the U.S. L/H and P/L insurers licenced in to 
do insurance business.  The P-value of t -test is provided below.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-
affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  
Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control 
banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
































Table 7 Number of Affiliated vs. Non-Affiliated by Insurance Line -- (Life-Health Insurers)
Product Line # Firms
# firms w/ business share 
>50%
% firm w/ share 
>50% % Firms Prem. Inc. ($M)
Individual Life 112 31 27.7% 93.3% 27,127.1                          
Individual Annuity 102 27 26.5% 85.0% 66,659.0                          
Credit Life 25 1 4.0% 20.8% 342.0                               
Group Life 102 1 1.0% 85.0% 8,988.1                            
Group Annuity 66 8 12.1% 55.0% 34,136.5                          
Accident & Health 106 28 26.4% 88.3% 64,949.7                          
Product Line # Firms
# firms w/ business share 
>50%
% firm w/ share 
>50% % Firms Prem. Inc ($M)
Individual Life 57 16 28.1% 79.2% 68,767.0                          
Individual Annuity 50 15 30.0% 69.4% 93,352.0                          
Credit Life 28 4 14.3% 38.9% 507.6                               
Group Life 48 2 4.2% 66.7% 15,657.6                          
Group Annuity 31 2 6.5% 43.1% 68,448.1                          
Accident & Health 56 11 19.6% 77.8% 39,493.6                          
Figure 7.a
Figure 7.b
This table examines the product mix of Life-Health (L/H) insurers. L/H insurance products are categorized as (1) individual life, (2) individual annuity, (3) 
credit life, (4) group life, (5) group annuity, and (6) accident & health insurance. 
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or 
control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
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Table 7.1 Number of Affiliated vs. Non-Affiliated by Insurance Line  (Property-Liability Insurers)
Product Line # Firms
# firms w/ business share 
>50%
% firm w/ share 
>50% % Firms Prem. Inc. ($M)
Personal Property 117 3 2.6% 73.6% 30857.9
Personal Liability 114 26 22.8% 71.7% 57650.1
Commercial Property 137 17 12.4% 86.2% 31575.3
Commercial Liability 149 88 59.1% 93.7% 92384.6
Product Line # Firms
# firms w/ business share 
>50%
% firm w/ share 
>50% % Firms Prem. Inc ($M)
Personal Property 34 2 5.9% 72.3% 33887.7
Personal Liability 32 14 43.8% 68.1% 66375.4
Commercial Property 41 9 22.0% 87.2% 14774.0
Commercial Liability 36 10 27.8% 76.6% 39269.5
Figure 7.1.a
Figure 7.1.b
This table examines the product mix of Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. P/L insurance products are categorized as (1) personal property, (2) personal 
liability, (3) commercial property, and (4) commercial liability. Table 15 lists detail P/L products and lines of business definitions.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-
affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control 
banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
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Table 8 Insurers Products Concentration Herfindahl Index ( Focused vs. Multi-lines) 
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Product Concentration Herfindahl Index ( Focused vs. Multi-lines) 
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Mean 56.6% 58.1% 52.2% 65.5%
Median 52.8% 53.5% 47.5% 61.2%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Product Herfindahl Index 0.37 0.35 0.43 0.46
Figure 8.a
Table 8 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Product Concentration Herfindahl Index ( Focused vs. Multi-lines) 
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Mean 62.5% 58.8% 49.2% 69.8%
Median 51.7% 49.9% 43.6% 65.2%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Product Herfindahl Index 0.11 0.00 0.27 0.01
Figure 8.b
t - Test   (P-value)
Product Herfindahl Index
t - Test   (P-value)
This table shows insurers products concentration level in insurance industry. The products concentration level was measured by herfindahl index, 
which approach to one when insurers are more focused producing.  L/H insurance products are categorized as individual life,  individual annuity,  
credit life,  group life,  group annuity, and  accident & health insurance.  P/L insurance products are categorized as personal property,  personal 
liability,  commercial property, and  commercial liability.
Product Herfindahl Index







































Table 9 Insurers Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE)
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers ROA , ROE
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
ROA 1.4% 1.8% 1.3% 2.3%
ROE 6.6% 8.7% 13.4% 3.9%
Non-Affi. Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
ROA 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7%
ROE 8.1% 8.3% 10.6% 5.9%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
ROA 0.23 0.48 0.16 0.17
ROE 0.19 0.01 0.18 0.00
Table 9 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers ROA , ROE
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
ROA 1.7% 5.8% 2.5% 9.7%
ROE 1.5% 10.5% 6.1% 15.5%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
ROA 1.9% 3.1% 2.7% 3.5%
ROE 5.6% 7.0% 6.3% 8.3%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
ROA 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.03
ROE 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05
This table reports insurers' overall performance - Return on Asset (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE).  The P-value of t -test is provided 
below in both Panel A and Panel B.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or 
controled by banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their 
holding companies, which own or control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or 
Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or 
controled by banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their 
holding companies, which own or control banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or 
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean (%)
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean (%)








































Table 10.1 Insurers Profitability Test
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Profitability Test
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Benefits Paid to NPW (%) 104.1% 104.9% 108.2% 98.8%
Comm and Expenses to NPW  (%) 66.3% 35.1% 36.3% 33.0%
NOG to Total Assets (%) 1.8% 2.9% 2.4% 3.9%
Yield On Invested Assets (%) 5.4% 5.3% 5.5% 4.9%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Benefits Paid to NPW (%) 64.5% 62.4% 64.5% 58.7%
Comm and Expenses to NPW  (%) 26.5% 18.4% 18.1% 19.3%
NOG to Total Assets (%) 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1%
Yield On Invested Assets (%) 5.6% 5.6% 5.8% 5.0%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Benefits Paid to NPW (%) 0.48 0.41 0.40 0.35
Comm and Expenses to NPW  (%) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.38
NOG to Total Assets (%) 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.05
Yield On Invested Assets (%) 0.43 0.20 0.04 0.01
Table 10.1 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Profitability Test
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Loss Ratio (%) 89.4% 73.0% 79.5% 51.5%
Expense Ratio (%) 41.2% 56.4% 57.4% 52.6%
Combined Ratio (%) 121.6% 111.4% 113.8% 103.1%
Yield on Invested Assets (%) 3.99% 4.60% 4.60% 4.57%
Return on PHS (%) 7.9% 13.2% 11.6% 20.0%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Loss Ratio (%) 72.1% 68.8% 69.5% 56.7%
Expense Ratio (%) 27.4% 27.9% 27.6% 30.2%
Combined Ratio (%) 100.2% 96.3% 96.3% 96.4%
Yield on Invested Assets (%) 4.10% 4.30% 4.40% 3.70%
Return on PHS (%) 6.8% 7.5% 7.4% 8.6%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Loss Ratio (%) 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00
Expense Ratio (%) 0.08 0.10 0.24 0.40
Combined Ratio (%) 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.31
Yield on Invested Assets (%) 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.48
Return on PHS (%) 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.15
This table provides results of the profitability test for Life-Health (L/H) insurers.  Four profitability ratios are compared: (1) Total Benefits Paid as a percentage of Net 
Premiums Written -- Benefits paid include death benefits, matured endowments, annuity benefits, accident and health benefits, disability and surrender benefits, group 
conversions, coupons and payments on supplementary contracts, interest on policy or contract funds and other miscellaneous benefits.  (2) Commissions and Expenses 
Incurred as a percentage of Net Premiums Written --  Commissions and expenses include payments on both direct and assumed business, general insurance expenses, 
insurance taxes, licenses and fees, increase in loading and other miscellaneous expenses, and exclude commissions and expense allowances received on reinsurance 
ceded.   (3) Net Operating Gain (after taxes) as a percentage of Total Assets -- Total assets are the mean of current and prior year admitted assets and this test measures 
insurance earnings in relation to the company's total asset base.   (4) Net investment income as a percent of invested assets --  Investment assets are the mean of cash 
and invested assets plus accrued investment income minus borrowed money.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-affiliated L/H 
insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are 
those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-
affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
This table provides results of the profitability test for Property-Liability (P/L) insurers.  Five profitability ratios are compared: (1) Loss Ratio -- The ratio of incurred losses and 
loss adjustment expenses to net premiums earned.  This ratio measures the company's underlying profitability, or loss experience on its total book of business.  (2) Expense 
Ratio -- The ratio of underwriting expenses (including commissions) to Net Premiums Written.  This ratio measures the company's operational efficiency in underwriting its 
book of business.   (3) Combined Ratio -- This ratio is the sum of the Loss Ratio and Expense Ratio.  This ratio measures a company's overall underwriting profitability.  (4) 
Yield on Invested Assets -- The ratio of annual net investment income divided by the mean of cash and net invested assets.  This ratio measures the average return on a 
company's invested assets, before capital gains or losses and income taxes.  (5) Return on Policyholders' Surplus (PHS) -- "Return" is calculated as the overall after-tax 
profitability from underwriting and investment activity, including unrealized capital gains. This ratio measures a company's efficiency in utilizing its surplus on a total return basis.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-affiliated P/L 
insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are 
those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-
affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
Median
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean
Median
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean
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Table 10.2 Insurers Leverage Test
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Leverage Test
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
NPW to Capital and Surplus (%) 200% 181.66% 212.67% 122.86%
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%) 224.64% 288.23% 207.05% 429.71%
RBC Ratio (%) 323.78% 374.11% 367.38% 415.40%
Capital and Surplus to Liability (%) 137.45% 184.93% 154.16% 243.50%
Reinsurance Leverage (%) 163.38% 113.96% 128.82% 80.10%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
NPW to Capital and Surplus (%) 130% 130.00% 150.00% 50.00%
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%) 163.00% 175.50% 174.00% 194.00%
RBC Ratio (%) 323.58% 748.28% 413.87% 904.93%
Capital and Surplus to Liability (%) 21.50% 23.40% 17.20% 85.80%
Reinsurance Leverage (%) 58.80% 22.85% 24.10% 20.90%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
NPW to Capital and Surplus (%) 0.22 0.31 0.00 0.00
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%) 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.00
RBC Ratio (%) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10
Capital and Surplus to Liability (%) 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.02
Reinsurance Leverage (%) 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04
Table 10.2 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Leverage Test
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
NPW to Policyholders' Surplus (%) 102% 102% 104% 95%
Net Leverage (%) 392% 215% 208% 249%
Gross Leverage (%) 494% 385% 386% 381%
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%) 201.25% 238.63% 227.20% 304.37%
RBC Ratio (%) 233.64% 279.00% 276.53% 308.54%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
NPW to Policyholders' Surplus (%) 90% 100% 105% 60%
Net Leverage (%) 230% 150% 130% 170%
Gross Leverage (%) 290% 220% 220% 220%
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%) 184.10% 187.70% 183.60% 216.50%
RBC Ratio (%) 267.75% 418.57% 343.36% 502.83%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
NPW to Policyholders' Surplus (%) 0.49 0.36 0.37 0.33
Net Leverage (%) 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.16
Gross Leverage (%) 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.48
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
RBC Ratio (%) 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.44
This table shows the results of the leverage test for Life-Health (L/H) Insurers. Four leverage measures are compared: (1) Net Premium Written 
(NPW) to Capital and Surplus -- This reflects the leverage, after reinsurance assumed and ceded, of the company's current volume of net business 
in relation to its capital and surplus.  (2) Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s adjusted surplus relative to the required 
capital necessary to support its operating and investment risks.  (3) Capital and Surplus to Liability -- This test measures the relationship of capital 
and surplus to the company's unpaid obligations after reinsurance assumed and ceded. (4) Reinsurance Leverage Ratio --The relationship of total 
reserves ceded plus commissions and expenses due on reinsurance ceded plus other refunds due or recoverable from reinsurers to total capital 
and surplus.     
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which 
own or control banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
banks.  Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which 
own or control banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
This table provides the results of leverage test for Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. Four leverage ratios are compared: (1) Net Premium Written 
(NPW) to Policyholders' Surplus -- This ratio measures a company’s net retained premium in relation to its surplus and exposure to pricing errors.  
(2) Net Leverage Ratio -- This represents the sum of a company's NPW to Policyholders' Surplus and Net Liabilities to Policyholders' Surplus.  (3) 
Gross Leverage Ratio -- This represents the sum of Net Leverage and Ceded Reinsurance Leverage, which is calculated.  (4) Best's Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) --  The BCAR compares an insurer’s adjusted surplus relative to the required capital necessary to support its operating and 
investment risks.
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Table 10.3 Insurers Liquidity Test
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Leverage Test
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Quick Liquidity (%) 88.13% 116.55% 110.7% 129.34%
Current Liquidity (%) 191.63% 229.67% 212.2% 267.8%
Operating CF to Total Asset (%) 2.92% 4.54% 5.9% 2.0%
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%) 41.2% 41% 44.8% 33.4%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Quick Liquidity (%) 17.95% 15.20% 13.3% 23.00%
Current Liquidity (%) 105.90% 108.80% 103.3% 139.8%
Operating CF to Total Asset (%) 3.64% 2.75% 3.8% 0.5%
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%) 30.4% 33% 39.6% 20.4%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Quick Liquidity (%) 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.31
Current Liquidity (%) 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.08
Operating CF to Total Asset (%) 0.11 0.01 0.34 0.04
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%) 0.48 0.22 0.09 0.03
Table 10.3 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Liquidity Test
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Quick Liquidity (%) 216.4% 293.8% 291.3% 306.3%
Current Liquidity (%) 325.6% 465.9% 470.5% 442.4%
Operating CF to Total Asset (%) 4.8% 3.8% 5.1% 3.8%
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%) 7.0% 4.8% 5.2% 3.2%
Non-Affi. All Affi. Assurbanking Bancassurance
Quick Liquidity (%) 54.1% 69.7% 63.6% 102.2%
Current Liquidity (%) 141.5% 225.3% 217.8% 242.0%
Operating CF to Total Asset (%) 5.2% 5.0% 5.2% 2.5%
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%) 3.8% 2.9% 3.0% 1.2%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Quick Liquidity (%) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.39
Current Liquidity (%) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.30
Operating CF to Total Asset (%) 0.02 0.02 0.39 0.03
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04
This table provides the results of leverage test for Life-Health (L/H) insurers. Four leverage ratios are compared: (1) Quick Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of 
unaffiliated quick assets to liabilities.  Quick assets include cash, short-term investments, 80% of unaffiliated common stock, Government bonds maturing 
in five years or less and all other bonds (excluding affiliates) maturing in one year or less.   (2) Current Liquidity Ratio – The ratio of unaffiliated invested 
assets, excluding mortgages and real estate, to liabilities.  This test measures the proportion of liabilities covered by cash and unaffiliated investment 
assets holdings.  (3) Operating Cash Flow to Total Assets – Operating cash flow is the change in cash and invested assets attributable to net underwriting 
and net investment income.  This ratio measures a company’s ability to meet current obligations through the internal generation of funds from insurance 
operations.  (4) Non-Investment Grade Bonds to Capital – The designation as non-investment grade utilizes the bond quality classifications that coincide 
with different bond ratings assigned by major credit rating agencies. This test measures exposure to non-investment grade bonds as a percentage of capital and surplus.  
This table provides the results of leverage test for Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. The liquidity ratios used for P/L insurers are similar to those for L/H 
insurers: (1) Quick Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of unaffiliated quick assets to liabilities.  Quick assets are defined as the sum of cash, unaffiliated short-term 
investments, unaffiliated bonds maturing within one year, government bonds maturing within five years, and 80% of unaffiliated common stocks.  (2) 
Current Liquidity Ratio – The ratio of unaffiliated invested assets, excluding mortgages and real estate, to liabilities.  (3) Operating Cash Flow to Total 
Assets – Operating cash flow is the change in cash and invested assets attributable to net underwriting and net investment income after policyholder 
dividends and federal income taxes.  This ratio measures a company’s ability to meet current obligations through the internal generation of funds from 
insurance operations.  (4) Non-Investment Grade Bonds to Capital – The designation as non-investment grade utilizes the bond quality classifications that 
coincide with different bond ratings assigned by major credit rating agencies. This test measures exposure to non-investment grade bonds as a percentage of capital and surplus.
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-
affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  
Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control 
banks.  Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.  Assurbanking-
affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.  
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control 
banks.  Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
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Table 11 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Deposits, and Net Income -- (Commercial Banks)
# firms % Firms % Assets % Deposits %Net Income
ALL 437
-- Bancassurance 48 11.0% 57.6% 55.0% 57.1%
-- Non-Affiliated 389 89.0% 42.4% 45.0% 42.9%
    - w/ ins. 46 10.5% 19.1% 19.9% 19.9%
    - w/o ins. 343 78.5% 23.3% 25.1% 23.0%
Figure 11.a
Figure 11.b
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-
affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products 
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
This table provides the distribution and market share of Commercial Banks (CBs) in terms of number of firms, total asset, total deposit, and net 
income.
Distribution of Firms by Assets -- (Commercial Banks)
Bancassurance
58%
 Non-Affi. w/ ins
19%
 Non-Affi. No ins.
23%
Bancassurance
 Non-Affi. w/ ins
 Non-Affi. No ins.



















Table 11.1 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Deposits, and Net Income -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
# Firms % Firms % Assets % Deposits %Net Income
Final Data 185
-- Affiliated 53 28.6% 34.1% 34.0% 36.1%
    - Assurbanking 39 21.1% 5.0% 6.3% 2.7%
    - Bancassurance 14 7.6% 29.1% 27.6% 33.4%
-- Non-Affiliated 132 71.4% 65.9% 66.0% 63.9%
Figure 11.1.a
Figure 11.1.b
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.  
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
This table provides the distribution and market share of Thrift Saving Banks (SBs) in terms of number of firms, total asset, total deposit, and net 
income.










Market Share by Number, Assets, Deposits, Net Income  -- (Thrift Saving Banks)

















Table 12 Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, Net Income ($ M)  -- (Commercial Banks)
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
# Firms 48 389 46 343
Total Assets 82,018.7 8,531.7 28,333.9 5,422.8
Total Deposits 49,757.7 5,764.2 18,743.9 3,726.4
Net Income 1,120.1 119.3 407.2 74.1
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Total Assets 4,213.1 2,210.1 11,689.0 1,974.2
Total Deposits 2,845.4 1,610.2 8,044.4 1,480.2
Net Income 58.3 26.1 121.4 23.2
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ 
ins.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o 
ins.
Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Non-
affi. w/o ins.
Total Assets 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Total Deposits 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Net Income 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
Figure 12.a
Figure 12.b
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or 
control insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are 
owned or controled by insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to 
bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding 
companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance 
companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
This table provides average and median Commercial Banks' (CBs) firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned), 
and net income.  The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Mean ($ Million)
Median ($Million)
t - Test   (P-value)








































Table 12.1 Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, Net Income ($ M)  -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
# Firms 132 53 39 14
Total Assets 5,185.6 6,690.6 1,327.4 21,630.8
Total Deposits 3,165.5 4,058.9 1,028.6 12,500.5
Net Income 65.0 91.6 9.3 321.0
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Total Assets 2,191.2 179.1 94.8 1,259.0
Total Deposits 1,449.5 133.8 57.5 757.0
Net Income 22.2 0.9 0.2 27.9
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Total Assets 0.37 0.00 0.17 0.12
Total Deposits 0.37 0.00 0.17 0.12
Net Income 0.34 0.00 0.15 0.10
Figure 12.1.a
Figure 12.1.b
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or 
controled by insurers.  Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding 
companies, which own or control insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
This table provides average and median Thrift Saving Banks' (SBs) firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned), 
and net income.  The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Median ($Million)
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean ($ Million)





































Table 13 Total Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
Panel A: Commerical Banks:   Total Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Total Deposit 0.64 0.74 0.70 0.75
Interest Bearing Deposit 0.55 0.61 0.58 0.62
Total Loan & Lease 0.57 0.63 0.64 0.63
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Total Deposit 0.71 0.76 0.70 0.77
Interest Bearing Deposit 0.59 0.63 0.58 0.64
Total Loan & Lease 0.61 0.65 0.66 0.65
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ 
ins.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o 
ins.
Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Non-
affi. w/o ins.
Total Deposit 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Interest Bearing Deposit 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.01
Total Loan & Lease 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.28
Figure 13.a
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-
affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products 
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
This table shows the portfolio of traditional banking products. The traditional banking products are deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet and 
loans on the asset side. Total deposits include deposits and saving accounts that either require interest payment or are not allowed to pay interest. 
Interest bearing deposits only include those requiring interest payment, such as savings accounts and time deposits. Total loans and lease include 
loans to individuals, commercial and industrial loans, and all other loan and lease. To smooth out size effects we scale Total Deposits, Interest Bearing 
Deposits, and Total Loans & Lease by total asset.
Mean 
Median 
t - Test   (P-value)
Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease 























Table 13 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks:   Total Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Total Deposit 0.67 0.53 0.52 0.55
Interest Bearing Deposit 0.63 0.48 0.49 0.45
Total Loan & Lease 0.64 0.42 0.36 0.60
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Total Deposit 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.61
Interest Bearing Deposit 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.52
Total Loan & Lease 0.66 0.53 0.35 0.72
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Total Deposit 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.37
Interest Bearing Deposit 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.32
Total Loan & Lease 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.02
Figure 13.b
Mean
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.  
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Median
t - Test   (P-value)
Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, and Total Loan & Lease 























Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Interest Income 0.061 0.048 0.047 0.049
Non-Interest Income 0.076 0.017 0.020 0.017
%Non-interest Income to Interest income 0.753 0.385 0.432 0.377
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Interest Income 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.048
Non-Interest Income 0.022 0.011 0.016 0.011
%Non-interest Income to Interest income 0.429 0.234 0.323 0.222
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ 
ins.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. 
w/o ins.
Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Non-
affi. w/o ins.
Interest Income 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.17
Non-Interest Income 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.14
%Non-interest Income to Interest income 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.23
Figure 13.1.a
Panel A: Commercial Banks Performance:    Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, %Non-interest Income to Interest Income
Mean
Median
t - Test   (P-value)
This table provides the statistics of Commercial Banks' (CBs) Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, and Ratio of Non-interest Income to Interest 
Income between banks. Interest income includes interest and fee income on loans, income from lease financing receivables, interest income on 
balances due from depository institutions, interest and dividend income on securities, and other interest income. Non-interest income comes from 
fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit accounts, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions.  To control 
for the size effect, we scale them by total asset. 
Interest Income and Non-Interest Income
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-
affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products 
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
 Interest Income and Non-Interest Income  
























Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Interest Income 0.048 0.038 0.034 0.049
Non-Interest Income 0.008 0.109 0.110 0.105
%Non-interest Income to Interest income 0.609 0.052 0.060 0.030
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Interest Income 0.047 0.039 0.036 0.046
Non-Interest Income 0.005 0.017 0.010 0.020
%Non-interest Income to Interest income 0.111 0.004 0.003 0.004
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Interest Income 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00
Non-Interest Income 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.47
%Non-interest Income to Interest income 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.20
Figure 13.1.b
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.  
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
t - Test   (P-value)
This table provides the statistics of Thrift Saving Banks' (SBs) Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, and Ratio of Non-interest Income to Interest 
Income between banks. Interest income includes interest and fee income on loans, income from lease financing receivables, interest income on 
balances due from depository institutions, interest and dividend income on securities, and other interest income. Non-interest income comes from 
fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit accounts, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions.  To control 
for the size effect, we scale them by total asset. 
Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks Performance:    Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, %Non-Interest Income to Interest Income
Mean
Median
 Interest Income and Non-Interest Income  




















Table 14 Banks Operating Performance:  Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Net Operating Income to Assets
Panel A: Commercial Banks:    ROA, ROE, and Net Operating Income to Assets
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
ROA 6.15% 3.19% 4.39% 3.00%
ROE 35.70% 35.58% 47.46% 33.71%
Net Operating Income to Asset 5.80% 3.09% 4.27% 2.90%
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
ROA 2.26% 1.53% 3.19% 1.48%
ROE 17.30% 17.15% 28.09% 16.15%
Net Operating Income to Asset 2.11% 1.46% 3.09% 1.39%
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ 
ins.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o 
ins.
Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Non-
affi. w/o ins.
ROA 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.03
ROE 0.49 0.12 0.41 0.05
Net Operating Income to Asset 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.03
Figure 14.a
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-
affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products 
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
This table reports banks' overall performance - Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Ratio of Net Operating Income to Asset.  The P-
value of t-test is also provided.
Mean (%)
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Performance - ROA,  ROE,  Ratio of Net Operating Inc. to Assets  

























Table 14 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks:    ROA, ROE, and Net Operating Income to Assets
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
ROA 1.18% -0.97% -1.65% 0.93%
ROE 12.86% 4.75% 0.30% 17.16%
Net Operating Income to Asset 0.82% -1.43% -1.98% 0.10%
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
ROA 1.04% 0.40% 0.24% 1.33%
ROE 11.06% 4.27% 2.25% 16.48%
Net Operating Income to Asset 0.88% 0.24% 0.17% 0.78%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
ROA 0.02 0.01 0.42 0.07
ROE 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00
Net Operating Income to Asset 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.10
Figure 14.b
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.  
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean (%)
Performance - ROA,  ROE,  Ratio of Net Operating Inc. to Assets  

















Table 14.1 Banks Operation Performance:  Interest Margin, Non-Interest Margin
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Interest Margin 5.12% 3.99% 3.75% 4.03%
Non-Interest Margin 1.11% -1.54% -1.32% -1.58%
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
Interest Margin 3.98% 3.92% 3.71% 3.97%
Non-Interest Margin -1.41% -1.69% -1.34% -1.75%
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ 
ins.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o 
ins.
Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Non-
affi. w/o ins.
Interest Margin 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.01
Non-Interest Margin 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.02
Figure 14.1.a
Table 14.1
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Interest Margin 3.09% 3.10% 2.67% 4.30%
Non-Interest Margin -1.54% -4.38% -4.96% -2.76%
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
Interest Margin 3.27% 3.04% 2.49% 3.89%
Non-Interest Margin -1.62% -2.26% -2.41% -1.99%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
Interest Margin 0.49 0.04 0.03 0.01
Non-Interest Margin 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.22
Figure 14.1.b
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
insurers.  Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or 
control insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Panel A: Commercial Banks Performance:   Interest Margin, Non-interest Margin
Mean (%)
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Mean (%)
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks Operation Performance:   Interest Margin, Non-interest Margin
This table shows Interest Margin and Non-interest Margin measuring the profitability of banks.  (1) Interest margin is defined as the dollar difference 
between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of earning assets. (2) Similarly, non-interest margin is defined as the dollar difference 
between non-interest income and non-interest expense as a percentage of earning assets. 
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled 
by insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. 
Non-affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance 
products as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.







































Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
RBC Ratio 117.27% 48.72% 85.58% 42.94%
Loan to Deposit Ratio 344.74% 239.63% 303.30% 230.50%
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 3.54% 1.11% 2.17% 0.95%
Bancassurance Non-Affiliated Non-affi. w/ ins. Non-affi.  w/o ins.
RBC Ratio 33.54% 14.15% 32.13% 13.89%
Loan to Deposit Ratio 117.37% 98.99% 166.87% 95.96%
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 1.14% 0.38% 0.87% 0.35%
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ 
ins.
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o 
ins.
Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Non-
affi. w/o ins.
RBC Ratio 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.02
Loan to Deposit Ratio 0.23 0.39 0.21 0.10
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.04
Figure 14.2.a
Banks OperationPerformance: Risk-Based Capital (RBC) Ratio,  Loan to Deposit (LTD) Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
Mean (%)
Median (%)
t - Test   (P-value)
Panel A: Commercial Banks Performance:    RBC Ratio,  Net Loan to Deposit Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by 
insurers.  Since  the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-
affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance 
companies.  Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products 
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
This table provides bank's Risk-Based Capital (RBC) Ratio, Loan to Deposit (LTD) Ratio, and Loan Charge-offs Ratio.  (1) RBC ratio is calculated as 
the ratio of total risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets.  (2) LTD ratio is used as a measure of bank's liquidity and is calculated as a bank's gross 
loans divided by total deposits, indicating the percentage of a bank's loans funded through deposits.  (3) Charge-offs are loans written off as 
uncollectable by the banks and are measured on a net basis, loans charged off as losses minus recoveries on loans preciously charged off, The loan 
charge-offs ratio is calculated as net loan charge-offs divided by the total loans.
Performance - RBC Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 






















Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
RBC Ratio 16.96% 47.43% 55.97% 23.65%
Loan to Deposit Ratio 98.70% 89.76% 81.38% 113.13%
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 0.39% 0.55% 0.27% 1.12%
Non-Affiliated Affiliated Assurbanking Bancassurance
RBC Ratio 14.31% 15.23% 15.65% 14.17%
Loan to Deposit Ratio 98.06% 72.59% 49.87% 103.58%
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 0.06% 0.12% 0.10% 0.35%
Non-affi.~ Affi. Non-affi. ~ Assurb. Non-affi. ~ Bancass. Assurb.~Bancass.
RBC Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.02
Loan to Deposit Ratio 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.24
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 0.26 0.28 0.12 0.08
Figure 14.2.b
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.  
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.  
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control 
insurers.  Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
t - Test   (P-value)
Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks Performance:    RBC Ratio,  Net Loan to Deposit Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
Mean (%)
Median (%)
Performance - RBC Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio 























Table 15: Property-Liability Insurance Products and Lines of Business Definitions
Products Lines of Business
Personal Property Private Passenger Automobile Physical Damage
Farmowners Multiple Peril
Homeowners Multiple Peril











Group Accident and Health
Credit Accident and Health
Other Accident and Health









Other Liability (occurrence, claims made)








Table 16 Data Sample Statistics
2003 2004 2005 Total
Joint Firms 88 85 87 260
  - Bank & LH 38 37 36 111
  - Bank & PC 14 15 15 44
  - Bank & LH, PC 36 33 26 95
Insurance Specialists 204 208 209 621
  - Life Insurers 110 104 102 316
  - PC Insurers 144 149 151 444
Banking Specialists 461 470 509 1,440
  - Commercial Banks 389 402 439 1,230
  - Thrift Saving Banks 132 132 146 410
This table lists the number of firms contained in the data sample by sectors and product lines. The firms under 
common ownership are aggregated to the group level. Joint firms are those producing both banking and insurance 
products. Life, PC, CB and SB subsidiaries are joint producers' business divisions by product lines. Insurance and 
banking specialists are firms producing only insurance or banking products, respectively.  The data sample accounts 
for 98 percent life insurance industry assets, 94 percent property-liability insurance assets, 88 percent commercial 
banks assets, and 81 percent thrift saving banks assets. 
Note: LH is the abbreviation for life insurance. PC is the abbreviation for property-liability insurance. "Bank & LH" 
refers to the affiliation between banks and life insurance companies, "Bank & PC" refers to the affiliation between 
banks and property-liability insurance companies, and "Bank & LH, PC" refers to the affiliation between banks, life 




Table 17. Outputs and Inputs Measures
Panel A: Property-Liability Insurers
Quantity
Present Value of Losses Incurred (PV (L )) Price = ( Premium Earned - Present Value of Losses Incurred ) / Present Value
 (1) Personal short-tail lines          of Losses Incurred 
 (2) Personal long-tail lines
 (3) Commercial short-tail lines
 (4) Commercial long-tail lines
Average Invested Assets Expected Rate of Return (ROR) on the Insurer's Assets
  Insurer holding of stocks and other invested assets -- Expected ROR on Invested Assets is the weighted average of the expected return on 
stocks and on other invested assets
-- Expected ROR on stocks is cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French CAPM 
with industry beta (SIC 6311) from Ibbotson Associates.
-- Expected ROR on other invested assets is the ratio of acutal investment income 
(minus dividends on stock) to insurer holding of other invested assets.
Quantity
Adminstrative Labor
  Total Administration and Manager Labor Expenses/Input Price 
Agent Labor
  Total Acquisition Expenses/Input Price 
Materials & Physical Capital
  Dollar Value of Net Premises and Fixed Assets 
Materials & Business Services 
  All Non Labor Expense / Input Price
Financial Equity Capital 
  Equity Capital (Surplus) 
Debt Capital 
  Loss Reserves and Unearned Premium Reserves 
Panel B: Life-Health Insurers
Quantity
Incurred Benefits plus Additions to Reserves (L  + W ) Price = [Premium Earned + Investment Income - (Incurred Benefits + Additions to 
 (1) Personal life insurance         Reserves)] / (Incurred Benefits + Additions to Reserves)
 (2) Personal annuities
 (3) Group life insurance
 (4) Group annuities
 (5) Accident & Health
Quantity
Adminstrative Labor
  Total Administration and Manager Labor Expenses/Input Price 
Agent Labor
  Total Acquisition Expenses/Input Price 
Materials & Physical Capital
  Dollar Value of Net Premises and Fixed Assets 
Financial Equity Capital 
  Equity Capital (Surplus) 
Debt Capital 










Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6331
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6411
The occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
Cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French CAPM using industry beta (SIC 
6331) from Ibbotson Associates.
Price = Investment Income Attributed to Policy Holders / Input Quantity
Price = Investment Income Attributed to Policy Holders / Input Quantity
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6311
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6411
The occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
Cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French CAPM using industry beta (SIC 






  Residential real estate loans, Loans to individuals.
Business Loans
  Commercial real estate loans, Commercial & Industrial loans,  Farm loans, 
Other loans.
Other Assets
  Securities and Investments held, and Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) activities
Quantity
Deposits
  Demand Deposits, Saving and Small Time Deposits, and Other deposits        ( 
domestic only)
Labor
  Number of Employees Reported 
Physical Capital
  Dollar Value of Net Premises and Fixed Assets 
Purchased Funds
  Federal Funds Purchased, Foreign Deposits, and Other Liabilities for Borrowed 
Money
Sum of the total interests and earnings on securities and investment and the total non-
interest income divided by the total dollar value of “other assets”.




Total interest income earned on these loans divided by the quantity of these loans
Price
The interest paid on these funds divided by the dollar value of purchased funds
The occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
The salary, wage and welfare per employee




Table 18.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Commercial Banks
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified commercial banks ( N= 111 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 3,821,298 8,868,608 4,035 51,172,912
Revenue 5,020,367 11,661,406 4,949 67,617,667
Profit 1,199,069 2,816,317 -18,449 16,444,755
Output quantity - Consumer loans 33,050,750 73,816,765 0 358,827,325
Output quantity - Business loans 20,434,609 48,476,928 0 268,248,721
Output quantity - Other assets 150,522,991 479,974,730 74,302 3,117,297,782
Input price - Labor 78.5325 45.3557 35.8438 347.2667
Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets 1.6137 5.7786 0.0000 52.2632
Input price - Deposits 0.0169 0.0147 0.0009 0.0969
Input price - Purchased Fund 0.0250 0.0241 0.0000 0.2176
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist commercial banks ( N= 1,238 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 288,041 644,243 20,013 5,518,470
Revenue 368,159 822,725 18,563 7,105,638
Profit 80,118 186,667 -59,209 1,738,170
Output quantity - Consumer loans 1,741,006 4,120,055 0 35,748,992
Output quantity - Business loans 2,261,665 5,119,329 0 46,505,825
Output quantity - Other assets 4,183,472 12,178,919 139,659 129,215,588
Input price - Labor 59.8007 22.7612 20.1755 276.4737
Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets 0.3977 0.6602 0.0000 14.1736
Input price - Deposits 0.0149 0.0056 0.0020 0.0596
Input price - Purchased Fund 0.0290 0.0247 0.0000 0.6769
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all commercial banks ( N= 1,349 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 578,768 2,782,530 4,035 51,172,912
Revenue 750,957 3,654,265 4,949 67,617,667
Profit 172,189 879,677 -59,209 16,444,755
Output quantity - Consumer loans 4,317,271 23,114,961 0 358,827,325
Output quantity - Business loans 3,756,992 15,516,865 0 268,248,721
Output quantity - Other assets 16,224,752 143,365,414 74,302 3,117,297,782
Input price - Labor 61.3420 25.8804 20.1755 347.2667
Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets 0.4977 1.7991 0.0000 52.2632
Input price - Deposits 0.0151 0.0069 0.0009 0.0969
Input price - Purchased Fund 0.0287 0.0246 0.0000 0.6769
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output 





Table 19.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Thrift Saving Banks
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified thrifit saving banks ( N= 68 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 219,562 512,449 5,416 3,177,384
Revenue 251,198 596,823 6,025 3,670,408
Profit 31,636 87,580 -20,548 493,024
Output quantity - Consumer loans 1,529,552 3,048,094 0 12,826,927
Output quantity - Business loans 283,622 1,129,100 0 7,047,061
Output quantity - Other assets 3,337,837 9,804,086 7,400 50,942,408
Input price - Labor 72.6990 28.7693 38.7872 251.0833
Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets 5.1889 12.3835 0.0000 61.9318
Input price - Deposits 0.0212 0.0067 0.0060 0.0361
Input price - Purchased Fund 0.0287 0.0284 0.0000 0.1990
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist thrift saving banks ( N= 202 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 258,653 336,869 32,583 2,526,626
Revenue 328,918 434,286 47,141 3,253,980
Profit 70,265 111,019 -19,880 727,354
Output quantity - Consumer loans 3,405,588 4,586,445 895 27,655,552
Output quantity - Business loans 924,846 1,767,719 0 16,150,809
Output quantity - Other assets 2,734,887 4,311,897 114,652 28,828,965
Input price - Labor 63.2470 24.1848 29.1730 295.5603
Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets 0.5389 0.4275 0.0000 2.9332
Input price - Deposits 0.0185 0.0057 0.0059 0.0422
Input price - Purchased Fund 0.0385 0.0390 0.0000 0.5253
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all thrift saving banks ( N= 270 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 248,808 387,931 5,416 3,177,384
Revenue 309,344 480,404 6,025 3,670,408
Profit 60,536 106,781 -20,548 727,354
Output quantity - Consumer loans 2,933,105 4,324,080 0 27,655,552
Output quantity - Business loans 763,352 1,652,333 0 16,150,809
Output quantity - Other assets 2,886,741 6,156,456 7,400 50,942,408
Input price - Labor 65.6275 25.6923 29.1730 295.5603
Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets 1.7100 6.5131 0.0000 61.9318
Input price - Deposits 0.0191 0.0060 0.0059 0.0422
Input price - Purchased Fund 0.0360 0.0368 0.0000 0.5253
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output 





Table 20.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Life Insurance Companies
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified life insurance companies ( N= 133 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 831,038 1,033,719 535 4,145,507
Revenue 1,125,697 1,400,670 3,545 6,489,245
Profit 294,659 434,943 -38,546 2,343,738
Output quantity - Life Insurance 957,672 1,636,354 8 7,719,653
Output quantity - Annuities 1,435,005 2,609,786 0 12,558,310
Output quantity - Accident & Health Insurance 284,276 535,468 0 2,669,184
Input price - Administration and management labor 1265.34 228.10 807.00 1882.00
Input price - Agent labor 1024.27 98.11 796.52 1457.71
Input price - Materials and physical capital 706.63 145.73 435.05 1019.43
Input price - Equity capital 0.1200 0.0061 0.1132 0.1280
Input price - Debt capital 0.0445 0.0140 0.0102 0.0823
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist life insurance companies ( N= 315 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 237,061 311,482 79 1,833,309
Revenue 311,534 422,973 255 2,373,229
Profit 74,474 139,820 -66,198 1,005,259
Output quantity - Life Insurance 217,125 364,395 0 2,955,663
Output quantity - Annuities 251,982 437,434 0 2,867,009
Output quantity - Accident & Health Insurance 252,897 587,877 0 3,382,254
Input price - Administration and management labor 1241.30 219.13 760.00 1923.00
Input price - Agent labor 999.39 99.63 760.01 1412.22
Input price - Materials and physical capital 714.76 177.99 353.01 1473.32
Input price - Equity capital 0.1200 0.0061 0.1132 0.1280
Input price - Debt capital 0.0466 0.0173 0.0102 0.1192
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all life insurance companies ( N= 448 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 413,398 676,399 79 4,145,507
Revenue 553,239 918,529 255 6,489,245
Profit 139,841 282,382 -66,198 2,343,738
Output quantity - Life Insurance 436,975 999,362 0 7,719,653
Output quantity - Annuities 603,192 1,561,572 0 12,558,310
Output quantity - Accident & Health Insurance 262,213 572,405 0 3,382,254
Input price - Administration and management labor 1248.44 221.85 760.00 1923.00
Input price - Agent labor 1006.78 99.72 760.01 1457.71
Input price - Materials and physical capital 712.35 168.94 353.01 1473.32
Input price - Equity capital 0.1200 0.0061 0.1132 0.1280
Input price - Debt capital 0.0460 0.0164 0.0102 0.1192
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output 





Table 21.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Property-Liability Insurance Companies
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified property-liability insurance companies ( N= 114 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 535,078 1,077,620 52 6,792,995
Revenue 662,600 1,247,356 73 7,258,835
Profit 127,522 218,534 -24,344 1,123,429
Output quantity - Personal property-liability insurance 485,816 1,130,523 0 5,597,831
Output quantity - Commercial property-liability insurance 312,227 690,986 0 3,923,788
Output quantity - Invested assets 3,128,234 5,587,308 2,570 29,081,332
Input price - Administration and management labor 1145.71 130.96 792.00 1408.00
Input price - Agent labor 1007.18 125.09 665.00 1438.53
Input price - Materials and physical capital 679.10 203.02 432.33 1655.83
Input price - Equity capital 0.0811 0.0015 0.0798 0.0832
Input price - Debt capital 0.0287 0.0267 0.0102 0.1889
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist property-liability insurance companies ( N= 443 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 331,560 458,874 323 4,402,666
Revenue 421,052 592,411 233 5,921,569
Profit 89,492 182,961 -385,183 1,518,902
Output quantity - Personal property-liability insurance 167,852 315,397 0 1,961,435
Output quantity - Commercial property-liability insurance 284,816 451,168 0 3,970,428
Output quantity - Invested assets 2,339,506 3,114,810 5,791 26,166,168
Input price - Administration and management labor 1171.83 152.04 664.00 1707.00
Input price - Agent labor 1046.39 130.13 714.00 1444.00
Input price - Materials and physical capital 706.07 158.86 296.82 1154.76
Input price - Equity capital 0.0811 0.0015 0.0798 0.0832
Input price - Debt capital 0.0315 0.0281 0.0102 0.3449
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all property-liability insurance companies ( N= 557 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost 373,214 640,437 52 6,792,995
Revenue 470,490 777,640 73 7,258,835
Profit 97,275 191,188 -385,183 1,518,902
Output quantity - Personal property-liability insurance 232,929 596,087 0 5,597,831
Output quantity - Commercial property-liability insurance 290,426 508,898 0 3,970,428
Output quantity - Invested assets 2,500,934 3,762,829 2,570 29,081,332
Input price - Administration and management labor 1166.48 148.23 664.00 1707.00
Input price - Agent labor 1038.37 129.97 665.00 1444.00
Input price - Materials and physical capital 700.55 168.99 296.82 1655.83
Input price - Equity capital 0.0811 0.0015 0.0798 0.0832
Input price - Debt capital 0.0309 0.0278 0.0102 0.3449
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output 





Table 22. Cost, Revenue, and Profit Scope Economy Estimates
Panel A: Cost Scope Economies
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
All -19.9% ** -11.4% ** -36.0% ***
Joint Firms -0.1% -24.1% *** -70.8% ***
Synthetic Joint Firms -24.4% *** -26.0% *** -78.6% ***
Panel B: Revenue Scope Economies
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
All 29.2% *** 25.6% *** 49.6% ***
Joint Firms 15.7% ** 32.1% *** 74.3% ***
Synthetic Joint Firms 33.7% *** 38.8% *** 78.1% ***
Panel C: Profit Scope Economies
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
All 2.6% * 3.9% * 7.6% ***
Joint Firms -0.4% 2.0% * 16.9% ***
Synthetic Joint Firms 6.3% *** 10.3% *** 25.9% ***
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Notes:   The data sample used to evaluate scope economies contains 260 actual joint firms and 298,185 hypothetic joint firms, which 
is created by merging every insurance specialist with every bank specialist.  Scope economy is present if the scope economy score is 
greater than zero; Scope diseconomy is present if the scope economy score is less than zero; Neither scope economy nor 







Table 23.  Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables (N = 214 )
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CSCORE Cost scope economy score -0.4231 0.4233 -1.0000 0.8984
RSCORE Revenue scope economy score 0.4482 0.3748 -0.7694 1.0000
PSCORE Profit scope economy score 0.1772 0.2430 -0.4029 1.0000
LASSETGTA Log ( Total group assets) 23.1793 2.1399 19.1334 27.7889
P_SHARE Total retail products business share (%) 0.6485 0.2184 0.0079 0.9886
P_SHARE_INS Insurance retail products share (%) 0.5731 0.3408 0.0000 1.0000
P_SHARE_BK Banking retail products share (%) 0.6090 0.2812 0.0000 0.9997
DV_BKASSUR Dummy - Bancassurer 0.3832 0.4873 0.0000 1.0000
DV_ASSURBK Dummy - Assurbank 0.5093 0.5011 0.0000 1.0000
DV_CONG Dummy - Conglomerate 0.1075 0.3104 0.0000 1.0000
BKASSUR_LH Dummy - Bancassurer doing life insurance only 0.1776 0.3830 0.0000 1.0000
BKASSUR_PC Dummy - Bancassurer doing property-liab. insurance only 0.0561 0.2306 0.0000 1.0000
BKASSUR_LHPC Dummy - Bancassurer doing both life & property-liab. insurance 0.1495 0.3574 0.0000 1.0000
ASSURBK_CB Dummy - Assurbank doing commercial banking only 0.0841 0.2782 0.0000 1.0000
ASSURBK_SB Dummy - Assurbank doing thrift saving only 0.4112 0.4932 0.0000 1.0000
ASSURBK_CBSB Dummy - Assurbank doing both commercial banking & thrift saving 0.0140 0.1178 0.0000 1.0000
CONG_LH Dummy - Conglomerate doing life insurance only 0.0140 0.1178 0.0000 1.0000
CONG_PC Dummy - Conglomerate doing property-liab. insurance only 0.0327 0.1783 0.0000 1.0000
CONG_LHPC Dummy - Conglomerate doing both life & property-liab. insurance 0.0607 0.2394 0.0000 1.0000
PRODHHI Insurance product mix HHI 0.5424 0.2469 0.1650 1.0000
PRODHHI_B Banking product mix HHI 0.4097 0.2590 0.0000 1.0000
DPWHHI Insurance geographic business HHI 0.2889 0.3518 0.0000 1.0000
LOFFDOM Log ( number of bank branches and offices ) 2.0552 2.4232 0.0000 8.6923
DV_MKT_H Insurance horizontal distribution dummy 0.4907 0.5011 0.0000 1.0000
DV_MKT_V Insurance vertical distribution dummy 0.1869 0.3908 0.0000 1.0000
C_TO_A Capital to assets ratio 0.1610 0.1132 0.0311 0.5314
XEFF_C_LH Cost X-efficiency - Life insurance 0.0846 0.2196 0.0007 1.0000
XEFF_C_PC Cost X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance 0.1364 0.2546 0.0034 1.0000
XEFF_C_BK Cost X-efficiency - Banking 0.1549 0.2882 0.0020 1.0000
XEFF_R_LH Revenue X-efficiency - Life insurance 0.0882 0.2198 0.0017 1.0000
XEFF_R_PC Revenue X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance 0.1210 0.2484 0.0044 1.0000
XEFF_R_BK Revenue X-efficiency - Banking 0.1358 0.2781 0.0013 1.0000
XEFF_P_LH Profit X-efficiency - Life insurance 0.7392 0.1123 0.4943 1.0000
XEFF_P_PC Profit X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance 0.9419 0.0209 0.9068 1.0000
XEFF_P_BK Profit X-efficiency - Banking 0.4157 0.1985 0.1676 1.0000
This table provides summary statistics of regression variables for financial groups joint producing banking and insurance products. Observations with 
extreme scope economy scores, e.g., scope economy scores >1 or <-1, are excluded from the sample. The final sample used in the regression contains 214 
actual joint producers
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